

AN UNDERSTANDING OF FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S THEORY OF 'END OF HISTORY'

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Abstract

There has been a trend in 19th century philosophy that human history has a direction and meaning. It believes that the evolutionary process of history will ultimately lead human society to an 'end'; that will be a fully developed society. But this trend was almost abandoned in 20th century philosophical discourses. 20th century philosophy concludes that human history as a meaningful process does not exist at all. Fukuyama wants to revive the tradition that regards history a meaningful process. For Fukuyama, it makes sense to believe that history is directional and has an 'end'. Through an analysis of the political and economic evolution of the contemporary world, he develops his theory of 'end of history'. Fukuyama asserts that in the contemporary world, most of the national states, through an economic and political evolutionary process of history, have reached the structures of a capitalist free market and liberal constitution. The structures of the free economy and of liberalism are now in their complete forms. The historical process has made them complete. This leads Fukuyama to assert that the ideals of liberal democracy have survived and endorsed itself as a goal of history. For Fukuyama there is no other goal in the contemporary world. This paper analyzes Fukuyama theory of 'end of history'.

Keywords: *Economic evolution, Capitalism, Political evolution, Desire for recognition, Liberal democracy, End of history*

1. Introduction

There have been three ideas about history. First is the idea that

history is cyclic process. According to this idea, history repeats itself. Second is the idea of Judaic-Christian tradition that regards history as a linear process that is directed toward an 'end'; that is the 'Day of Judgment'. The idea of cyclic history is problematic for the reason that it makes history insignificant. Such a conception of history has no idea of growth in the real sense. If history repeats itself, there will not be a change in the future. Consequently, it will not be important for us. In the case of linear history, history is important as there is a concept of growth or change. But here it may also be argued that due to emphasis upon eschatology, the Judaic-Christian tradition will no longer be interested in contingent historical growth, their 'end' is spiritual.¹ The third is chaotic which means history is not capable of generalization

Philosophers have another approach to linear history that comprises the idea of growth and change, but its 'end' is not eschatological. This approach is found mainly in the writings of Hegel and Marx. Fukuyama was also interested in this approach. It leads Fukuyama to develop his idea of 'end of history'. He explains that for Hegel and Marx, there is a process of evolution in human society which is not open ended. They believe that the evolutionary process of history will ultimately lead human society to an 'end'; that is, a fully developed society. In a fully developed society, there will be no more contradictory ideas and hence, no further development and change. This society will satisfy most fundamental human desires. That would be the 'end of history' for Hegel and Marx. For Hegel this 'end' is a liberal state and for Marx this 'end' is a communist society.²

Although there has been criticism raised against Hegel and Marx's idea of 'end of history', Fukuyama believes that the idea of 'end of history' makes sense for us. He argues that the history of humankind is coherent and directional. Human society from simple tribal society, through various forms of experiments, has reached the modern liberal and capitalist society. Through an analysis of the political and economic development of the contemporary world, he develops his theory of 'end of history'. Fukuyama asserts that in the contemporary world, most of the national states, through an economic and political evolutionary process of history, have reached the structures of a capitalist free market and liberal constitution. In other words, the contemporary world is the 'end point' of human ideological revolution for Fukuyama.³ He is of the view that the structures of the free economy and of liberalism are now in their complete forms. The historical process has made these structures complete. Ideals of liberal democracy have survived the world wars and other political conflicts. This led Fukuyama to assert that liberalism has

endorsed itself as a goal. For Fukuyama, the contemporary world is ‘post-historical world’ in the sense that the moment of historical change has reached its final goal and there is no other goal in the contemporary world.⁴ For Fukuyama historical change is a meaningful process.

