

## **THE AMBELA EXPEDITION 1863: A MILITARY FAILURE BUT A POLITICAL TRIUMPH; AN APPRAISAL**

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### **Abstract**

The British annexation of Punjab took place in 1849, however, they had started sending expeditions against the Pukhtun tribes of the Indian North-West Frontier since 1847. Till 1863, they sent not less than twenty successful expeditions against the different tribes of the Frontier. In 1863, the troops engaged in the famous Ambela expedition. The Ambela expedition was directed against the Hindustani Mujahidin rather than the Pukhtun tribe (s), it, nevertheless, sparked a common rising of the people of Buner, Swat, Dir, and other areas against the British. In addition, the participation of the Akhund of Swat turned the expedition into a holy war. This study finds that the Ambela expedition proved a military disaster, badly exposing the military strategy of the troops. The troops, however, were able to win the day through not military might but through political maneuvering.

**Keywords:** *Ambela expedition, Mujahidin, The troops, Akhund of Swat.*

### **1. Introduction**

The Indian North-West Frontier [henceforward Frontier], throughout its known history, played a very important role in the political history of the Indian subcontinent. This Frontier witnessed the rule of many invaders. Like other invaders, the Mughuls also crossed this Frontier and established a mighty empire in India. Akin to other empires, the Mughul Empire became weakened and subsequently perished. When after the death of Aurangzeb, small principalities emerged in the subcontinent, Punjab also slipped and went into the hands of the Sikhs.

The British, in 1849, annexed Punjab and became masters of the Sikhs' possession including the Frontier. Being the power, the British administered the areas under their control with their mind-set and ways and in case of impediment, compelled the tribes by force of arms through sending expeditions. Between 1850 and 1863, they propelled twenty separate expeditions against the different Pukhtun tribes of the Frontier, employing aggregately 6000 regular troops.<sup>1</sup> Among these expeditions, some were directed against the Hindustani Mujahidin [henceforward Mujahidin]. James Darmesteter wrongly asserted that "from 1850 to 1857 they [British] had to send sixteen expeditions against the rebel camp at Sitana [Sithanah], whence plundering raids were continually directed across the border."<sup>2</sup>

We can find enough literature on the Ambela expedition but most miss the point that this expedition was a military failure. Besides, most of the authors were of the opinion that the expedition ended after the destruction of Malka which is not so. The destruction of Malka was the first part of this expedition while the second part was the punishment of Jadun and other tribes. This paper is an attempt to analyse whether the Ambela expedition was a military failure but a political triumph. Besides, this paper also gives answers to the following questions.

1. Was this expedition directed against the Buner tribes?
2. What role did the Akhund of Swat play in this expedition?
3. How the British political officers succeeded in concluding the expedition?

Being historical research, analytical and descriptive techniques are used in this paper. Throughout this paper, local terms are given in such a manner to conform to the local Pukhtu/Pashto rendering and pronunciation.

## **2. Background Study**

Hindustani Mujahidin<sup>3</sup> were the followers of Sayyid Ahmad (1786–1831) popularly known as Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed, who came to the North-West Frontier (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) from Rayi Baraili for waging *jihad* against the Sikhs. After his death in the battle of Balakot in 1831, his remaining Mujahidin settled in Sithanah and first came into collision with the British in the First Black Mountain expedition 1852-53.<sup>4</sup> During the course of Indian uprising of 1857, the East India

Company also faced some troubles in the Frontier region. In Nowshera, some companies of 55th Native Infantry showed signs of disgruntlement and some of them fled to Mardan fort and from there to the nearby hills. They were followed, more than a hundred were killed, three to four hundred were wounded and about one hundred and fifty were captured.<sup>5</sup>

During these troubles, Mubariz Khan of Chinglay invited the Mujahidin to his village. Due to hostilities of Mujahidin with the British, Sheikh Jana and Naranji were destroyed by Major Vaughan's troops in July 1857. Following a hiatus of a few months, Mujahidin accompanied by the people of Chinglay, Khudu Khel, Sheikh Jana, and Naranji attacked Lieutenant Horne, Assistant Commissioner Yusufzi. In this bout, he escaped with his life but five men of his party were killed.<sup>6</sup> On 22 April 1858, another expedition was sent against the Mujahidin, the troops, as per the practice, destroyed Sithanah<sup>7</sup>, Mangal Thana, Chinglay, and Panjtar.<sup>8</sup> Due to the hostilities of Mujahidin and the Sayyids of Sithanah [henceforward Sayyids] with the British, the authorities, in May 1858, extracted an agreement from both the Jadun and Utmanzi tribes not to allow Mujahidin and Sayyids to reoccupy Sithanah.<sup>9</sup>

After the expedition of 1858, Mujahidin settled in Malka, on a spur of Mahaban Mountain, given to them by Amazi tribe. In April 1861, it was reported that Kabal and Kaya, villages belonging to the sections of Utmanzi and Jadun, permitted Mujahidin who established their colony in Seri, just near Sithanah. From Seri, according to the records, Mujahidin committed several outrages on the border and also carried off Hindu traders from Hazara for ransom. As a result, blockade was imposed on the said tribes.<sup>10</sup> Due to this blockade, Jadun not only destroyed the Seri post but also paid the fine imposed on them. In September 1861, Utmanzi and Salar and Mansur sections of Jadun, "bound themselves, as before, to prevent the Syuds [Sayyids] from re-establishing themselves at Sittana [Sithanah], and, in the event of any attempt being made by the Syuds [Sayyids], the extracting parties would unite to prevent, or expel them."<sup>11</sup>

