

CITY IN TRANSIT: CROSS-MIGRATION IN LAHORE DURING PARTITION OF INDIA

ADNAN TARIQ

Assistant Professor, Department of History
Government Islamia Graduate College, Civil Lines, Lahore
kaziadnan@msn.com

Abstract

Cross-Migration in its processes as a historical phenomenon is the least studied topic in partition literature. At the time of the partition of India, the exodus of non-Muslims from Lahore was considered a short-term phenomenon, as population transfer was not officially considered. However, that assumption of temporary phenomenon proved wrong sooner than later. We hold that different concerned quarters/parties were seeing this possibility according to their perspective i.e. official perspective, both Lahore based and high political elite. Due to the unanticipated course of events, certain crucial steps were taken haphazardly, not synchronizing with the requirements of the ground situation. This paper attempts to study the reasons behind this transformation in the policies adopted by governments in the changing dynamics of the situation. It is found that amidst the confusion regarding the social definition of displacement of the people, authorities realized that certain specified measures should have been adopted to transfer the people accordingly.

Keywords: Migration, Partition, Violence, Massacre, Punjab.

Introduction

In this study, we are attempting to study the processes of cross-migration, which means the movement of 'evacuees' from Lahore and 'refugees' into Lahore.¹ A major theme of this paper is to re-create the conditions, which emerged due to the transitions in the city of Lahore during the partition. Many such changes were taking place in Lahore which were quite unexpected and which resulted due to the utter mismanagement of affairs during cross-migration. However, it would not be correct to declare the unfolding of the events as completely unexpected

as there had been foretelling in this regard. Especially Lt. General Sir Francis Tucker prepared a paper, in which he envisaged a plan to divide British Indian Armed Forces. He also mentioned another hypothetical assertion about the possibility of the large-scale massacre in Punjab in case of political miscalculations. However, his assessment was not taken seriously.ⁱⁱ This indifferent attitude by concerned quarters meted out towards the recommendations by Tucker led to the unleashing of horrendous violence and migratory flow. The Indian National Congress demanded the partition of the provinces under the pressure of All India Hindu Mahasabha on 9 March 1947.ⁱⁱⁱ This party was, though all Indian in its character, but primarily Punjab-based Hindu merchant class was its main component. Under this pressure, as suggested by Neeti Nair also, Indian National Congress had demanded the partitioning of the provinces. Another important step which was revealed in 1992 by the private secretary of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, H.C Beaumont was that Ferozpure District was included in the Pakistani Punjab in its earlier draft. However, later on, it was demarcated and put into the Indian side of Punjab. This re-demarcation led to the unexpected rise in ongoing violence.^{iv} These were the reasons, which led to the emergence of certain unexpected features, which were not supposed to happen such as the transfer of population. Nevertheless, with that unexpected tide of the circumstances, population transfer had to occur at the last minute of the partition process. In that particular domain, many scholars had come up with their findings such as Wazira Fazila– Yacoobali Zamindar focused on cross-migration as a long-term activity resulting in the lingering issues of citizenship and boundaries.^v In the same way, M. Ilyas Chatha has included cross migration in the study of violence and rehabilitation with its subsequent repercussions.^{vi} Our study would focus on the policies and process of cross migration as an isolated phenomenon. Starting from the theme, that neither political parties nor partition plan had included the transfer of population, this research would end with the analysis of the unexpected turns of the incidents in the wake of the gravity of the situation on large.

Process and Conditions

Why did a huge majority of people stay till the very last days in Lahore and did not leave while there was still time? The answer is partly rooted in three major factors; the first was that many of the non-Muslims, including politicians, were anticipating Lahore to be on their side of partitioned Punjab. As the early trickle of migrants began soon after the March violence, a host of senior leaders appealed to people not to migrate, as this would create more problems. The second factor causing their delay in the city was that the press had been issuing such statements that things would settle down.^{vii} The *Tribune* had published fearsome

advice essentially for non-Muslims: ‘don’t desert Lahore like cowards, remove your womenfolk, children, and valuables, consider your homes like castles, and fight like soldiers to save civilization from jungle raj.’”^{viii}Lala Jagat Narain, Convener, Lahore Rakshak Samiti also appealed to people not to leave their ancestral homes in panic.^{ix} Such statements and appeals became a regular feature in the non-Muslim quarter of Lahore throughout May and June. Non-Muslims of Lahore stuck to their homes after reading the newspaper report of Sardar Baldev Singh’s interview, saying:

“So far as we are concerned, I can assure you that Lahore will never go to Pakistan.” State authorities, politicians, and press, across the board, were not considering the transfer of population. That was why many of the non-Muslims from Lahore were not anticipating their final exit from the city. There were still perceptions that affairs would improve soon and migration in small groups would cause a bigger problem for those who were left behind. The leaders who made such appeals had failed to assess the implications of their public statements correctly. There was more than sufficient indication that things were only bound to deteriorate. The chances of an amicable settlement by the end of March were non-existent. Assurances given and appeals made by political leaders were superficial because they had no plan to implement them on the ground.^x The last reason, which had convinced a large chunk of non-Muslims in Lahore not to flee, was their hopes attached with the deployment of the ‘Punjab Boundary Force.’ Most of those who stayed back in Lahore were hoping that once the P.B.F. troops were deployed they would be safe. However, as time proved, there were simply not enough troops for such deployment.^{xi}

Before August around two and a half lacs non-Muslims had shifted from Lahore. The remaining were in transit camps in Lahore waiting for their final evacuation.^{xii} Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and even Master Tara Singh were not in favor of a whole scale transfer of population.^{xiii} Thus, we see that few non-Muslims remained within the walled city of Lahore.^{xiv} From about 20 August the situation seemingly rapidly improved in Lahore city, mainly because there were practically no Hindus and Sikhs left in Lahore.^{xv} The city of Lahore had suffered more in the exodus of its non-Muslim population rather than having horrendous tales of violence. In the very earlier time--mid of March, the displaced persons were considered as the victims of violence and entitled to temporary relief. As at that time, the partition as a terrestrial activity was not being conceived. It was assumed very strongly that once the situation normalized every wrong would be righted eventually.

Accordingly, the relief missions were the precursor of the large-scale process of migration.

Escorting Cross-Migration

The movement and escorting of thousands of refugees had been the main concern of the troops, formerly of the Boundary Force and later under the Lahore area and the East area respectively. Close liaison between these custodians were arranged to see whether these evacuations were being conducted in an orderly manner or not.^{xvi} Since transport, as well as protection from hostile elements, was entrusted to the army who set up the 'Military Evacuation Organization' (M.E.O.). In the beginning, it had its headquarters at Amritsar, but these were later shifted to Lahore for closer liaison with Pakistan Government.^{xvii} The appointment of a Liaison Officer at Lahore and a Transport Controller at Amritsar, provided with one hundred trucks, was inadequate because there was no machinery to prevent attacks of hostile mobs on the convoys in West Punjab.^{xviii} As subsequent events proved, a hundred trucks were not sufficient to cope with this huge problem of evacuation. It was decided to entrust this work of evacuation to the military. The East Punjab Area Headquarters at Lahore was converted into the 'Advance Military Evacuee Organization' and a separate command known as Military Evacuee Organization was established.^{xix} Military trucks were used for short distances such as Lahore to Amritsar or for transporting passengers from isolated locations to the transitory camps for non-Muslims and then to railway stations for last evacuation journeys. Due to the crucial security situation, special security measures were arranged to envisage four guards on each trains-2 in front and 2 in the back bogies.^{xx} The M.E.O with an additional pool of 1,000 trucks deployed around 1,200 military and civilian trucks at the peak period and in the middle of November around 3, 13,400 non-Muslims and 2, 09,440 Muslims had been transported in this way.^{xxi}