Fukuyama wants to revive the great philosophers’ tradition that regards history a meaningful process. He observes that 19th century philosophy sets a trend that human history has a direction and meaning. But the 20th century this trend is almost abandoned because of a long debate of epistemological problem of the knowledge of ‘past’.⁵ 20th century philosophy concludes that human history as a meaningful process does not exist at all. Fukuyama follows Immanuel Kant, Friedreich Hegel and Karl Marx, who believe that we are moving toward more and more stable political and social order that can be explored through an analysis of the world history of man. Fukuyama argues that such philosophers relate the meaning of history to the evolution of the idea of freedom.⁶ To deal with the question of the direction and meaning of history, he focuses on economic evolutionary and political evolutionary processes. For an understanding of economic evolutionary process of history Fukuyama relates the rise of modern science to economic evolution. However, in order to explain the political evolutionary process, he explores the history of ‘human desire for recognition’. He believes that both the economic and political processes of history have reached an end.

To highlight Fukuyama’s idea of ‘end of history’ I have divided this paper into three main sections. In the first section, I discuss how he analyses the economic evolutionary process of history. Here, I analyse how Fukuyama relates the rise of capitalism to the mechanism of modern natural sciences. Here, I also examine his argument that political evolutionary process of history cannot be explained by merely economic reasons. In the second section, I discuss the mechanism of political evolutionary process of history. Here I show how Fukuyama explains the political evolutionary process through dynamic of ‘thymos’; the human ‘desire for recognition’. Here I explore how ‘thymos’ is transformed in ‘megalothymia’ and ‘isothymia’ and how liberal democracy arises because of the decline of ‘megalothymia’ and the rise of ‘isothymia’. Finally in the third section I focus on Fukuyama’s analysis of challenges to contemporary liberal democracy and the idea of ‘end of history’. Here I explain how he concludes that human political history has reached its end.

2. Fukuyama’s Analysis of the Economic Evolutionary Process of History

To explain the economic evolution, Fukuyama focuses on the growth of natural science. He argues that the rise of modern natural science is parallel to the expansion of our material needs. He explicates that science is a system of knowledge through which human beings satisfy all material needs that it can secure them.⁷ According to Fukuyama, modern science creates more effective techniques and methods for the fulfilment of human needs. It provides the mechanism of multi-dynamic evolution of society. Military and economic developments are clear cut examples of such evolution. What Fukuyama makes clear is that the technological and industrial revolution of modern natural sciences has transformed traditional societies into consumer societies.⁸ As a whole the contemporary societies have experienced consumerism in technology. They can never go back to tradition. The mechanism of scientific knowledge provides such a direction of human history that is irreversible.

Elucidating Fukuyama's viewpoint, M.C. Lemon explicates that for Fukuyama the rise of modern capitalism is directly connected to the mechanism of scientific knowledge. The mechanism of scientific knowledge provides the ground for economic evolution and it culminates in modern capitalism. Modern capitalism provides the structure of industrialization and free market that fulfils human desire to produce and consume different kinds of utilities or physical needs.⁹ Fukuyama explains the rise of modern capitalism as an 'economic evolutionary process of history'.

As far as the 'political evolutionary process of history' is concerned, Fukuyama asserts that it culminates in liberal democracy. He accepts that there is a relationship between economic development and liberal democracy, but he asserts that there is no necessary connection between economic evolutionary process and political evolutionary process. He thoroughly criticizes the idea that a capitalist economy necessarily produces a liberal democracy.¹⁰

Fukuyama identifies three lines of arguments which are usually put forward in defence of the simultaneous emergence of capitalism and liberal democracy. He critically examines these arguments. The first argument is put forward that as industrialization and free market dynamics create conflicting interests and only democracy is capable of mediating such interest, therefore capitalist economic growth and democracy are necessarily related to each other.¹¹ Fukuyama rejects this viewpoint. He argues that capitalist economic growth can be without a

democratic setup. It is not necessary that only liberal democratic setup can produce favourable conditions for capitalist economic growth. We can see that in the contemporary world, modern dictatorships more effectively produce such favourable conditions for capitalist economy than liberal democracies.¹²

The second argument is put forward in the context of democratic revolution in some of the economically grown authoritarian states. It is said that as dictatorship can no longer be sustained due to a power struggle between competitors, so democracy eventually emerges as an instrument against dictatorship. Consequently, the emergence of a democratic society will be inevitable with the rise of a technological developed or capitalist society.¹³ Fukuyama responds that if democratic values are merely instrument for gaining power against dictatorships, then it will hardly be stable when power is gained. For Fukuyama, we cannot understand the emergence of democracy simply by examples of specific countries. This requires an understanding of political evolutionary process of history.¹⁴