In August 1862, the Punjab authorities claimed that the tribes had broken their agreement. Utmanzi openly announced that they had done so due to their weakness, while according to the British, the Jadun had no such plea. Amazi and Mada Khel, as stated by Elgin, Viceroy of India, also favoured the Mujahidin. To disperse this colony, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab proposed to send a force of five or six thousand against them, "and that on the conclusion of military operations the force should remain for some days on the top of Mahabun [Mahaban, Mabanr], in order to carry out the political objects in view", first the punishments

of the Jadun and Utmanzi by sword or fine accordingly due to “the breach of their engagements and renewal thereof.” Second, the execution of agreements from Amazi, Mada Khel, and Hasanzi tribes, not to allow Mujahidin; and third, the dispersion of Mujahidin from Malka. The Viceroy of India at that time not favoured this proposal and hence was not materialized.<sup>12</sup>

### **3. Casus Belli of the Expedition: Reoccupation of Sithanah**

Though the Viceroy, at that time did not approve the expedition, but the authorities in the Frontier had made their minds up for another expedition, for which, they needed an excuse. The Commissioner Peshawar Division, Colonel Taylor, affirmed that from August 1862 to July 1863, no case of kidnapping by the Mujahidin was reported.<sup>13</sup> However, In the spring of 1863, two men were murdered, which were attributed to Mujahidin and the Sayyids of Sithanah. Besides these murders and other acts, on 5 July, Sayyid Mubarak Shah and Mujahidin reoccupied Sithanah. As a result, blockade of Utmanzi and Jadun was once again enforced and militia was posted for the protection of Amb state as Mujahidin and Sayyids had sent threatening messages to her chief.<sup>14</sup> In the opinion of Sadiq Hussain, the British for propaganda and to gain sympathies of the Hindus, kidnapped some Hindu merchants and overtly to save the chief of Amb decided to destroy Malka.<sup>15</sup>

Regarding the reoccupation of Sithanah, Deputy Commissioner, Hazara reported that due to a dispute between Kabal and Kaya villages, the weaker party requested the Sayyids for help. Taking advantage of this, and also with the support of Upper Mansur Jadun, the Sayyids on 28 June 1863, with some five hundred to seven hundred Mujahidin, reached Sithanah. On the first of July, Mujahidin and Sayyids moved to Kaya and then to Kabal and after a week returned to Sithanah. On 5 July, four principal men of Kabal and Kaya of the opposed section came to Tarbela with some members of their families. Regarding the reoccupation of Sithanah, the authorities made investigations and found that Jadun put responsibility on Utmanzi as the Utmanzi *jargah*<sup>16</sup> had no reason for allowing the Sayyids.<sup>17</sup>

The Deputy Commissioner, Hazara reported that Salar Jadun claimed that the Sayyids had claimed that they had got permission for the reoccupation of Sithanah from the authorities that is why, the Jadun offered no resistance. But the Deputy Commissioner added that this

flimsy plea he did not accept on the ground that if the government permitted them, a notice would be sent to him as well. Besides, Muhammad Shifan, Minister of Amb, who according to the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, informed him of every movement of the Mujahidin, had also not reported anything about the reoccupation of Sithanah, which indicated that this was done suddenly. Muhammad Shifan also claimed that if Mujahidin settled in Sithanah, they would attack Amb and the Deputy Commissioner Hazara considered his apprehensions well founded.<sup>18</sup>

On 15 July, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, informed the Viceroy of India, that Mujahidin, invited by a faction of Utmanzi and supported by a strong party of Jadun, had settled in Sithanah. Both the tribes were again put under blockade. To protect Amb and to punish Mujahidin and Sayyids, the Lieutenant-Governor had “called upon for a confidential report of the ulterior measures intended to be taken against the Sittana [Sithanah] fanatics and the tribes who had supported them.” The Lieutenant-Governor prepared a report, with the assistance of Colonel Taylor, which suggested, “the dispatch of a strong force to punish the hostile tribes as the only means of securing permanent peace on the frontier.”<sup>19</sup> The Viceroy, this time accepted these proposals and also issued special instructions for carrying out the intents of the expedition.<sup>20</sup> During these days, Sayyid Mahmud Shah<sup>21</sup> in a letter to the authorities claimed that the *jargah* of Mada Khel, Amazi, and Hasanzi tribes, some eighty men, has visited Sayyid Mubarak Shah and Mawlwi Abdullah, Amir Mujahidin, and professed their allegiance. They also agreed that they would follow Mubarak Shah in his attack on Amb or other territories. Mubarak Shah replied that he had no intention of attacking Amb or the government territory but “the [the] Government and Amb Chief had established posts to seize their [the Sayyid’s] traders, and to levy fines from them, and had blocked their road altogether which could not be patiently endured.”<sup>22</sup>

As the authorities increased pressure on the local tribes, the whole Jadun *jargah*, started for Sithanah on 3 September, to request the Mujahidin to retire to their old position at Malka, “otherwise that they would compel compliance by force of arms.”<sup>23</sup> It was also reported that Essa Malak, a Jadun chief, was with them. This act brought the situation up to some extent to normal in the British circles but the position once again became odd when some two hundred and fifty Mujahidin and Utmanzi, under Mawlwi Abdullah, attacked the camp of Guides<sup>24</sup> at Topay on the night of 7 September 1863. In this attack, according to the record, two Jadun *malaks* participated and Essa Malak instigated this.