Even then, it was such a huge task to be tackled only with such provisional dispensation. In that situation, the Government of West Punjab announced that those persons, who had buses, motorcars, or wagon Lorries were requested to hand them over to Government for evacuation. They were supposed to provide those Lorries buses at the 'Sultan Ki Serain Adda' for the joint assemblage for the planned operation.^{xxii} The evacuation and transportation of Muslim refugees was a huge task due to the shortage of transportation facilities as Lahore transport companies were monopolized by non-Muslims. All the non-Muslims had arranged all those buses, lorries and other transport vehicles for the speedy evacuation of non-Muslims from the city of Lahore.^{xxiii} Due

to the crucial security situation on the routes, the government had announced a temporary change in the routes for the cross-migrations. Especially in the last week of August Lahore-Amritsar NW, the railway section was seriously affected on such a level that it was decided not to go to India via Lahore but via a more southern route. It should have been only a two-hour journey but a change in the route had converted it into more than 12 hours.^{xxiv} Another supplementary plan was for trains to move via Kasur and Lodhran to avoid possible trouble spots.^{xxv} According to the new plan, various Refugees special trains were to run for that purpose under the escort of the boundary forces. One Refugee special had to run from Narowal to Lahore for the evacuation of the non-Muslims on different routes, and then another Refugee special had to run from Lahore to Amritsar. On 26 August the government had announced that people wishing to travel between Delhi and Lahore should note that railway journeys through the intervening territories were wholly insecure.^{xxvi} An American physician connected with a missionary organization stated that the Hindu and Sikh refugees coming out of West Punjab were in much better condition and much better organized than were the Muslim refugees proceeding from East Punjab to West Punjab. He said that the Hindu and Sikh refugees were taking with them all their effects. On the other hand, the Muslim refugee columns were mainly city-dwellers driven from their homes and they were not able to take care of themselves to the same degree, as the Hindu and Sikh families were able to.^{xxvii}

The major influx of refugees pouring into Lahore had started in August when the Muslims from East Punjab had started to come into Lahore in the form of large caravans. By that time, the majority of the non-Muslims, from Lahore, had left the city and were in camps waiting for their final evacuation to India. However, the Muslim refugees from East Punjab had not completed their evacuation journey towards west Punjab. Their real exodus had to start from East Punjab and M.E.O. had conducted that operation mostly in favor of Muslims due to the above mentioned factual difference in evacuation conditions. Due to that difference, the caravan carrying the Muslim numbered tens of thousands and in some cases crossed the figure of lacs in one single movement. That was the evacuation movement of Muslims for Lahore and West Punjab as well. On 12 September, about 1, 25, 000 refugees poured into Lahore from Ferozepore District, Faridkot State, and Amritsar District.^{xxviii} In the same period, it was reported that 54,000 Muslim refugees were moved from Delhi to Lahore with a daily average of 8,000, between 10th and 16 October. After 16 October, it was intended to run two double-headed trains on daily basis, carrying 14,000 refugees. Both sides administrations

had decided to arrange a special evacuation mission for the Muslim refugees going to Lahore. That joint railway staff was composed mainly of officers of the two Military Evacuation Organizations.^{xxxix} The last mission of that special arrangement was completed on 1 March 1948 in which a special train carried about 2500 Muslim refugees from East Punjab and rural areas of Delhi, living in Humayun's tomb camp, to its final destination--Lahore.^{xxx} General Wajahat Husain has written in his memoirs in detail about evacuating the non-Muslims from Lahore and bringing back Muslim convoys from the hostile areas of west Punjab to the refugee camps in Lahore. Initially, their mission was to take Muslim refugees, comprising five to six thousand from Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, and Jullundur to Lahore via Amritsar and bring back Hindu and Sikh refugees on return. Those missions were carefully planned as the crossing of the Muslim columns with the incoming Sikh-Hindu columns could have caused bloodshed.^{xxxi} However soon they had discovered that those convoy columns going in opposite directions seldom clashed, as both sides had suffered so much that they were not prepared to get involved in further senseless bloodshed.^{xxxii}

Transit Camping and the Evacuating Non-Muslims from Lahore

Evacuation of refugees was the main task in the backdrop of Partition. The military evacuation authorities carried out the non-Muslim movement in the middle phase of cross migration. As many an exodus had already taken place before the operations of the M.E.O,^{xxxiii} the M.E.O did not have a large number of Non-Muslims to be evacuated to East Punjab as compared to the Muslims refugees from East Punjab. However, there were still many refugees in the different camps of evacuees in Lahore. The whole evacuation operation was organized on two levels. First, the principal object was to shift non-Muslims from the walled city and settle them in evacuee camps in Lahore before their final evacuation. Second, evacuating those refugees (non-Muslim) from Lahore. For that purpose, the two governments had exchanged Chief Liaison Officers (CLO) to coordinate the evacuation work with the local authorities.^{xxxiv} The authorities estimated that at least 100,000 persons had evacuated the city by the end of June.^{xxxv} Hardayal Hardy, an advocate of Karachi traveled by the Lahore Mail to Montgomery on 26 August. He recorded his experiences in an article for the *Hindustan Times*, while coming from Karachi he had to stop at Lahore. He managed to reach the house of a friend. However, finding that all his Hindu and Sikh acquaintances had left, he contacted a Muslim friend who was also a senior officer. The officer took him to his own house. Under his protection, Hardy had a chance to travel through Lahore. He visited the evacuee camp in Lahore. The refugee camp at D.A.V. College had over

30,000 people. Interestingly, Hardy said that he also saw prominent businesspersons in the camp.^{xxxvi} Moreover, by the end of that process, it was reported from Lahore on 25 November, out of 300,000 Hindus and Sikhs formerly residents, less than 10,000 remained, in Lahore, were waiting for their final evacuation.^{xxxvii}

There were many evacuee camps in Lahore. One such camp was established in 'Lala Lajpat Rai Hall' in the civil lines area. That camp was established for the non-Muslims from the Krishan Nagar and other immediate areas.^{xxxviii} Another camp was established in the garden situated in front of the Lahore railway station. In that camp, Hindus and Sikh families settled temporarily. They were assembled there after being evacuated from 'Naulakha, Krishan Nagar, Ram Gali, Mozang, Rajgarh, Arya Nagar,' etc. In the nearby Lahore station, 'Naulakha' and 'Both Wala Chowk' also became temporary refugee camps for non-Muslims.^{xxxix} The camp established at 'Gol Bagh' at 'Kachehri Chowk' was the biggest evacuee camp for the non-Muslims. The majority of the non-Muslims in that camp were from the walled city. It was arranged to rescue them from the inner residential quarters of the walled city. Then to relocate them into temporary transit camps, situated outside the walled city. That temporary camp was earlier established in the Gol Bagh at Katcheri Chowk-which was shifted later to the D.A.V. College. Police and later military provided an escort to those evacuee families from the walled city to the D.A.V. College.^{xl} Its hostel was converted into a refugee camp for non-Muslims of Lahore, who were waiting. Military personnel, non-Muslims from Krishan Nagar, Sant Nagar, and other adjoining Hindu areas were staying and waiting for their migration. Nearby houses of Hindus were vacant and were not allotted to any refugee.^{xli}

The second category of refugees for the evacuation was of those non-Muslims, assembled in Lahore from different parts of the West Punjab, for final evacuation. Apart from local evacuees, outsiders were also staying there for their final evacuation. Sardar Gurbachan Singh Bhatti has narrated his last journey to Lahore and East Punjab,

We had moved from Malikwall to Lahore to settle temporarily in 'D.A.V. College Hindu Camp' for final evacuation to West Punjab. The Baluch Military accompanied us to 'D. A. V. College Camp Lahore.' It was ten o'clock at night. The college camp people said we do not have many rations now, just gave us boiled lobia, [a green vegetable] and promised to arrange something in the morning. Therefore, we tried to sleep half-starved. We had to stay at that college camp for seven days...when we reached there; it had at least 1500 refugees

staying in the college. As we went to its gate one day, we met one of our relatives who was in the army. He told us, 'our convoy is coming soon and is going to Khalsa College, Amritsar. You better get on those trucks already loaded with passengers, you should get on them in batches of five to seven people on each truck. Therefore, we did just that. We reached Khalsa College, Amritsar, at eleven at night. We stayed right on the road then, placing our luggage right there. By daybreak, we thought; where should we go? We know that there was an orphanage, so we went there. The people there informed us, 'some of your relatives are looking for you and you should contact them.'^{xlii}

At the beginning of August, the situation especially in the walled city was so volatile that it was almost impossible to reach the Hindu Camp established at Gol Bagh. Many of the evacuee families were either being evacuated with the help of the Dogra and Gurkha regiments or on their own by putting their lives at explicit risk.