The third argument is to the link between economic development and democracy. It is argued that the modern economy is associated with industrialization and scientific knowledge. They can only proceed in more and more political liberalization; therefore, modern economy and liberal democracy are necessary related to each other. Moreover, the successful industrializing cannot be possible without the participation of labour. Consequently, industrial and capitalist societies eventually produce an educated middle class that demands political participation and equality of rights. Therefore, liberal democracy is necessarily allied to modern industrial and capitalist societies.¹⁵ Fukuyama accepts that democracy works properly in educated or literate societies, but he does not agree that education necessarily leads to democratic norms. In other words, it is not necessary that educated class will prefer democracy. We can observe that in some of the advanced industrialized countries, democracy is not preferred. For Fukuyama, preference of democracy is not the result of the process of industrialization or economic evolution.¹⁶

What Fukuyama concludes from forgoing arguments is that the emergence of democracy cannot be explained solely in economic terms. The process of economic evolution does not explain democracy. Fukuyama categorically stated that democracy is never chosen for economic reasons.¹⁷ He clarifies that the understanding of universal human history is not possible by merely Marx's economic theory because it does not explain the political evolutionary process of history.

Fukuyama incorporates Hegel's idea of 'struggle for recognition' in his explanation of universal human history.¹⁸

In short, as Lemon explains, that for Fukuyama the process of universal history is by virtue of two drives. One is an economical drive or 'desire for the fulfilment of material needs'. It explains the economic evolutionary process. Other is political drive or 'struggle for recognition'. It explains the political evolutionary process. Hegelian idea of 'struggle for recognition' is central to Fukuyama's thesis of 'end of history'.¹⁹

3. 'Desire for Recognition' as a Mechanism of the Political Evolutionary Process of History

In interpreting Hegel's idea of 'struggle for recognition', Fukuyama maintains that there is a permanent 'desire for recognition' as a trans-historical feature of human nature.²⁰ In summarizing Fukuyama's point, Lemon explains that the 'desire for recognition' is a non-material drive that constitutes socio-political dimension of human history. 'Desire for recognition' provides the ground for the explanation of the political evolutionary process of history. What we can conceive from analysis of political history is that man has 'sense of worth' that enables different human groups or classes to strive for their recognition. Following Hegelian dialectics, Fukuyama asserts that the history of class struggle is the movement toward rational recognition of self-worth. The culmination of this movement is the liberal democratic order that ensures the mutual recognition of different classes. For Fukuyama, social order based on mutual recognition is the goal of history. The accomplishment of this goal is the end of history.²¹

What Fukuyama makes clear is that western philosophy wrongly links the history of liberal-political movements to social contract theories. He argues that social contract theories emphasize upon self-preservation and material interest. Such theories do not properly explain human acts of generosity and sacrifices for community, which have been a central feature of liberal-political movements. Fukuyama believes that liberal political history can be understood adequately if we focus on the human nature of 'desire for recognition' rather than the desire for material needs.²² For Fukuyama, 'desire for recognition' is a part of the human soul or personality that can explicate the moral dimension of political history.²³ To explain this point, he relates Hegel's 'desire for recognition' to Plato's *thymos* or 'spiritedness'.²⁴

We know that for Plato human soul has three inner tendencies, each having different functions. They are reason, spirit and appetite. 'Thymos' is related to spirit. It is an emotional part of the soul, by virtue of which an individual expresses his anger against any threat.²⁵ Fukuyama links 'thymos' to his idea of 'desire for recognition'. He explicates that because of 'thymos' human beings estimate their own worth and want to be recognized and respected by the other. They are also capable of assigning worth to their group members and showing a feeling on behalf of others. Fukuyama identifies the role of 'thymos' in political history. He agrees with Hegel that there has been a struggle between different classes for their recognition.²⁶ Fukuyama also notices the role of 'thymos' in the evolution of democracy in many communist regimes. He argues that the crisis of communism was not merely the result of economic reasons but also the result of dissatisfaction of 'thymos' or 'self-esteem' that was not being satisfied because of restrictions of freedom in communist regimes. Fukuyama believes that the revolutionary phenomenon associated with the crisis of communism and the evolution of democracy can only be understood if we understand human 'desire for recognition'.²⁷