Contrary to the claim of local writers, the attack met with complete failure.<sup>25</sup> The main cause of its failure was that Colonel Taylor had already predicted:

If any point is attacked in strength, it will be either Umb [Amb state] or this Topee [Topay] detachment, and the strength will be the Hindoostanee [Hindustani] fanatics in the van and a mass of irritated blockaded Jadoons [Jaduns] and Otmanzais [Utmanzis] forming the main army.<sup>26</sup>

Similarly, Colonel Taylor also informed the Commanding Officer, Mardan that for the last three days, he received reports about the intended attack of Mujahidin and the local tribes on Topay camp and made a requisition that he at once occupy Topay with a detachment.<sup>27</sup> After this attack, Hasanzi attacked Shongle hamlet in the Black Mountain area, where one of the Amb outposts was situated followed by another attack on the levies of Madad Khan of Tanawal, in which one *jamadar* and six or seven men were killed. These attacks were also attributed to Mubarak Shah and Mujahidin.<sup>28</sup>

Regarding the causes of Ambela expedition, Ghulam Rasul Mehr has stated that Sayyid Mubarak Shah got control of Sithanah, and like Sayyid Umar Shah wanted to take revenue from Utmanzi. In this regard Sayyid Mubarak Shah wrote a letter to Utmanzi tribe, in response, a faction favouring him agreed on giving him *ushr*.<sup>29</sup> Mubarak Shah then decided to settle the arrangements of Kabal and Kaya and for that purpose led an expedition. But due to floods and rainy season Mubarak Shah encamped there and waited for an appropriate time. On the other hand, the rival Utmanzi knew the approach of Mubarak Shah and fled to Tarbela, a British-controlled area in front of Kabal.<sup>30</sup> Mehr has further stated that during that time, a British officer visited Tarbela. The migrants of Kabal and Kaya complained to him, and he forwarded these complaints to the government. These migrated Utmanzi also told the chief of Amb that after Kabal and Kaya, Mubarak Shah would attack him. At that time Jahandad Khan had died and Muhammad Akram Khan, a child of thirteen or fourteen years, became the chief of Amb. His minister got frightened by this report, migrated to Darband, and requested the British for protection. Mehr has maintained that in the case of Mubarak Shah's attack on Kabal and Kaya, the British were not bound to interfere as the said areas were independent. Same was the case of the Amb, which till that time was not attacked.<sup>31</sup> According to Muhammad Shafi Sabir, the causes were first, the letter of Sayyid Mubarak Shah and Mujahidin to the chief of Amb in which they instructed him to make an alliance with them

instead of the British. Second, Mujahidin's attack on the British camp at Topay along with Essa Malak, in which the British suffered heavily and third, Mujahidin settlement in Sithanah and Malka.<sup>32</sup> In this regard, Abdul Halim Asar, Faqir Muhammad Abbas, Muhammad Amir Shah, and some other local writers had presented a different but incorrect view and stated that the British entered Buner on the pretext of hunting, by knowing this the Akhund of Swat [henceforward Akhund] proclaimed *jihad* against them.<sup>33</sup>

However, due to the disturbed situation in Sithanah, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab recommended: "That military expedition be sent to compel the submission of the tribes, the expulsion of the Hindoostanee [Hindustani] fanatics, and to demand guarantees for the preservation of peace towards our [the] Government for the future."<sup>34</sup> The force which would be sent consisting of not less than five thousand infantry equipped with artillery should start not later than 10 October. "It is probable that the whole expedition will not last more than three weeks or a month." It was also instructed that all arrangements should be kept secret and the expedition was planned to be ended by 15 November.<sup>35</sup> According to D.S. Richard's exaggerated statement, as the Mujahidin for two years, before 1863, plundered and kidnapped peaceful native traders, "the General's order were brief and to the point: 'Saf Karo' (clean up), or, loosely translated, 'effectively rid the frontier of the chronic cause of disturbance'." Interestingly, these instructions were received somewhat reluctantly by General Chamberlain.<sup>36</sup> John Adye has stated that due to the late season, the Commander-in-Chief proposed to postpone the expedition but Punjab authorities had strongly supported the expedition.<sup>37</sup> Finally:

An expedition was accordingly sanctioned by the Supreme Government, the first object of which was to effectually rid the frontier of the chronic cause of disturbance---the Hindustani fanatics. Their mere expulsion from the right bank of the Indus back upon their old posts at Malka and on the south bank of the Barandu, was not considered enough; nor was it thought advisable that they should find shelter in Swat, and make that powerful tribe the future focus of disturbance on the frontier. If possible, the line of retreat of the fanatics towards the Barandu was to be cut off; and although their extirpation might not be possible, yet their dispersion would be on lines of direction favourable to their capture, if the co-operation of the well-disposed sections of the tribes could be obtained. The punishment of the Gaduns was to be a secondary consideration to the primary

one of crushing effectually the small, but troublesome, horde of fanatics.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, preparations were started for the Ambela expedition, which till this time is fresh in the minds of the local Pukhtuns and occupies a second place after the uprising of 1897,<sup>39</sup> in the Frontier expeditions against the Pukhtuns from the annexation of Punjab till its partition in 1901.