Moving through the city towards his assigned bivouac car on the grounds of the Gymkhana Club, Atkins did not see a single human being moving. A sinister, ominous silence punctuated only by the roar of those distant fires enveloped his convoy. Capt. R. E. Atkins of the 2/8 Gurkhas gasped in horrors of the city on transit. Atkins had been besieged by a horde of pathetic, half-hysterical Hindu businessmen ready to offer him anything twenty-five thousand rupees, their daughters, their wives jewelry, if only he would let them flee in his jeep from the hell Lahore had become.^{xliii}

Those remaining pockets from deep inside the walled city were facing deathly hardships. While just coming on the Circular Road, many of them had to face death as anybody could have stabbed them easily. We come across many accounts either from the police reports or from the oral testimonies that how many of them had lost their lives after escaping the brutal phase of killing while trying to come outside of the walled city to escape on the way of 'Evacuee Camp,' in Gol Bagh. On the fifteenth of August, 12 Sikh young men were shot dead when they were trying to come outside from the Shish Mahal Road as they were trying to reach the Hindu camp.^{xliv} Many accounts and police reports were showing the acts committed on those evacuees coming out of the walled city and who were attacked around the Circular Road. One such registered FIR described the incident,

Ram Kishan Head Constable had reported from Guru Arjun Nagar, Lahore that yesterday morning one injured person came to my room. He was bleeding very badly. On my asking, he told me his name was Vali Chand. He told me that he is from Jammu State and of the Brahmin caste. He was employed in North West Railway and had been attacked at circular garden by a Muslim goon whom he could not identify. After that, he fainted. I have sent that person to Mayo Hospital along with a police constable.^{xlv}

Due to the crucial security situation, the evacuation process had small hours of delay, which were not officially announced, but for the protection of the refugees, those precautionary measures were adopted. For instance, many refugees who had assembled in the 'D.A.V Hindu Camp' had told the representative of the evacuee authorities that they wish to go to India as soon as possible but the security situation outside the camps had not made their evacuation so easy. In the mid of September when the situation in the city of Lahore was almost at peace and no disturbance could halt the evacuation, the transfer of the evacuee from the camp was started. The total strength of non-Muslims in 'D.A.V Hindu Camp' was 10,000.^{xlvi} Within two months, almost all the evacuees were sent to India. The first batch of those refugees was sent in a very organized way on 5th September 1947. American Counselor General in Lahore, who was residing in Faletti's Hotel at that time, had sent his official report about the first organized convoy of non-Muslim from that camp to Amritsar,

The residents at Faletti's Hotel woke up this morning to the sound of great bustle and shuffle along the road. For more than two hours, they watched the quaintest cavalcade passing along. That was the first organized evacuee party of Hindu and Sikh refugees on its way to Amritsar. Men, women, and children with their few movable earthly belongings, including cycles, charpoys (beds), and pets, on 60 trucks and hundreds of donkey-carts, bullock-carts, and horse-carriages, formed the caravan. A flying military jeep patrol shepherded the procession, which was accompanied by lorry-loads of troops. These refugees were the first large batch of the 10,000 Hindus and Sikhs crammed in the D. A. V. College Camp.^{xlvii}

In another report in early October, he stated that only 200 evacuees were left in that camp and Lahore also. By the end of that month,

all the non-Muslims had been evacuated from the city to India under military escort. Thus, Lahore was left with almost no non-Muslims.^{xlvi} Almost all the non-Muslim evacuees had left Lahore before the 3rd of November. After that date, there was no further movement of the non-Muslim evacuee from Lahore (not of Lahore residents) to India. Twenty-seven thousand non-Muslims in five special trains arrived in Amritsar on November 1. Eleven thousand four hundred non-Muslims were moved to India in motor transport from Lahore, Bhai Pheru, Nankana Sahib, and Lyallpur on October 29 and 30. The M.E.O., India, also moved the following in motor transport: Non-Muslims from Jhelum and Chakwal to Lahore on Oct. 29 - From Chinot to Lahore on Oct. 29 - 1,200. From Lyallpur to Lahore on October 31. They were brought to Lahore to board them on trains, buses, or different Lorries under the escort of military personnel. That series of evacuee convoys were being sent to India by the start of November. After the 3rd of November 1947, no further movement of non-Muslim columns from Pakistan to India is reported after the arrival of the last foot convoy towards the end of October.^{xlix} Many people charged the West Punjab authorities for stage-managing publicity about the Hindu and Sikh camps on their side. Brij Lal, Refugee Officer, DAV College Refugee Camp, Lahore, refuted a statement by the West Punjab authorities, which said that 200 tins of milk powder had been supplied to this camp. Brij Lal said that not a single tin of milk or any fresh vegetables had been supplied to the D.A.V Hindu Camp in Lahore. It was quite cognizable that both sides' governments were not coming up with the required level of proficiency while treating the evacuees in the camps.

Class conscious Evacuation- Elite and Poor

Cross-migration did not randomly occur in Lahore. Rather it was conducting itself with the unfolding of event and time in respect of different experiences by different strata of the social fabric in Lahore. There was clear class-related movement in, many of its aspects. Those evacuees without financial support had no choice but to leave the city on their own. On the other hand, the rich by the end of June had made quick decisions in matters of selling property and moving to east or west Punjab.^{li} Many of those who had sent their families in the mid of March remained in the city to protect their business with the assumption that the situation would normalize soon. However many of those who had left Lahore in earlier times were poor classes followed by those who were Lower middle-class, daily wage workers. Bali, an important RSS worker during partition days Lahore has recorded their systematic migration in pre-partition times in the following words, Lahore became empty of various sections of peoples in the following order: beggars, mendicants, and lepers were the first to leave Lahore, next went the coolies, laborers,

domestic servants, and the Bhayyas or Purbias who had been earning their honest living at Lahore. The tenants of houses and kothies followed suit but a good proportion of owners of immovable property stayed behind. Women and children were sent away first and when the police terror of arrests and detentions of the minorities was at its height, their parents sent all young men away. Towards the end of July, only old men were left here and there and only pensioners, sick and weak people in their dotage, now inhabited the once thickly populated Krishan Nagar area. The silent resolve of all who left Lahore was to come back as soon as normal conditions prevailed after 15 August.^{lii}

The rich class had a very different experience of the final journey from Lahore. They were not aloof from what was going on in high politics and on the ground as well. Still, they were not going through the same volatile situation, which had been faced by many of their community members in Lahore during the last few months. There was another class, which was thinking that normalization of the situation would restore their mode of living as before. Their misreading of the situation had resulted in their prolonged stay in the city. Thus, many of them were remained in different pockets in the walled city of Lahore or in some well-off localities. In that respect, the non-Muslim residents of the Model Town were not expecting that partition violence would reach their localities because they had been aloof from the violence. They could witness the murderous events from safe distances and go away without ever having to face a mob. Their stories about Partition were either always about their servants, cooks, drivers who would go out to the city and come back dead or with some horrendous stories. There had been no person in Model Town who had taken part in the rioting; even during the worst days, the place remained peaceful.^{liii} Their being so aloof from the violence had lent them the sense that it is indeed possible for them to remain in the city and the situation would normalize soon. Such conception had resulted in quite a different version of the evacuation series; without facing any sort of violence. Som Anand a famous writer was residing in Model Town in those days. He said that he and his father were of the view that they do not need to leave the city in which they had been living since time immemorial. His father had a sound business position in the city and their residence in Model Town had made them untouched by the violent course of the city. In his autobiography, he clearly stated that none of their family had thought about leaving the city up to the last moment making the exodus inevitable. There were many of their brethren from Model Town, who were in the same position of seeing the riots and having wishful expectations. However, all in vain, and every possibility of cosmopolitan living died down in no time. Faletti's Hotel had become the center for the

booking of the air tickets for their final journey from Lahore. An Air Company promising Lahore-Delhi flight out of their routine schedule arranged a special flight mission. Thus, the elite class from Model Town, Lower Mall, and Lahore Cantonment could leave safely from Lahore.^{liv}

It was not an absolute picture of the exit of the rich class. Rather it was a generalized portrayal of one type of evacuation with pertinent features and details. In the same way, another prominent family from Lahore had requested directly to Lord Mountbatten for the safe evacuation of their family members along with the transfer of their property and other assets. The proprietor of the Rama Krishna & Son Booksellers, business premises, situated at the junction of New Anarkali and the Mall Road, opposite Tollington Market, Lahore. Mr. Krishna's family had left for New Delhi with complete safety, but their property assets worth 7 lakhs and 75 thousand rupees remained in Lahore. Mr. Krishna was such an influential person that the French Ambassador in Delhi had requested in-person to Governor-General Lord Mountbatten for the security and transfer of his entire belongings in Lahore. One of Mr. P. Krishna's uncles, Mr. Rama Krishna, residing in London, was a most talented and reputed painter. A rich collection of his works was a part of the valuable belongings to be rescued at the Lahore residence of the Krishna's.^{lv}

The gruesome events accompanying the Partition riots eventually engulfed the elite localities as well. We see that ultimately Model Town also had to go through the same fate the old city was going through. The violence in Model Town was not of that level as were being perpetrated in other localities of walled city and Lahore in general. Even then, a few murder cases occurred. Some accounts show that in Model Town many Pathans were very active in those days in looting, plundering and killing as well.^{lvi} In the last phase of the partition days, many persons from Frontier Province had entered Lahore with the intention of loot and plunder. This was confirmed by various reports.^{lvii} The entry of those people into Lahore occurred at that time when the whole of the old city or proper city was also evacuated, with non-Muslims, and their houses were either looted or captured by the locals and refugees. In that situation, the entry of those persons into the city in the early days of September had diverted their attention towards the Model Town, which was still having many families of non-Muslims who were spared from the actual situation so far.^{lviii} Those persons had caused panic enough to force those non-Muslims to leave. Thus, the coming of those persons could be an immediate factor in the non-Muslim's exodus from the Model Town. Many of the kothis in Model Town were empty owing to the situation; criminal gangs had wandered through the lanes, with the plundering

purpose.^{lix} In that way, if they felt the need to kill a person, they would not hesitate. One incident of murder at the hand of those persons in the Model Town was registered in Thana Ichhra.