What Fukuyama explains is that human history is not merely economically determined. The role of non-material or non-economic human desire is primarily important for understanding the course of human history. In other words, human actions and his objectives are not merely explicable by capitalists or economic discourse based on material-economic needs. Consideration of non-material human desires is also important for understanding of human actions and his objectives. Fukuyama cites an example that the sole objective of 'historical labour wage movements' was not to gain merely material wealth but was also to establish 'self-esteem'. Therefore, he maintains that for a proper understanding of human revolution in history material reasons are not sufficient. We should also focus on 'human desire for recognition'. Poverty or in-availability of material needs is not the cause of revolution. The cause of revolution is the feelings of the poor that only the rich are recognized and the poor are treated as slaves.²⁸

For Fukuyama, 'thymos' as the inner sense of 'self-worth' is a source of recognizing worth of others. It leads us to a collective sense that 'men are equal' and equally respectable. It is a source of the moral virtues of courage, generosity and public spiritedness. But as all individuals evaluate their self-worth and others-worth, therefore there is always the possibility that one regards oneself as superior to others. Therefore, there is a dark side of 'thymos' that can become a source of the evil character

of man. This is 'megalothymia'. It is a desire to be recognized as superior to others. It is the root cause of the authoritarian attitude of a tyrant who wants to impose his values and views on others by using power.²⁹

Lemon explains this point that 'thymos' as a self-asserting character of the soul, can be converted into 'megalothymia' and can cause an ambition in a group to impose their identity or values to others. 'Megalothymia' is the reason behind human cruelty and aggression. It is the passion of man, by virtue of which he oppresses others for his recognition. For Fukuyama, in human political history, tyrannical ambitions are by virtue of the inner passion of 'megalothymia'.³⁰

What Fukuyama makes clear is that there are two sides of 'thymos'. One is 'isothymia'. It is the inner sense of the soul by virtue of which humans want to be recognized as equal to the other. That is a good side. The other side is 'megalothymia'. It is the passion of the soul by virtue of which humans want to be recognized as superior to the other. Fukuyama emphasizes that the historical process should be understood by these twin aspects of human 'desire for recognition'.³¹ The history of the quest for glory or the quest to become master in the medieval and modern periods can be understood by 'megalothymia'. Similarly, the movement toward equality of rights and justice can be understood by 'isothymia'. Lemon rightly explains Fukuyama's viewpoint that human political history is basically a history of emergence and eventually the decline of 'megalothymia'.³²

3.1. The Decline of 'Megalothymia' and the Rise of 'Isothymia' as the Source of Democracy

What we have observed in political history is that there has been a quest of glory and superiority through power and suppression. But according to Fukuyama, the passion of 'megalothymia' has been obscured in the modern world due to the rise of the consumer culture of capitalism and isothymotic moral movements. Therefore, contemporary political vocabulary like egalitarianism, territorial sovereignty and self-esteem has replaced the old vocabulary of glory and superiority. The dominance of 'isothymia' is playing a role in the democratic transformations worldwide.³³

What Fukuyama wants to explain is that the capitalist modern society provides outlets to satisfy human desire for glory and the desire to be recognized as superior to others. He explicates that 'isothymia' can

only dominate if we manage ‘megalothymia’. ‘Megalothymia’ can only be managed if there are some constructive means to satisfy it. In other words, ‘megalothymia’ as a desire is a psychological need. If it is not satisfied in a constructive manner, it can turn into tyrannical ambition and consequently can smash ‘isothymia’ and democracy. He gives an example from the contemporary liberal capitalist democratic society of the United State that provides outlets to satisfy ‘megalothymia’ in a constructive manner. A capitalist democratic society permits economic and scientific activities. By engaging in these activities, capitalists and scientists compete and strive for superiority over others. Through these means, they satisfy their psychological desire to be recognized as superior to others. Moreover, in modern societies, sport competitions, and athletic adventure provide means to be recognized as superior to others. Therefore, Fukuyama concludes that in modern liberal capitalist society tyrannical ambitions of ‘megalothymia’ have now been banished in the contemporary world. Consequently, ‘isothymia’ is prevailing in the contemporary world. It is the source of one civilized society that can ensure equality of right.³⁴