#### 4. Selection of the Ambela Pass

To reach Malka, centre of Mujahidin, there were two routes at that time, either by mountain crest or round by the foot of the mountain to the northwest corner, where lies Chamlah valley. The entrance to it is affected on the west by Ambela pass.<sup>40</sup> At the time of the expedition, Daran and Ambela passes were known to the British while the Khanpur pass was discovered afterward. The Daran Pass used by General Sidney Cotton in the expedition of 1858, led almost directly to Chinglay where it branches into two, one led to Mangal Thana and the other to Kogah. The main hurdle in choosing the Daran pass was that no force accompanied by artillery and baggage could reach beyond Mangal Thana and entirely clear the hills in one day after leaving Naway Kalay.<sup>41</sup> The other reason which favoured the selection of Ambela pass was that Daran pass “had already been chosen as the route for the force under Sir S. Cotton, the attention of the tribes was naturally directed to it, and it was reported to have been stockaded within a short distance of the plain, and held by a small party of the enemy.”<sup>42</sup> The *Calcutta Review* has asserted:

The Umbeyla [Ambela] Pass was reported to be of a more level and open character, and we [the British] were led to believe that by the adoption of that route it would be easy to reach Kogah by a forced march on the evening of the first day, whilst a second would carry the force to Mulkah [Malka] itself, and ten days at furthest see the column at Cherorai or Dherbund [Darband] on the Indus *re confectd [sic]*.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, Ambela pass was chosen for the expedition. Its selection was mature and homework had already been done on it. Colonel Taylor reached Swabi camp on 12 October 1863, where he found Captain Munro with Lieutenant Sandeman and Extra Assistant commissioner, Atta Muhammad Khan—“a very intelligent native official, who had long been employed by Lieutenant Sandeman in examining the routes through the



Mahabun tract, and that by the Umbeyla [Ambela] Pass among others.”<sup>44</sup> All of them and the reports of other officers confirmed that the Ambela pass “was easy as to roadway, and presented no military obstacles; that the Chumlah [Chamlah] Valley was wide and open, and the northern slopes of the Mahabun easier than those on the southern face.”<sup>45</sup> Besides, by using Ambela pass, the retreat of Mujahidin into Buner and Swat might be cut off.<sup>46</sup> According to D.S. Richard, plan behind the Ambela pass was to drive the Mujahidin from Malka towards Indus, where another force was deployed for their encounter.<sup>47</sup> *The Calcutta Review* also mentions: “Since June 1863, small bodies of troops had lain at the passages of the Indus and closed the way against all such as hearing of the assembly of the Field force, desired either to cast in their lot with the colony or desert the cause whilst there was yet time.”<sup>48</sup>

## **5. The Ambela Expedition: Step by Step**

Before entering the Ambela pass, copies of the proclamation were issued to Jadun, Amazi, Mada Khel, and Buner tribes and the sections of Chamlah valley. The Jadun immediately sent their *jargah* to the camp and remained there for the rest of the expedition. The Buner tribes resented the route the British had chosen and decided to oppose the troops. Different sections of the Chamlah came to the British camp and also brought supplies for the troops. The two Mahaban tribes, Amazi and Mada Khel sided with Bunerwals.<sup>49</sup>

On 13 October 1863, Brigadier-General Nevill B. Chamberlain, commander of the force, arrived at Swabi, and on 18 October, the force moved to Naway Kalay. To deceive the tribes, that the troops might be used the Daran pass instead of the Ambela pass, General Chamberlain dispatched Major Keyes with a small column to the mouth of Daran pass. On 19 October, movement of the troops through Ambela pass was ordered. On the following day, the whole force assembled on the heights of Ambela pass. Major Keyes also joined the advance column there.<sup>50</sup> The colonial troops captured one of the Ambela *malak* during their advance. On investigation, it was known that slight opposition was made by the people of his village belonging to Chamlah, situated on the mouth of the pass. The *malak*, along with a wounded man, was sent back with a message that if they provide forage they would be paid. A verbal proclamation was also announced to him, and was allowed to carry a dead body of one of his villagers, killed during the fighting.<sup>51</sup> On the next day, reconnaissance was made into the Chamlah valley. The advance of the reconnaissance was unopposed but during the retreat British troops

suffered considerable casualties. From that time, Buner tribes made common resistance and reinforcement of the tribes started arriving on daily basis.<sup>52</sup>

Shahbaz Muhammad opines that Mujahidin settlement at Malka provided them an opportunity to propagate<sup>53</sup> that the British intended to annex Buner, they succeeded in it and this propaganda spread like a wildfire in Buner.<sup>54</sup> D.S. Richard also stated that tribal chiefs were convinced by religious men that the real purpose of the campaign was the annexation of Buner.<sup>55</sup> Mehr maintains that Mujahidin proclaimed *jihad* against the British and sent proclamations to different *khans* and the Akhund.<sup>56</sup> Muhammad Shafi Sabir also held the same view that Mawlwi Abdullah sent Mujahidin to every village to induce them to wage *jihad* against the British.<sup>57</sup> However, independent of the propaganda and efforts of Mujahidin, this expedition considerably heightened local resentment and along with other tribes, the Akhund also joined the Buner tribes on 26 October 1863<sup>58</sup>. Before him, Sayyid Mubarak Shah joined them. General Chamberlain in a telegram stated:

The Akhoond [Akhund] of Swat having joined, coalition is serious, because his influence extends as far as Kohat, and other tribes may take up the fanatical cry. I [General Chamberlain] recommend your sending trans-Indus as many troops as can be spared from below. Any backwardness now may cause great inconvenience; whereas, if the tribes hear of the arrival of troops, those tribes not committed are likely to keep quiet.<sup>59</sup>

On 30 October, the Akhund and Mujahidin in a combined attack captured Crag picquet which after severe fighting was retaken by the troops. General Chamberlain informed the Adjutant-General that the people and Akhund had overcome their hostilities and made common cause against the British. He narrated the changing situation as follows.