Muhammad Ahmad Khan from 81 J Block, Model Town, Lahore registered an FIR that today afternoon some unknown person came to Kothi no 82, next to mine, and inquired from my housekeeper about the owner of the next Kothi no 82. My relatives told them that this Kothi belonged to a Hindu. In the meanwhile, a Sikh came over there and told those unknown persons not to enter that Kothi. Those men killed that Sikh, entered the Kothi, and warned us not to interfere. These men were Pathan. They were 20 in numbers and armed. The killed Sikh was Kirtar Singh.^{lx}

On the other hand, the lower class evacuee had to face a lot of hardship while on their last journey. They were not afforded any kind of courtesy or kindness either by authorities or by the escorting bodies. For them, the last journey was not less than a passage in the river of fire. Those poor persons become miserable to such a level that had no more care for the remaining belongings they were able to collect from their houses. All those belongings were also snatched on the pretext of security concerns on the way.^{lxi} Lahore district magistrate had ordered for the search of non-Muslim evacuees on the pretext that the belongings could cause harm to them during their journeys. According to that order, the refugees were banned from taking their belongings with them.^{lxii} Some of the evacuees had submitted complaints about the removal of all of their belongings by the searching authorities at Shahdara evacuee camp. Those searches in the name of security had caused much panic among different evacuee caravans in Lahore. The order of those searches came from the district magistrate of Lahore, who stated that due to the escort's concern it was important to have detailed search operations of those refugees. Under the cover of these orders all belongings of evacuees passing through Lahore were subjected to rigorous searches. Reports received show removal of personal belongings generally and cash of evacuee apart from the unnecessary harassment.^{lxiii} The mishandling of refugees at the hand of security personnel was a routine activity happening everywhere on their route of evacuation from their hometown to Lahore for their final evacuation.

During this crucial time of evacuation, many groups and individuals took much advantage while offering their services in that matter. Some Kabuli Pathan transporter had availed that opportunity with

maximization of their charges, they had their stand at the Shahdara bus stand and had been involved with offering their transport services to those Muslim refugees who had just come to Lahore and instead of staying at Lahore, considered it a more feasible option to move away from Lahore. Thus, a big number of those refugees had contracted a Kabuli Pathan. They had started to take advantage of the influx of refugees by providing them transportation from Lahore to other cities. Those Kabuli transporters had brought with them big cargo trucks and converted them into public conveyance. They took refugees from Lahore to Gujranwala, Wazirabad, and Rawalpindi.^{lxiv} Locals were not the only ones to exploit that situation. Some of the British officers were also involved in taking advantage in the form of taking far more charges for evacuation journeys. Mr. Marshall, who lived at Sunny View Hotel, Lahore, and was working for an engineering firm there, alleged that some British officers in Lahore were charging Rs. 1000 per head to take refugees from Lahore to Amritsar in military transport while bringing refugees back from Amritsar.^{lxv} Marshall was alluding to a certain Captain White who had since been repatriated to the United Kingdom and who was reputed to have gone into partnership with local motor drivers for taking refugees in both directions between Lahore and Amritsar at exorbitant rates.^{lxvi}

Violence during Evacuation—Enter the Retribution

Violence during cross-migration was more of retributive nature due to certain reasons. Its connection with the trains had another justification for its being retributive. When the attacks on evacuee's trains started, all the non-Muslims had already left Lahore or were leaving. In that condition when the news of Muslim trains massacres started to reach Lahore, the ultimate result was the emergence of revenge with new target spots—'railway stations.' That revenge led all the followed-up violence into the dimension of the evacuee trains, having no more targets in the residential vicinities. As almost all the non-Muslims had left Lahore. In that condition news of Muslim killing coming from east Punjab, Lahore Muslims took revenge from the non-Muslim trains coming from different areas of West Punjab, staying at the different stations at Lahore. In the later days of the exodus, the attackers realized that more was to be gained by attacking the large caravans in railroad trains than by searching out isolated targets in different localities. As a result, the violence had started to shift to those places, which were to be the last safe passage from their hometown. Another supplementary reason was that refugees from east Punjab brought with them stories of attacks and heart-wrenching descriptions to the Muslims of Lahore. That factor generated an immediate pretext for the attack on the refugees' trains in different stations of Lahore.^{lxvii} That was the perspective, which created a

horrendous atmosphere around the last journey. The train as the best transport was the main source of that evacuation. However, that best source converted into the most horrible part of many of the families from Lahore.

Mrs. Anant Kaur was in Lahore before leaving for Amritsar. She had studied at Forman Christian College, Lahore, and lived at 28 Davis Road. In August, their neighbors left the city as soon as possible as they were told there was a threat to their lives. It was quite sudden. One day my father arrived from the office and told us to pack and leave. My brother was also present there he was an inspector of shops and commercial establishments. He had a Muslim friend, Manzoor. One day Manzoor went to my brother in his office and insisted on being with him while coming back to our home. Later he told that some persons were there outside to stab him. At that, we had decided to leave the city forever. High pitched slogans were there, 'Ya-Ali, Ya Ali!' On telling me about her last journey, she told me that when my father returned from the office told the bus to pack and leave as soon as possible. We moved to the station to get a train. The train we boarded had arrived from Gujranwala. My sister was expected to arrive on this train and we waited for her to join us. However, when that train arrived, we saw it was really in a bad shape, people were lying killed in various compartments, and almost the whole train was butchered.lxviii

It is difficult to locate the first proper train attack either on this side of the border or that side. Nevertheless, the construction of our argument is that almost all the train massacres or attacks in Lahore were of action and reaction chain. Without going into which was the starting action, our argument goes on the empiricist thematic approach that every train attack in Lahore was somehow connected with the pro-action or reaction--one of either act. There were a few random attacks on trains in Lahore since 12th August but all of them were insignificant, as outlined above. The first proper and planned attack in Lahore was made on 20 August. A large crowd of about 500 persons had planned an attack on the refugee special on the Mughalpura Railway Station. However, when that crowd had reached the station, that refugee special had left already for Amritsar. In anger and panic, that crowd had attacked the evacuee convoy comprising of many trucks bound for Amritsar. That crowd had made those trucks stop and the evacuees were pulled out of them. That crowd killed 17 persons. An inquiry prepared by *Civil and Military Gazette* had revealed that all those persons involved were refugees from

West Punjab.^{lxi} Nevertheless, it could not be possible for the refugees to plan such kind of act. It could be possible that the majority of city culprits to be involved in that attack would assist refugees from Amritsar. If that attack must have been from those sections, which were active and experienced in conducting such organized acts in Lahore during that period. One of the eyewitnesses from Amritsar had said that the plan to attack that refugee train was made by the culprits comprising refugees from Amritsar in the majority. That vindictive sense went further to the other railway stations in Lahore. On another occasion, a mob held up a train between the Lahore Railway Station and Badami Bagh Railway Station, resulting in three passengers being killed. The raiders also sustained a few casualties.^{lxx} An eyewitness culprit involved in that attack, Ghulam Murtaza Butt had told in detail about that incident.^{lxxi}

We also attacked a train packed with Hindus in Badami Bagh station. Our group had attacked that train. However, there was very tight security by military men. We narrowly escaped in that attack as military men had opened fire on us. We were 12 boys who were successful to enter one of the carriages but as soon as we had entered the train, the Nepali Gurkha military reached there in no time and opened fire on us. That was the very heavy fire. We could not do anything to those Hindus and escaped with their lives while very hardly any -body of us was killed by that heavy fire.