3.2. ‘Isothymia’ as the Goal of History

Lemon better explains how Fukuyama considers the role of ‘isothymia’. Fukuyama critically examines Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism as it does not accommodate ‘isothymia’ in political life. Such liberalism overemphasizes contract theory and merely pursues rational self-economic interest. Contrary to this, the contemporary trend of liberalism gives importance to ‘isothymia’ and pursues a ‘rational recognition’ of individuals on a universal basis. That is, the idea of a proper universal liberal state in the viewpoint of Fukuyama. This state would be constituted on the basis of a liberal constitution that would treat its subject not as an ethnic group or any other group type. This state will treat subject as human and will equally recognize them. That would be a classless society in true sense and would be based upon the principle of ‘living together’ rather than other traditional principles. That would be a liberal democratic state based upon the idea of equal-recognition or ‘isothymia’.³⁵

Although Fukuyama believes that the ‘liberal democratic ideology’ is prevailing, he recognizes that this ideology has not yet harmonized worldwide. He explains that liberal ideals have not been culturally evolved in some states. Liberal ideals of the state should have compatibility to cultural and moral characteristics of people. Moreover, Fukuyama asserts that for harmonizing liberal ideology on a global level,

democratic states should not implant or promote irrational 'thymotic pride' such as racism, nationalism and religious biases. The state should focus upon the upbringing of rational 'thymotic pride' or a sense of living together by producing constructive means for the satisfaction of 'megalothymia' and promoting 'isothymia'. 'Thymotic phenomenon' is crucial for the stability of liberal democracy for the reason that it can create suitable environment for democratic values.³⁶

'Thymotic phenomenon' is also crucial for true economic success. Fukuyama observes that there are theoretically capitalist economies but are untruly economically successful countries. For Fukuyama, it is because the role of 'thymos' is not recognized for economic life in those countries. Just like the role of thymos in creating suitable environment for democratic values, there is also the role of 'thymos' in creating appropriate economic behaviour in a society without which capitalism cannot give economic benefit to the people in true sense. What Fukuyama wants to explicate here is that without appropriate or rational 'thymotic phenomenon' in a society, democracy would not be possible and without true democracy, capitalism would not be able to attain success in economic aspects. Capitalism can fully be flourished and beneficial in a true democratic culture. Economic motivation cannot provide economic success unless a suitable culture is not evolved.³⁷

Although Fukuyama agrees that there are still problems of democratic stability or irrational pride of 'thymos' in the contemporary world and because of which liberal democracy and capitalism are not fully harmonized on a global level; he is of the view that by and large, 'thymotic phenomenon' has been recognized on a global level. It is the ultimate rationale of human history. This leads to a liberal democracy that flourishes as a capitalist economy. Through the evolutionary process of history, the principles of liberal democracy and the capitalist economy have now been fully grown. There will be no further progress in this principle. That is the 'telos' or end of history. This is the way how he uses the notion of 'end of history'.³⁸

3.3. End of Imperialism as the 'End of History'

As we have seen that for Fukuyama, the manifestation of 'thymos' is central to the process of political history. The decline of 'megalothymia' and rise of 'isothymia' are important for his concept of 'end of history'. He is of the view that in the traditional world 'megalothymia' was satisfied by military glory or competition among

nations to show superiority and fame. It was the root cause of bloody battles which were fought for their desire to be recognized as superior. But due to the emergence of outlets of 'megalothymia' in contemporary modern western world, economic and scientific activities satisfy 'megalothymia'. Such activities have closed the door to the tyrannical ambitions of 'megalothymia'. Consequently, the cause of wars has almost vanished. As history is regarded as a history of battles and the cause of battles has almost disappeared, therefore history has reached an 'end' in Fukuyama's viewpoint.³⁹