We [British the troops] are engaged in a contest in which not only are the Hidoostanees [Hindustani] and the Madabun [Mahaban] tribes (including even some Jadoons [Jaduns] and Khodakhails [Khudu Khel] accessories, but also the Swatees [Swatis], the Bajourees [Bajawaris], the Indus tribes north of the Burrendo [Barandu], with a large sprinkling of the discontented and restless spirits from within our own border.<sup>60</sup>

From that time till 6 November 1863, the tribes continuously fired on British positions and working parties.<sup>61</sup> The situation at Ambela

proved difficult for the troops and on 4 November, the Punjab government “borrowed a part of the escort belonging to the Viceroy’s Camp.” The situation mentioned by W.W. Hunter is that “before three weeks were over, the Punjab stations had been so denuded of troops, that the officer commanding at Mianmir could with difficulty supply a guard of twenty-four bayonets for the Lieutenant-Governor.”<sup>62</sup> Hunter has further stated:

The Punjab Government anxiously inquired on the 8<sup>th</sup> November, if the General [Chamberlain], on receiving reinforcement of 1600 Infantry and some guns would be needed in order to render any forward movement practicable, and with the dispiriting intimation that the General [Chamberlain] deprecated any advance on Malka until the intermediate tribes could be brought to terms.<sup>63</sup>

On 8 and 10 November, efforts were made for a truce but bore no results. On 13 November, the tribes had for the second time taken Crag picquet briefly.<sup>64</sup> Due to the alarming situation at Ambela, Sir Hugh Rose, Commander-in-Chief, arrived at Lahore and directed the expedition himself.<sup>65</sup> On 18 November, after suffering four officers and forty-five men killed and sixty-nine wounded, the commander of the field force telegraphed as follows:

The troops have now been hardworked [hard worked] both day and night for a month, and having to meet fresh enemies with loss is telling. We much need reinforcements. I find it difficult to meet the enemy’s attacks and provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. If you can give some fresh crops to relieve those most reduced in numbers and dash, the relieved crops can be sent to the plains and used in support. This is urgent.<sup>66</sup>

On 20 November, for the third and last time Crag picquet was taken and retaken by the tribes and the troops respectively. In this contest, General Chamberlain was wounded and became unable to lead his force.<sup>67</sup> The bodies of the British soldiers killed on 18 November, were recovered on 21 November, and probably the following Pashto *tapah*<sup>68</sup> reflect this:

د امبيلې كيد ر ساريه شو  
چې يې خوراك شو د كوراوو لړمونونه<sup>69</sup>

**Meaning:**

The Ambela's jackals got fatty, as the flesh of the English became their food.

Crag picquet from that time called Qatal Garh (قتل گره), because according to local writers, the troops had numerous casualties at this front. G.B. Scott has also stated that "the fighting round the crag was so bloody on both sides that it was known as *katalgarh* [Qatal Garh] or slaughter fort; by this name is the campaign still known among our [British] sepoys."<sup>70</sup> About the fighting on Crag picquet, Haidar Ali has quoted Parwiash Shaheen who on the authority of Masood Alam Nadvi has exaggeratedly claimed that General Chamberlain received severe wounds at this front, and total casualties of the troops reached to seven thousand. He has further stated that all the sepoys in Punjab cantonments were sent to the Frontier, and when the Viceroy of India heard about the critical situation of his troops he died.<sup>71</sup>

After General Chamberlain, Major-General Garvock assumed command of the force. John Adye has asserted that due to the complex situation, the new Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were in favour of withdrawing the force from Ambela.<sup>72</sup> During this time, some three thousand men from Bajawar under Faiz Talab Khan, and five hundred men with Haji of Kuner, a religious figure of great importance and spiritual head of the Hasanzi, also joined the Mujahidin.<sup>73</sup> According to W.W. Hunter "on 28<sup>th</sup> November the Punjab Government in vain recorded a Minute, deploring the stationary attitude of the force, and urging some forward movement."<sup>74</sup> Muhammad Shafi Sabir has claimed that till December, on the one side, some 25000 British soldiers were gathered in the vicinity of the field and on the other side, some tribes due to harsh weather and prolonged war had return to their homes. Therefore, the new Viceroy stressed on the conclusion of the expedition.<sup>75</sup>

Along with fighting, political efforts were continued and the tribes, after 20 November, also made no serious attack. On 10 December, the Buner *jargah* arrived and on 14<sup>th</sup>, sent their final reply in which they rejected the British terms. Major James, in his memorandum dated 14 December 1863, affirmed that the Buner *jargah* informed him that:

The pressure of the Bajouries [Bajawaris] and Ghuzan [Ghazan] Khan is so great upon the Akhoond [Akhund] that he is unable to counsel peace. At the same time, they warn me [Major James] that the Akhoond [Akhund] is summoning those men of Bonair