Those attacks on the evacuee's caravan resulted in the sudden halt of the refugee's special from across the border. For instance, one such attack on the convoy of non-Muslim at Shahdarah by a mob killing at least five had resulted in the immediate stoppage of the refugees train to carry Muslims from East Punjab. That time that train was at Amritsar railway station. But that attack had forced the authorities not to send that train to the west due to the expected threat of attack on that train as soon as it would leave the Amritsar railway station. Mian Mumtaz Daultana said,

"As a result of this incident, the special trains which are bringing refugees from east Punjab were returned yesterday from Amritsar without any passengers. I am told that this was done as retaliation against this incident."^{lxxii}

On 9 September, an armed *Jatha* of Sikhs, between the railway station of Bhatinda and Sirhind, attacked another Muslim refugee train in which 121 passengers were killed.^{lxxiii} In retaliation for the massacred rain

reaching Harbanspura, local feelings were inflamed at that tragic incident. It was the most horrendous massacred train that reached Lahore. Many of the local interviews had told the actual number of those killed had crossed five hundred. This caused panic and anger the locals from Harbanspura had attacked the evacuee's train stopped at Harbanspura railway Station. Harbanspura, after Lahore Railway Station, had become the most vulnerable place as it was situated at a place, which was out of the main city of Lahore. It was not inhabited by any residential locality, except some of the villages, which were out of sight from the main railway station or even the track. Although, there were some barracks and quarters for railway employees. Thus, it was an easy area where culprits could execute their plan on the evacuee train. Thus, we see by the end of the next month following partition, there were at least three main and planned attempts on the evacuee trains in Harbanspura. All three attempts were carefully planned and comprised hundreds of attackers. Only one attempt was successful. The first attempt failed due to the reciprocal deal between the two sides to let each side train for its destination safe.

Shyam Lal's train was similarly stopped at a station called Harbanspura near Lahore for two days. As the train was open, the passengers especially women were jeered at by Muslims from the railway overhead bridge. We had collected stones to defend ourselves. Some people went to the driver and asked him to park the train either before or after the station and not at the platform itself. It was becoming dark and everyone was afraid of a possible attack. The driver agreed when he was paid some money at the rate of Rs 5 per family. He pulled the train back away from the crowds. We passed the night with round-the-clock vigils. The next day, we found out that our train had been stopped in exchange for another train at Amritsar, which was full of Muslim refugees from Delhi. The reason was that an earlier train of Muslim refugees had arrived in Pakistan full of dead bodies. Therefore, our train was stopped as a guarantee for the Muslim special train from Delhi. Finally, the two trains were exchanged at the border and we saw people from Delhi for the first time.^{lxxiv}

These reciprocal tactics had been used to avoid many of the possible train massacres. It resulted in the 'give and take' policy by both sides. This resulted in saving tens of thousands life on the cross routes of trains. However, despite this reciprocal deal, many trains were massacred. This compromise deal would not last anymore as we have at least one big massacre in Lahore, which had bypassed that 'give and take policy.' On 21st September 1947, there has been considerable resentment

in Lahore on the arrival of three Muslim Refugee trains, attacked at Beas. Casualties were heavy in one train, which brought in 100 dead and as many wounded. All those three trains were stationed at Harbanaspura Railway Station. People were extremely provoked by the carnages on the trains. At the same time, a train of non-Muslims had reached there loaded with hundreds of non-Muslims from Pind Daden Khan. Getting informed of this, some 3000 to 4000 Muslims from the surrounding localities marched towards the Harbanaspura railway station armed with spears, hatchets, swords, and firearms. That train was already attacked twice with a few casualties and had reached Harbanaspura. The attack at Harbanaspura was not as successful as the mixed escort with the train kept attackers at bay by firing a good deal and killing some 10 or 12 of them. The total casualties of that train both in the Mughalpura and Harbanaspura attacks were 138. 59 persons at Mughalpura station attacked by 100 armed Muslims attackers and 79 at Harbanaspura Railway Station attacked by 400 armed Muslims.^{lxxv} The driver of that train was Muslim, he ran away from the scene and it was with great difficulty to arrange another driver for that train. Within a short period, that train proceeded to Amritsar under the escort of one Gurkha platoon.^{lxxvi} Sir Francis Tucker has written in his memoirs, *While Memory Serves*, that, 'At Harbanaspura we saw the results of the previous night's attack on a refugee train— dead bodies were lying on the railway track. When we passed the place, about 30-40 bodies were lying on the track and they were being removed under military supervision. The smell in the area was dreadful.'^{lxxvii} That attack had ultimately resulted in another part of the chain reaction.^{lxxviii} The next day had seen another organized train attack on the Muslims train bound for Lahore at Amritsar on the 22nd of September. That train was carrying 4,500 Muslim refugees from Alwar. There appear to have been about 1,000 wounded, which leaves over 3,000 killed, and missing. When the train was attacked, the British officer in command of the escort was killed along with 8 Muslim soldiers in the escort, and the remaining 13 Hindus from the same escort surrendered to the attackers. That attack was organized by RSS.^{lxxix}

The situation of the railway tracks was of such grave level that the Indian government had to impose emergency on the railway tracks for the further passages of the Muslim refugee's train to Lahore.^{lxxx} That situation was demanding a mutual discouragement about any further train carnages in Lahore or east Punjab side. Many of the refugees in Lahore along with local goons had the strongest feelings regarding more attacks on the trains. As the numbers of the trains came to Lahore along with bloodshed was far more than the trains they had tried to assault. Many of the Muslim eyewitnesses narrated that the Indian Prime Minister had

ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, to prepare the possibility of setting up a military movement control organization on the Delhi-Lahore line.^{lxxxii} Sardar Patel had played a role to prevent further carnage on the Muslim refugee trains in east Punjab to save the evacuee trains in west Punjab. Once by the end of October, another Muslim refugee train was about to be attacked in the vicinity of Amritsar, Patel realizing the threat to the remaining evacuees in West Punjab, appealed to the Amritsar people not to attack that train. That message was heeded and after that, no train was massacred either in East or West Punjab.^{lxxxiii}

Conclusion

This study has assessed the reasons behind the mismanaged affairs of cross-migration. This study concludes that the policies adopted were according to the unexpected changes in the tide of events. The crowd in Lahore emerged as the leading element behind many detrimental situations. However, local officials had tried to calm the situation, but the local criminals played the real role, and those activists were involved already in all the massacres. We see that at the initial stage Boundary Force had tried its best to control the situation. One of the primary objectives was to control the exodus of the non-Muslims from the city as many of the politicians, newspapers, and high officials were against population transfer. Our study sees the melting of that across-the-board conviction about maintaining the city of Lahore with its erstwhile cosmopolitan character, though compromised. However, the crowd in the locality believed that conviction. It was indeed clear that the city was not going to maintain its earlier look. Nevertheless, a hope was rising that, normalizing the situation would entail somehow a flexible circumstance for the non-Muslims to make their comeback for the backup of their business concerns in Lahore. However, the mob mentality was not letting them make their aimed comeback. Even the lower cadre of the police itself scared many of them. Those non-Muslims who had tried to open their up-held business shops with the help of Muslim or British persons were forced to cancel their missions in the city. On many occasions, we see that the backup mission permitted officially by Commissioner Office was not allowed to operate by the large-scale gathering of the crowd.

Thus, we see that Lahore had emerged with a crowd not allowing any non-Muslims to maintain their direct or indirect presence in the city. That mob absorbed with the sense that as non-Muslims had left the city, thus they had forfeited the right of any type of property in the city. That sense had prevailed among the Trust buildings as well, which found it equally difficult to conduct its activities and operations in the city. The Indian government had sent a special mission under the supervision of

Rajkumari Amrit Kaur to negotiate the status and future dealing so that trust institutes could function appropriately. That mission had somehow achieved its objective by reactivating many of the trusts in the city and exchanging Muslim and non-Muslim institutes on both sides of the west and east Punjab and had many of them transferred mutually. However, the remaining personal property could not be given such type of reasonable dispensations. We see that in late August, Government has tried to show its power to adopt strict measures against the looters and plunderers in the city. The reason behind the strict measures was to lessen the numbers of refugees cross migration and the existence of the possibility of an amicable option regarding the return of non-Muslims. However, the large-scale stream of cross-migration and heightened mob psychology had changed the last hopes of cosmopolitan Lahore diametrically.