Elucidating Fukuyama's theory of 'end of history', Lemon writes that 'end of history' is the end of imperialism on a global level. What implies from the recognition of 'isothymia' on global level is that all individuals and states are equal. Here, the only condition is that all state must be ideologically liberal democracy. Theoretically, all are inclined to accept this ideology, so no imposition of power will be allowed. Power would not be justified on rational level.⁴⁰ Additionally, 'megalothymia' as tyrannical ambitions has been obscured in the modern world, therefore 'war' will no longer be there in the contemporary world.

Fukuyama critically examines the views of some social theorists who believe that human nature has a permanent feeling of insecurity that leads human to war strategies. Such theorists assert that the preparation of war and war strategies are a permanent feature of world politics. Fukuyama rejected this view. He argues that there is no rational ground to prove that human nature has a permanent feeling of insecurity. Fukuyama explains that war strategies and preparations are not because of a permanent feeling of insecurity of men or the state. This is because of anarchistic political order that always wants to be recognized by the imposition of his views through the inner desire of 'megalothymia'. In other words, feeling of insecurity is not because someone is weak. This is because the other is aggressive. A state or an individual cannot have a fear of others unless others have tyrannical ambitions of 'megalothymia'.⁴¹

Although for Fukuyama tyrannical ambitions of 'megalothymia' have been obscured in the contemporary world, he thinks that 'nationalism' can revive them. Lemon interprets Fukuyama that nationalism can be an obstacle for global harmony if it over emphasizes the pride of nation and demands 'isothymia' for citizen of a nation rather than whole humanity. Fukuyama hopes that liberalism and the free-market mechanism can restrict nationalism to the cultural level in a same way that it has restricted religion to the private level in the west and other parts

of the world. Therefore, he believes that the idea of 'isothymia' is prevailing and thus it is rationally the 'telos' or the 'end of history'.⁴² He believes that no essential change will be there in contemporary modern states, which have already achieved the political goal of liberal democracy and the free market mechanism. Through the advancement of science and a rational understanding of 'isothymia' other states are inclined to this path. In this sense, he believes in 'end of history'.

4. Challenges to the Idea of 'Isothermia' and Idea of 'End of history'.

As we have seen that Fukuyama's idea of 'end of history' is connected to the rationale that 'isothymia' as a source of liberal democracy is a fully developed idea that has no contradiction. According to Lemon, Fukuyama is aware that there is a clear challenge to the idea of 'isothymia'. He observes that 'isothymia' as 'desire for equal recognition' cannot fully be actualized in democracy. There may be some inequalities in democracy. He inquires that inequality may exist as a cultural phenomenon if historical process does not completely transform culture into liberal political values. Perhaps some legal laws are non-egalitarian in those states that are in a transitional period.⁴³ Moreover, inequality may also exist as a natural inequality. It is either by inequality of natural ability, which varies from person to person or it is inequality which is originated in capitalism as a division of labour or wealth. Fukuyama explains that capitalism is by nature non-egalitarian and cannot be functional without the division of labour. This inequality is inevitable and non-mitigated. The inequality of wealth ultimately produces the problem of recognition of a poor in a society.⁴⁴ Thus 'isothymia' can become problematic. Fukuyama observes that many kinds of inequality are inevitable. Such social inequality will remain even in a perfect liberal democracy. In other words, in a liberal democratic setup there will always be tension between liberty, equality and equal rights. To rid all inequalities in a liberal democracy is not possible.⁴⁵

We can say that the term 'isothymia' is not used for all kinds of equalities in democracy. It is used for the equality of specific rights such as the rights of participation in the political process. Fukuyama believes that the demand of excess of 'isothymia' can damage the democratic sense of equality. In other words, 'isothymia' is an approximation that is achieved through the political process of history and that provides ground to live together with peace. This peace can be destroyed if politics is

based on the demand of all kinds of equalities. Democracy cannot banish natural inequalities.