[Buner] who returned to their homes, and that many of them will obey the call. From the whole tone of the message, I [Major James] gather that they wish me to understand that, however much they desire peace, they cannot accomplish it till we [British the troops] render it possible for them [Buner *jargah*] to act independently of their allies.<sup>76</sup>

After the final reply of Buner *jargah*, the officer commanding ordered invasion Buner territory on the following day. The village of Lalu was captured “and, with its large stores of grain, at once destroyed.” After capturing Lalu, the force bivouacked in the vicinity of that village and not a single shot was fired on the troops during the night. After Lalu, the troops on 16 December, occupied and burnt Ambela village.<sup>77</sup> The advancement of the troops to Ambela village was opposed only by Mujahidin. G.B. Scott has stated:

It was soon evident that the enemy was thoroughly disheartened. Ambela was deserted, and the sacred banner of the Akhund was seen hurrying along towards the hills. One party alone proved game to the last. Some two to three hundred Hindustanis suddenly burst out from a ravine and charged straight on to a Pioneer regiment, killed and wounded four or five officers and for a brief space drove the regiment backwards.<sup>78</sup>

As stated in the previous lines that both on 15 and 16 December, the Buner tribes did not take part in the fighting. G.B. Scott has claimed:

The Bonerwal chiefs informed him [Major James] that they [Buner chiefs] were willing to treat, but that the Akhund's party, which but for diplomacy would now have been holding the passes into Swat, still held out, and intended attacking the British position on the 16th. They advised that our [British the] troops should now take the initiative and attack Ambela, in which case the Bonerwals would stand aloof.<sup>79</sup>

Roberts has also narrated the situation at Ambela after 10 December, in the following words:

James, the Commissioner, had been working to detach the Bunerwals from the combination against us [the British], and on the afternoon of our arrival a deputation of their headmen arrived in camp, and before their departure the next morning they promised to accompany a force proceeding to destroy Malka, and

to expel the Hindustani fanatics from the Buner country. Later, however, a messenger came in to say they could not fulfil their promise, being unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon them by their co-religionists. The man further reported that large numbers of fresh tribesmen had appeared on the scene, and that it was intended to attack us [the troops] on the 16th. He advised the Commissioner to take the initiative, and gave him to understand that if we [the troops] advanced the Bunerwals would stand aloof.<sup>80</sup>

Roberts has further stated, “we [the troops] bivouacked for the night near the village of Umbeyla [Ambela], and the next morning the Bunerwals, who, true to their word, had taken no part in the fighting on the 15th or 16th, came in and made their submission.”<sup>81</sup> The result of this fighting benefited the British.

Fyztullub [Faiz Talab] Khan and the Bajouries [Bajawaris], Ghuzan [Ghazan] Khan and his clansmen from Dheer [Dir], with the miscellaneous gathering from more distant parts, were all in rapid flight towards their homes. The Akhoond [Akhund], with the Khans and people of Swat, alone remain on the crest of the Bonair [Buner] Pass—not, as before, with flaunting standards, but behind the hill, out of sight, and all prepared to run in the event of our advancing.<sup>82</sup>

Some writers presented a different view of the fighting on 15 and 16 December at Lalu and Ambela villages respectively. In this regard, Muhammad Perwaish Shaheen has wrongly claimed that on 15 December, fifteen thousand *ghazis*, under the Akhund, attacked the troops. In this fight, British losses were 168 killed and 67 wounded and the tribesmen lost their 100 men besides numerous wounded.<sup>83</sup> Nasarullah Khan Nasar has stated that after this defeat, except the Swat *lakhkar*,<sup>84</sup> rest of the tribes started going back to their homes. The Akhund tried to stop them and later in a *jargah*, it was decided that who left the field, the *lakhkar* would burn his house. When the colonial authorities, at Ambela, learnt about it, they gave huge money to Zaidullah Khan and attacked the Akhund’s *lakhkar*, which after severe fighting turned back by the Akhund. After this battle the Akhund consulted Ghazan Khan and other *khans* and agreed to the settlement.<sup>85</sup>

The colonial troops, now in full strength, entered Buner and were in a position to compel the tribes for their terms which along with other terms included the burning or destroying of Malka. In this regard, Major

James, in his memorandum dated 5 December 1863, has explained that his object in destroying Malka by the Buner *jargah* was, “to prevent the possibility of any future sympathy between them and the Hidnoostanees [Hindustanis].”<sup>86</sup> He proposed that if Buner *jargah* not agree on the destruction of Malka by themselves then the troops by force should do this. He has predicted:

It is my [James] firm belief that, by driving the enemy out of Laloo [Lalu], or rather from their bivouac in its vicinity, and advancing on Umbeylah [Ambela village], we should force the jirgah [jargah] to come in, and could then continue the operations as above detailed.<sup>87</sup>

The events run according to the plan, and on 17 December, the Buner *jargah*, as predicted by Major James, again arrived and agreed to the terms. This time they left their greater part in the camp as a token of submission and returned. A party of the troops escorted by Buner *jargah*, advanced from Ambela on 19 December, and after the destruction of Malka returned on 23 December.<sup>88</sup> The expedition was originally planned as a three weeks expedition but took about three months with considerably high casualties on both sides: British casualties were 238 killed and 670 wounded while tribes lost their 3000 men in killed and wounded.<sup>89</sup>