References

ⁱ ‘Evacuees’ are non-Muslims leaving Lahore forever and ‘refugees’ means Muslims pouring into the city of Lahore from west Punjab or other parts of India.

ⁱⁱ Sir Francis Taker had presented a detailed report about the future status of the British Indian army in respect of the political circumstances unfolding at that time. He did not mention this scheme in his memoirs, *While Memory Serves*. However, Leonard Mosley has narrated the whole scheme of that paper and its treatment at the hands of the Cabinet Mission and Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief of the British Indian army. This indifferent and questioning opinion by relevant quarters led ultimately to huge mismanaged affairs in many respects including migratory process whose results are still in academic wait to be explored. See his book, Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (New York, Harrcourt, Brace & World Inc.), 136-139.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Changing Homelands* offers a rejection that the idea that essential differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities made political settlement impossible. Far from being an inevitable solution, the idea of partition was a very late, stunning surprise to the majority of Hindus in the Punjab. In tracing the political and social history of the Punjab from the early years of the twentieth century, Nair overturns the entrenched view that Muslims were responsible for the partition of India. Some powerful Punjabi Hindus also preferred partition and contributed to its adoption. Almost no one, however, foresaw the deaths and devastation following the wake of partition of Punjab. .Neeti Nair, *Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India*, (Harvard University Press, 2011)

^{iv} *Dawn*, 28th March 1992, The Radcliffe Awards, as revealed by his Private Secretary H.C. Beaumont was tampered with at the last moment, in particular Ferozpur, earlier allotted to Pakistan was allotted to India despite a Muslim majority.

^vWazira, Fazila Yaqoob-Ali Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (Karachi, OUP, 2006)

^{vi}Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011)

^{vii}The answer to why such a vast majority of people waited up to the very last days to leave their ancestral homes is partly rooted in the belief that perhaps as the ‘big leaders’ were saying, things would settle down. In fact, as the early trickle of migrants began soon after the March violence, a host of senior leaders appealed to people not to migrate, as this would create more problems. Such statements and appeals became a regular feature throughout May and June. Jagat Narain, convener of the Lahore Rakshak Samiti (Defense Committee), while appealing to the people not to run away to safer places said: ‘it is the duty of every citizen to stick to his home and maintain a collective unity and safety of the *Mohalla* (locality) and also to keep public moral high. Among the important and influential people who appealed, through newspapers, to Hindus and Sikhs not to leave their homes and properties in West Punjab were Ajit Singh (29 June 1947, *Vir Bharat*); Sardar Patel and Baldev Singh (4 July 1947, *The Tribune*); Acharya Kripiani (4 July 1947, *Vir Bharat*); Pratap Singh (Kairon) MLA (10 and 14 April 1947, *The Tribune*); Baba Kharak Singh (17 April 1947, *CMG*); Nehru and Patel (through Jang Bahadur Singh officiating editor *The Tribune*, 26 May 1947) and many more. Raghuvendra Tanwar. *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 389.

^{viii}*Tribune* (Lahore) 20 May, 1947. The leaders who made such appeals had failed to assess the implications of their public statements correctly. There was more than sufficient indication that things were only bound to deteriorate. The chances of an amicable settlement by the end of March were nonexistent. Assurances given and appeals made by political leaders were obviously superficial because they had no plan to implement them on the ground. As the massive influx began to build up from both sides, the system, already overburdened, tired and half-hearted simply collapsed. Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 150.

^{ix}On 23 May Jagat Narain, Convener of the Lahore Rakshak Samiti (Defense Committee), while appealing to the people not to run away to safer places said: ‘it is the duty of every citizen to stick to his home and maintain a collective unity and safety of the *Mohalla* (locality) and also to keep public moral high.’ Raghuvendra Tanwar. *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 283.

^x*Ibid.*

^{xi}*Ibid.*, 342.

^{xii}*CMG* (Lahore) 25 August, 1947. Nehru was not in favor of wholesale migration of population.

^{xiii}Pandit Nehru, Sardar Tara Singh, Mahatma Gandhi's statement We have tried not to encourage mass migration, but condition being what they are and what they have been we have to think in tone of a large exchange of population. The Nehru. File No. 8800, Pp. 10493-11444. *Extract From High Commission In India to Secretary Commonwealth, London, 21 August, 1947, F.O.371, N. AKG.*

^{xiv} Ibid.

^{xv} From about 20th August the situation seems rapidly improved in Lahore city, mainly because of the fact that there were practically no Hindus and Sikhs left in Lahore. *Extract from Report for the Secretary of State on the events in Indian and Pakistan for the period 15th to 26th August. DO/33/60, NAKG.*

^{xvi} For this purpose, a close liaison management was established in both wings of the Punjab in close association with civil and military authorities. The liaison section of the East Punjab Government at Lahore has been greatly strengthened by the appointment of a number of assistant liaison officers of the ranks of Major and Captain. Prithipal Singh Kapur, *Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab* (Patiala, Government of Punjab, 2004), 184.

^{xvii} Since transport as well as protection from hostile element was entrusted to the army who set up the Military Evacuation Organization (M.E.O.) in the beginning, it had its headquarters at Amritsar, but these were later shifted to Lahore for closer liaison with Pakistan Government. See M. S. Randhawa, *Out of Ashes: An Account of the Rehabilitation of Refugees from West Pakistan in the Rural Areas of the East Punjab* (Bombay, New Jacks Printing Works, n.d), 27.

^{xviii} CMG (Lahore), 21 September, 1947.

^{xix} The appointment of a Liaison Officer at Lahore and a transport Controller at Amritsar, provided with one hundred trucks, was found to be inadequate because there was no machinery to prevent attacks of hostile mobs on the convoys in the West Punjab. Even otherwise, as subsequent events proved a hundred trucks could not cope with this huge problem of evacuation. It was, therefore, decided to entrust this work of evacuation of refugees to the military. The East Punjab Area Headquarter at Lahore was converted into the Advance Military Evacuee Organization and a separate command known as Military Evacuee Organization was established at Lahore. Prithipal Singh Kapur, *Main Currents of Freedom Struggle in Punjab*, 186.

^{xx} On 24 September, the Prime Minister asked that the Commander-In-Chief, Indian Army, should report on his examination into the possibility of setting up a military movement control organization on the Delhi-Lahore line. These arrangements also envisaged that there should be 4 guards on each train - 2 in front and 2 behind. The general movement program between Delhi and Lahore was to run one double-headed fuel train of 100 wagons each day. *Emergency Committee Meeting at Government House, New Delhi on 25 September, 1947. DO/33/62.NAKG*

^{xxi}Military trucks were used for short distances such as Lahore to Amritsar or for transporting passengers from isolated locations to the transitory camps for non-Muslims and then to railway stations for last evacuation journeys. The MEO (India) with an additional pool of 1,000 trucks deployed around 1,200 military and civilian trucks at the peak period and in the middle of November around 3, 13,400 non-Muslims and 2, 09,440 Muslims had been transported in this way. See her article, Ravinder Kaur, "The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006), 22-26.

^{xxii} They need to provide those Lorries, buses at the Sultan Ki Serain Adda for the joint assemblage for the planned operation. *Inqilab* (Lahore), 17 September, 1947.

^{xxiii} Begum Salma Tassadduq Husain, *Azadi Ka Safar* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Center, University of The Punjab, 1987), 109.

^{xxiv} Stephen Keller, *Uprooting and Social Change: The Role of Refugees in Development* (Delhi; Manohar Book Service. 1975), 58.

^{xxv} Saleem Ullah Khan, *Journey towards Pakistan: Documentation on Refugees of 1947* (Islamabad: National Documentation Center, 1993), 91.

^{xxvi} People wishing to travel between Delhi and Lahore should note that railway journeys through, the intervening territories are wholly insecure. There have been several attacks of a communal nature, a mob held up a train between the Lahore and Badami Bagh railway stations on Sunday afternoon, resulting in three passengers being killed. The raiders also sustained a few casualties. *CMG* (Lahore) 26 August, 1947.

^{xxvii} Z. H. Zaidi (Editor-in-Chief) *Jinnah Papers. Pakistan: Pangs of Birth*, 15 August-30 June 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, National Archives of Pakistan, Vol. V, 1994, 636-640.