Another challenge to the idea of 'isothymia' is re-assertion of 'megalothymia'. Here, Fukuyama examines the influence of Nietzsche's idea of 'will to power' upon contemporary moral and political philosophy. He notices that Nietzsche and his followers are merely interested in a specific manifestation of 'thymos' according to which man wants to be recognized as superior to others. In other words, Nietzsche and his followers are merely interested in 'megalothymia' and do not give room to 'isothymia'.⁴⁶Fukuyama argues that if 'isothymia' is altogether rejected and 'megalothymia' is left unchecked, then pursuance of superiority becomes the goal. Consequently, it will reopen the door to tyrannical ambitions and bloody wars. He realizes that because of the struggle of recognition, there is still a possibility of ethnic and nationalist violence even in post-historical world. But he hopes that such kinds of conflicts can be replaced by economic strategies.⁴⁷

We have seen that for Fukuyama, satisfaction of 'megalothymia' is a human psychological necessity on the one side. On the other hand, 'megalothymia' may turn into a tyrannical manifestation that is the root cause of bloody wars. He believes that 'isothymia' as a source of democracy is a way to encounter such war conflicts. Fukuyama asserted that liberal democracy can provide a balance between 'isothymia' and 'megalothymia'.⁴⁸He is of the view that liberal democracy provides outlets to satisfy 'megalothymia' by promoting economic and scientific activities. It also provides a ground for satisfaction of human desire to be recognized as equal to others by giving equal rights of political participation. This position is what he calls a normative part of his argument about the assertion of 'end of history'. He clarifies that his idea of 'end of history' is not about the empirical condition of the world but about the moral adequacy of liberal democracy. He believes his normative assertion about liberal democracy has empirical evidence that it provides justice and equality in many parts of the contemporary world.⁴⁹In other words, what he argues is that democracy provides ground for rational 'thymos'; a balance between 'isothymia' and 'megalothymia'. It provides a ground to live together without war conflicts. We can say, the rationalization of Fukuyama's theory of 'end of history' is related to the stability and continuation of rational 'thymos'. That is how Fukuyama explains challenges to his theory of 'end of history'.⁵⁰

Conclusion:

What we can conclude from forgoing analysis is that for Fukuyama, history is directional and has reached an 'end'. To explain the coherent and directional history of humankind, he focuses on economic evolutionary and political evolutionary processes of history. Economic evolution is associated with the development of scientific knowledge. The mechanisms of scientific knowledge provide the ground for economic evolution. The fulfilment of human material needs and the technological aspects of modern science get form of modern capitalism. Fukuyama believes that the rise of modern capitalism in the contemporary world is the culmination of economic development and that executes itself free market mechanism. The rise of modern capitalism is by virtue of an 'economic evolutionary process of history'.

As far as the 'political evolutionary process of history' is concerned, Fukuyama asserts that it is linked with human 'struggle for recognition'. Political evolution cannot be explained in material terms. For Fukuyama, political evolutionary process is by virtue of human permanent 'desire for recognition'. 'Thymos' as 'desire for recognition' constitutes socio-political dimension of human history. 'Thymos' manifest itself in two opposite desires; 'isothymia (desire for equal recognition) and 'megalothymia' (desire to be recognized as superior). We can say that because of these opposite desires, there has been a struggle between under privileged who want 'isothymia' and the privileged who want to show their superiority by tyrannical ambitions of 'megalothymia'. Thus, history is human 'struggle for recognition' for Fukuyama.

Fukuyama believes that the political evolutionary process of history culminates in 'liberal democracy' that recognizes 'isothymia' and has the ability to manage the tyrannical ambitions of 'megalothymia'. Liberal democracy provides outlets to satisfy 'megalothymia' by promoting the competitive nature of capitalism and scientific activities. It also provides a ground for satisfaction of human desire to be recognized as equal to others by giving equal rights of political participation. In other words, liberal democracy provides a ground to live together without war conflicts. The main thesis of Fukuyama is that liberal democracy and the free-market mechanism are the goal of human coherent and directional history. There will be no essential change in the social, political and economic structures of those contemporary modern states that have already achieved this goal. In this sense, he believes in 'end of history'.

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- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.405
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