After burning Malka, the first objective of the expedition was accomplished and for the second, on 3 January 1864, the troops moved to Kabal and on the following day to Mundi<sup>90</sup>, which was also burnt by the local *jargah*.<sup>91</sup> In the same month, Major Cox, Deputy Commissioner Hazara, extracted an agreement from Mada Khel and Amazi tribes and bounded them not to allow Mujahidin to resettle there. Later he also received the submission of Hasanzi tribe.<sup>92</sup> Thus, after accomplishing both the objectives, the Ambela expedition ended after Malka was destroyed, about half of the Mujahidin were either killed or wounded and fresh and strong agreements were extracted from Mahaban, Jadun, Amazi and Mada Khel tribes. Malka, as stated earlier and claimed by the authorities was destroyed by the Buner *jargah*, which left great effects on the tribes of the Frontier including Swat, Dir and Bajawar.

The record has claimed that Malka was destroyed by the Buner *jargah* in the presence of the British officers in fulfilment of the agreement. But according to the local narrative, as claimed by Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, only one house in the precinct of Malka was set on fire. Yusufi has further stated that Zaidullah Khan of Dagar was at the

forefront in the destruction of Malka and the negotiation with the British, as a reward for which a British Commander presented him his pistol, and in 1868, he was shot dead with this pistol.<sup>93</sup> Haidar Ali, Muhammad Shafi Sabir and Bahadar Shah Zafar Kaka Khel also have stated that British made an alliance with Zaidullah Khan and as a reward Major James gave him his pistol, and burnt one deserted house in Malka.<sup>94</sup> Whereas, Ghulam Rasul Mehr has quoted Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah of Sithanah, stating that not a single house was burnt at Malka.<sup>95</sup>

## 6. James Powders: The Settlement

It was a common practice of the authorities in all expeditions in the Frontier that they commenced political manoeuvring at the start or even before every expedition, and got very fruitful results. Same is done in the Ambela expedition. In this expedition, the troops once again succeeded in getting support of the two local *khans*, Ajab Khan and his brother Aziz Khan of Sudam. According to Colonel Taylor, Aziz Khan “was the only chief in camp who could perform the duty” as his brother Ajab Khan at that time was performing his duty on Ambela pass. But the Colonel Taylor alluded to a problem, as the Buner tribes supposed that the Ambela pass was selected by the troops on the instigation of these two brothers.<sup>96</sup> James Darmesteter has stated about the political activities that:

The Afghans charged the gunners with sticks, and stopped with their mantles the mouths of the guns. British pluck and diplomacy at last exhausted the constancy of the allies; jealousy crept in; the coalition melted like snow; “double rupees” hastened the decomposition; and at last, the Jirga [jargah] of the Bunervals [Bunerwals] volunteered to guide the British army to the Hindustani camp.<sup>97</sup>

W.W. Hunter presented the same opinion and has claimed that “what our arms had failed to accomplish, dissensions and diplomacy began to effect.”<sup>98</sup> As stated earlier, two prisoners were captured during the advance to Ambela pass, one was a *malak* of Rega and the other a wounded man, also hails from Buner. Colonel Taylor informed them of the British intentions and also offered them to bring supplies from Chamlah villages. On the following morning, the said *malak* along with the *malaks* of Ambela and Kuga villages arrived at British camp with fowls and goats and also agreed on arranging supplies for the troops.



Thus, all the principal *malaks* of Chamlah villages came and offered fowls. In the words of Colonel Taylor, “all these favourable symptoms not unnaturally received a check when Bonair [Buner] threw itself into opposition.”<sup>99</sup>

In reply to the British proclamations, first of all, the two chief *malaks* of Buner Zaidullah Khan and Nawab Khan sent replies. They complained against the British having chosen the Ambela Pass that “we [colonial troops] were at liberty to follow our own enemies, and they [Buner *malaks*] would only be prepared to defend their own territory should we [the troops] turn upon it.” But the above two *malaks*, through a message, informed the Colonel Taylor that “if trustworthy men were sent to them to explain matters and fully satisfied them” that the troops had to deal only with Mujahidin and not with the Buner, “they would abandon resistance and take away the Buner tribes.”<sup>100</sup>

On 3 November 1863, two Buner *malaks*, residents of Malandaray pass, visited the British camp on the invitation of Aziz Khan. In the words of Colonel Taylor, “I [Taylor] conversed with them, and described the way in which the Bonair mullicks [Buner *malaks*] could meet us, and discuss the points at issue between us.”<sup>101</sup> After two days, these two *malaks* brought a letter of Zaidullah Khan and Ahmad Khan of Bagrah, two chief *malaks* of Buner, “in which they expressed a wish that trustworthy persons might be sent to them, to whom they might explain their wishes.” Colonel Taylor replied that “they should be met and escorted by the Suddhoom [Sudam] chiefs, if they came within reach.” Thus, by the services of these two *malaks* “a concerted signal for a truce being arranged.”<sup>102</sup> On 10 November, a brief armistice was agreed. Captain Munro and the *khans*, viz. Arbab Fateh Khan, Muhammad Sarbuland Khan, two Sudam *khans*, Masam Khan, Faizullah Khan, and Afridi Khan met with Buner *malaks*. The *khans* on the British side tried their utmost best to convince the Buner *malaks* and they were almost successful in it but according to the spies’ report, the Swat, Bajawar, and Amazi tribes, and the Mujahidin were firm to fight.<sup>103</sup>