^{xxviii} About 1, 25,000 refugees poured into Lahore from Ferozepure District, Faridkot State and Amritsar District. *CMG* (Lahore), 12 September, 1947. It needs re-iteration that Ferozepure was originally awarded to Pakistan, but given to India at the last moment *Dawn*, 28 March 1992

^{xxix} Dr. Matthai reported that 54,000 Muslim refugees, a daily average of 8,000, had been moved from Delhi to Lahore between 10th and 16 October. On and after 16 October, it was intended to run two double-headed trains' daily, carrying 14,000 refugees. A pool of rakes, to which India would contribute 20 and Pakistan 12, would be formed. A joint Military and Railway staff (Milrail), composed mainly of officers of the two Military Evacuation Organizations, would operate this combined. *Emergency Committee Meeting at Government House*, New Delhi on 18 October 1947. DO/33/62. NAKG.

^{xxx} A special train carrying about 2500 Muslim refugee from east Punjab and rural areas of Delhi who were living in Human's tomb camp, left Nizamuddin railway

station for Lahore on Monday. There are no more refugees now in this camp. *Eastern Times* (Lahore) 2 March, 1947.

^{xxx} These arrangements were designed primarily to avoid clashes while the refugees were on the move and to enable both the countries to make protective and administrative arrangements for them. We ensured that Muslim and non-Muslim refugee trains did not stop at the same station simultaneously. My staff maintained close touch with the railway authorities concerned and kept a strict watch over all these moves. General (Rtd) Muhammad Musa H.J. *From Jawan to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier* (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1984), 75.

^{xxxii} We escorted the largest Muslims refugees' column, approximately half a million moving along the GT road from Ludhiana-Jullundar to Lahore. Approximately 50 miles long column. Major General Syed Wajahat Husain, *1947: Before-During-After: Memories of a Soldier* (Lahore, Ferozsons, 2010), 74.

^{xxxiii} In June large groups of non-Muslims fled the city, and most of the large non-Muslim businesses moved their offices out of Lahore. Richards D. Lambert, *Hindu-Muslim Riots* (Karachi: OUP, 2012), 97.

^{xxxiv} Evacuation of refugees was the main task in the backdrop of partition. The whole evacuation operation was organized on three levels. First, establishing transit camps for refugees to be evacuated. Second, transporting those refugees (non-Muslim) from Lahore and third settling them in refugee camps in Lahore before final resettlement. Ravinder Kaur, "The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006):2226.

^{xxxv} *The New York Times* (New York) Jun 23, 1947.

^{xxxvi} Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 359.

^{xxxvii} 25 November 1947. It was reported from Lahore on that date that, out of 300,000 Hindus and Sikhs formerly resident, less than 10,000 remained, the rest having fled across the frontier to India. Saleem Ullah Khan, *Journey towards Pakistan: Documentation on Refugees of 1947* (Islamabad: National Documentation Center, 1993), 318.

^{xxxviii} *CMG* (Lahore) 24 August, 1947.

^{xxxix} Interview with Shaikh Rehmet Ali, Misri Shah, Lahore. In front of Lahore railway station, a garden was transformed into temporary camp for the non-Muslims to be evacuated through the Lahore railway station. In that, camp Hindus and Sikh families were placed. They were assembled there after being evacuated from the inside the walled city of Lahore and other areas along with Naulakha, Krishan Nagar, Ram Gali, Mozang, Rajgarh Arya Nagar et. In the nearby Lahore station, Naulakha and 'Borh Wala Chawk' were also became temporary refugee camps for the non-Muslims. Interview on 22 December 2014.

^{xli}Interview with Abdul Aziz from the Koocha Jogi Tehkhana, Bhatti Gate, Lahore. The Sikh and Hindus families were being brought out from the walled city and assembled in the Katchehri Chowk in the Gol Bagh (now Nasir Bagh). After that, this camp was shifted in the D.A.V College. Police and later military provided escort to those evacuee families from walled city to the D.A.V College. Interview on 6 January 2015.

^{xlii}D.A.V. College hostel was converted into refugee camp for non-Muslims of Lahore, who were waiting for proper arrangement for their safe evacuation from the city. In this hostel, non-Muslims from Krishan Nagar, Sant Nagar and other adjoining Hindu areas were staying and waiting for their migration. Iron-Gate of hostel was locked and guarded by Gurkha Military personal. Nearby house of Hindus were vacant and were not allotted to any refugee. One day when I was roaming towards lower mall to D.A.V. Hostel Gate. I had seen Hindus women washing their clothes and utensils, a Gurkha had told me not to come closer. A Hameed, *Yadein Lahore Ki* (Lahore, Alfaisal Publications, 2003.)103-104.

^{xliii}Jan Talbot, *Epicenter of Violence: Partition Voices and Memories from Amritsar* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006) 75.

^{xliiii}Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre. *Freedom at Midnight; The Epic Drama of India's Struggle for Independence* (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 362. [original 1975]

^{xliiv}The businessperson who stayed on in Lahore in deference to Gandhi's wishes tells of an outing he made from the relative safe, site of the refugee camp. After going to the hospital to search for the body of his brother-in-law he goes on: ...the moment I entered the hospital I found that twelve Sikh young men all shot and dead were displayed on the footpath. These young men were-shot on the morning of the fifteenth on Shish Mahal Road when they were try in g to reach the refugee camp. Stephen Keller, *Uprooting and Social Change: The Role of Refugees in Development* (Delhi; Manohar Book Service, 1975), 52.

^{xliv}FIR. No. 371 Note Book No.1, 14 August 1947. Thana Kotwali, Lahore

^{xlvi}These refugees were the first large batch of the 10,000 Hindus and Sikhs crammed in the D. A. V. College camp. Together 1,300 Lorries were mobilized by the Government of out this major operation of exchanging evacuees from, and West Punjab. Z. H. Zaidi (Editor-in-Chief), *Jinnah Papers. Pakistan: Pangs of Birth*, 15 August-30 June 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, National Archives of Pakistan, Vol. V, 1994, 475.476.

^{xlvii}*Ibid.*

^{xlviii}Non-Muslim refugees in D, A. V. College, Lahore, now number only 200, the remainder having left for Amritsar on Oct. 9 under military escort. *Extracts from letter of Ministry of Information, Government of India, New Delhi*, October 13, 1947.DO/33/60.NAKG.

^{xlix}No further movement of non-Muslim columns from Pakistan to India are reported after the arrival of the last foot convoy towards the end of October.

Twenty seven thousand non-Muslims in five special trains arrived in Amritsar on November 1. Eleven thousand four hundred non-Muslims were moved to India in motor transport from Lahore, Bhai Pheru, Nankana Sahib and Lyallpur on October 29 and 30. The M.E.O., India, also moved the following in motor transport: Non-Muslims from Jhelum and Chakwal to Lahore on Oct. 29 - From Chiniot to Lahore on Oct. 29 - 1,200. From Lyallpur to Lahore on October 31. *Extract from Press Information Bureau, Government Of India. New Delhi, November 3, 1947. DO/33/60.NAKG*

^lMost camps were full to the brim, and refugees took to the pavements. The situation was equally bad on both sides: The shortage of sweepers, the resultant problems of hygiene, the shortage of medicine—there was no difference between East and West Punjab. Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 460.

^{li}The *CMG*, in particular; published numerous detailed reports of how big businessmen were moving out from Lahore. The *HT* in its 'Punjab Newsletter' reported during the week (16- 23 June) that 18 banks and insurance companies besides other commercial establishments had moved out of Lahore to the eastern districts. The report also said that no earnest effort was being made by Muslim League' leaders to persuade people not to shift their businesses. As quoted in Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 226.

^{lii}A. N. Bali, *Now It can be Told* (Jullandhar: The Akashvani Prakashan, 1948),27

^{liii}Ravinder Kaur, "The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006):2226.

^{liv} Mr. Bedi suggested that we should go to Delhi by air, leaving everything in Hafeez Sahib's charge. There seemed to be no other way, and father agreed to it. By the afternoon of that day, we were in Delhi telling my brother the story of our narrow escape.' *Ibid.*

^{lv}12th September 1947 Rear Admiral the Earl Mountbatten. I have the honor to recommend to the gracious attention of Your Excellency the plight of a distinguished Hindu family of Lahore that happens to have been for many years very well known to a member of this Embassy's staff Mr. F. Krishna the present head of the fifty years old and renowned Rama Krishna ac Sons, Booksellers Firm, has been compelled to fly from Lahore along with his family. His entire property, movable and Immovable, has remained in Lahore unprotected. Mr. Prakash Krishna has left Lahore on the 22 nd August 1947, along with all his family, after locking up the Rama Krishna & Sons, He has left behind his whole property consisting of a building Value: Rs 4 lakhs, a stock of books Value: 5s 3 lakhs. Shop furniture and fittings Value: 5s 75.000. Household furniture, clothes, utensils and other necessary items of any decently furnished house in residential quarters. One of Mr. P. Krishna's' uncles, Mr. Room Krishna, presently residing in London, is a most talented and reputed painter. A rich collection of his works is a part of the valuable belongings to be rescued at the Lahore residence of the

Krishna's. (IOR)R/3/1/173, Disturbances In The Punjab, 1947. *Henri Roux, Charge d Affaires de France, New Delhi to Earl Mountbatten*, September 18, 1947.

^{lvi} It is important to mention here that the word Pathan is not used as the identity of the whole of the Pathan community. Rather its usage is primarily about the involvement of certain persons, which could be considered as common under such circumstances. Thus this is just a reference taken from the primary sources in order to substantiate the argument about the involvement of the random segment of lower classes. The political affiliation and tilts of the leading party from the NWFP was also in favour of Congressite politics and they were also against the demand of All India Muslims League. This stance of the leading party from the Pathan region is about high politics and held quite neutral association with common man of even that provincial region. Thus in two above mentioned respects; we can differentiate the mentioning of Pathan as street opportunist.

^{lvii} A reliable army officer from Pakistan army had told me that 250-armed Pathan had just drifted into the Lahore. Sir Francis Tucker, *While Memory Serves* (London: Cassel and Company Ltd, 1959), 479.

^{lviii} Looters still very active. A house in model town broken open. Refugees looting nearby houses in model town. Non-Muslims of model town gone panicky for fearing of looting and attack by neighboring villages. (*Rees Collections*, Mss. Eur F 274/63, O.I.C.O)

^{lix} Someone in the neighborhood had told him that Pathans were still keeping a watch on the area. Ravinder Kaur, "The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration, *Economic and Political Weekly*," Vol. 41, No. 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006):2227.

^{lx} FIR. No. 223, 26 September, 1947, Thana Ichhra, Lahore.

^{lxi} The mediums and modes of corruption and the connivance of antisocial elements with authorities assigned the task of regulating evacuation were numerous. While the ordinary, less fortunate, who moved on foot or in trains packed to maddening levels were harassed and searched at every step, even the well to do with greater resources had more than their share of harassment. Reports said that when people arrived at airports to catch flights they were often searched: and the military and police in connivance with each other seized valuables, very often. Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 376.

^{lxii} The coal, firewood, kerosene oil, yarn cloth hosiery knitted goods all food grains and food stuff ferrous and nonferrous metals utensils galvanized pipes etc That act was condemned and highly protected by the Indian authorities. Even Sardar Swaran Singh had written a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in that matter for that alleged conduct of the authorities. *From Governor Of East Punjab to Mudie*, Camp Jallundar, 23 September, 1947. (Mudie Papers, Mss. Eur F 164/16, O.I.O.C)

^{lxiii} Ibid

^{lxiv}A Hameed, *Yaaden Lahore Ki*, 138.

^{lxv}23rd October, J. T. Hughes, *Incidental Intelligence No 35*. DO/33/66, NAKG.

^{lxvi}C.B Duke Deputy High Commissioner U.K Pakistan to A.C.B. Symone office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India, DO/33/66, NAKG.

^{lxvii}(IOR) R/3/1/172, *From Her Excellency to H.E.*, 28 August 1947.

^{lxviii}Ian Talbot, *Epicenter of Violence: Partition Voices and Memories from Amritsar* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), 22.

^{lxix}17 people were killed and 34 injured in a mob attack on a convoy of Amritsar-bound refugees on Wednesday morning, near the Moghalpura railway station on the Shalimar Link road. The casualties included women and children. Inquiries made by "the *Civil & Military Gazette* from the military and police officials reveal that about 500 men, armed with spears, kattes and lathis,' attacked the convoy. The trucks were stopped and refugees were pulled out of them. Our Staff reporter who visited the place of incident, found pools of blood all over the road and women and children screaming. On the other side of the railway bridge, there is a big concentration of refugees from East Punjab and it is said that the attackers came from among them. A military and the police immediately went to the place and removed the victims to various hospitals, it is learnt that originally the plan was to attack the refugee special train, which left early in the morning, but the mob missed it. *CMG* (Lahore) 20 August, 1947.

^{lxx}*CMG* (Lahore) 25 August, 1947.

^{lxxi} Interview with Ghulam Murtaza Butt, Kashmiri Darwaza, Lahore. 22 December, 2014.

^{lxxii}*CMG* (Lahore) 29, August 1947.

^{lxxiii}*Jinnah Papers. Pakistan: Pangs of Birth*, 15 August-30 September 1947, 681.

^{lxxiv}Ravinder Kaur, "The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006):2227.

^{lxxv}*Summary Of Train Incidents During The Period 19 Sep-23 Sep 1947.*(Mudie Papers, MssEur, F 274/72,O.I.C.O)

^{lxxvi} Accompanied by Deputy Commissioner I went to *Harbanapura* Railway Station where those trains had arrived. On the way through, I saw column of Muslims armed with spears, hatchets, swords and firearms rushing towards the station on foot, on cycles and in *Tongas* Some 3000 to 4000 had already collected there and surrounded a non-Muslim train which had arrived from Pind Dadan Khan. This wretched train was attacked soon after it left Pind Dadan Khan on the 19th and then again, at *Mughalpura* this morning where there were 80 casualties of which 3 were killed and more than 12 seriously injured. The third attack at *Harbanapura* was not as successful as the mixed escort with the train kept attackers at bay by firing a good deal and killing some 10 or 12 of them. The Deputy Commissioner and I, spent nearly two hours at the station trying to

persuade the attackers to go back. The train could not proceed on to Amritsar of the Muslim engine driver had run away and moreover there were apprehensions of attack further down the line. Reinforcements were therefore sent for and arrived in the shape of one Gurkha platoon. (IOR)R/3/1/172. *From Deputy Hicomind, Lahore to Foreign, New Delhi. 21 September, 1947*

^{lxxvii} Sir Francis Tucker, *While Memory Serves* (London, Butler And Tanner Limited, 1950), 486.

^{lxxviii} A Muslim refugee train went safely through Amritsar on its way to Pakistan on the night of the 23rd. This was 24 hours after there had been an attack on another Muslim train, provoked by the arrival of a train from Lahore with dead bodies in it. Curfew had been imposed on the railway track. *Emergency Committee Meeting, 26th September, 1947. DO/33/62, NAKG.*

^{lxxix} Details of the attack on the Muslim evacuee special at Amritsar on September 22 show that the train was carrying 4,500 Muslim refugees from Alwar. There appear to have been about 1,000 wounded, which leaves over 3,000 killed, and missing. When the train was attacked, the British officer in command of the escort, which consisted of 13 Hindu and eight Muslim belonging to the Royal Army, started organizing defense. He was at once killed by a burst of fire from automatic weapons. The Hindus in the escort are reported to have surrendered; all eight Muslim died fighting. The attack which lasted apparently uninterruptedly for two hours, was made by the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh. *Indian New Chronicle* (Bombay) 26 September, 1947.

^{lxxx} *Emergency Committee Meeting, 26th September, 1947. DO/33/62, NAKG.*

^{lxxxi} The Prime Minister asked that the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army should report on his examination into the possibility of setting up a military movement control organization on the Delhi-Lahore line. *Emergency Committee Meeting, 26th September, 1947. DO/33/62, NAKG*

^{lxxxii} Intended to block and attack the Muslim convoys, which were to pass through Amritsar. Patel hurried to Amritsar and urged the Sikhs to raise a volunteer force to protect the Muslim refugees. In another speech to a large congregation of Sikh refugees from West Punjab numbering about 1.5 to 2 lakh, who had "blood in the eyes", Patel made a fervent plea saying, "I have come to you with a specific appeal. Pledge the safety of Muslim refugees crossing the city. Any obstacles or hindrances will only worsen the plight of our refugees who are already performing prodigious feats of endurance....Let there be truce for three months in which both sides can exchange their refugees. This sort of truce is permitted even by the laws of war." The message went \ home. No convoys were attacked after this speech, which marked a turning point in the history of the Punjab. It would be recalled that, prior to partition. Madhav Godbole, *The Holocaust of Indian Partition; An Inquest* (New Delhi: Rupa&Co.2006), 156.