On 20 November, Major Hugh R. James, ex-Commissioner, Peshawar, after returning from England took charge from Colonel Taylor and joined the troops at Ambela. He was an expert in making intrigues among the tribes. Charles E. Stewart has stated that he wrote a letter to one of the chiefs and congratulated him on the fighting. When the other chief heard about it demanded to see it and after its reading the chief said that this “letter is only meant for you to show to us. No doubt the real letter offers you a large bribe to secede from our coalition”, the young

officers called it “James powders.”<sup>104</sup> Major James had known many of the chiefs, stated by G.B. Scott, called them to the camp “and shortly after it became evident that the dissension in the rank of the enemy had widened.”<sup>105</sup> On 25 November, a Buner *jargah* met Major James and according to his report, he was about to settle the matters but the negotiations were broken off by Zaidullah Khan, “who was informed by the Moulvie [Mawlwi Abdullah] that his rival, Ahmad Khan [has] received large sum of money from me [Major James], it resulted, however, in the retirement of Ahmad Khan, with two important sections of the tribe.”<sup>106</sup> Major James, who arrived on 20 November 1863, reported round about 30 November:

I [Major James] succeeded in drawing off Ahmad Khan, with the greater portion of the Ashezai [Ashezi] and Salarazi [Salarzi] sections of the Bonair [Buner] tribe; the Ranizai [Ranizi] were also induced to return to their homes, to the number of 2,000; Sohbat [Sohbat] Khan of Swat also sent home his immediate followers; minor personages acted in a similar manner; and, amongst those who remained, a mutual mistrust prevailed. These desertions were becoming so numerous that the Akhund [Akhund] issued denunciation against all who should leave the field, and the Moulvie [Mawlwi] redoubled his efforts to bring back the wavering.<sup>107</sup>

G.B. Scott has stated that Major James made special proposals to the chiefs of each tribe and had a large command of secret service money.<sup>108</sup> He further argued that Major James kept his arrangements secret from military authorities. The Commander-in-Chief of India determined to shift the strength of the tribes from Ambela to Swat by sending a force towards Swat. But Major James had already assured the Swat chiefs that their country should not be invaded, and the troops detailed for Swat turned towards Buner and joined the rest of the force at Ambela.<sup>109</sup>

As a result of political steering, the Buner *jargah* arrived at the British camp on the afternoon of 10 December, and remained there for a night. On the following day, the *jargah* left the camp for consultation with Akhund and other allies. The Akhund was not agreed on the peace agreement and a fresh contingent also joined the tribes. Major James reported this situation that “the jirgah [*jargah*] was overruled by Ghuzan [Ghazan] Khan and other new comers, and was unable to come in.”<sup>110</sup> But after the fighting on 15 and 16 December, the Buner *jargah* again arrived, this time “not even talking of terms, but simply asking for

orders.” Major James made the following requisitions on the Buner *jargah*.

I.—To dismiss the troops of all kinds on the Bonair [Buner] Pass.

II.—To send a party to destroy Mulkah [Malka] completely, to be accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be considered necessary.

III.—To expel the Hindoostanees [Hindustani] from the Bonair [Buner], Chumlah [Chamlah], and Amazai [Amazi] lands.

IV.—To leave as hostages the whole of their chief men till the above requirements should be fully carried out.<sup>111</sup>

The *jargah* left its greater part in the camp and returned. On 18 December, the Buner *jargah* was ready to escort the British party. Colonel Taylor accompanied the *jargah* as a political officer. The whole of the regiment of Guides<sup>112</sup> under Captain Jenkins was selected as his escort and was accompanied by Colonel Adye, Colonel A. Taylor, Major Roberts, Major Johnstone, Major Wright and Lieutenant Carter. A body of levies under Aziz Khan, chief of Sudam, also accompanied the escort. This party advanced from Ambela on 19 December and on 23 December, returned to the camp at Ambela pass. The following day Major James had the final interview with the *jargah* and dismissed them.<sup>113</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

The reoccupation of Sithanah by Sayyids and Mujahidin and their advance to Kabal and Kaya were of tribal nature as such movements were common in those days’ tribal society. With the occupation of Sithanah, the position of Amb, whose chief was a British ally and enemy of the Sayyids and Mujahidin overtly became unsecured. The British used the Amb state as a buffer between them and the Sayyids, Mujahidin, and the other tribes. Interestingly, a portion of Utmanzi and Jadun tribe invited Mujahidin and Sayyids and only four men of the opposite faction raised objection on their arrival, but as the authorities had interests in it they took measures against the Sayyids and Mujahidin.

In this expedition, the Mujahidin strategy worked. They, before the proclamation to the tribes, predicted that the British would proclaim to the tribes that the expedition would only be directed against the Mujahidin. The same was proclaimed by British and the local tribes being already propagated by Mujahidin supposed that the expedition was for the annexation of Buner. Like the previous expedition in 1858, the British

would have very easily completed this one too, but could not do so because of the support of the local tribes for the Mujahidin. In 1858, the people of Tatalay and Utmanzi, due to their tribal rivalries, not only welcomed the troops but destroyed Chinglay, Panjtar and Sithanah before the arrival of the troops. In 1863, the situation was different, because not only the neighbouring clans but almost all the tribes of Swat, Dir, and Bajawar joined the Mujahidin. Besides, the other factor by which the 1863 expedition become a sour dream for the British was the participation of the Akhund. By his joining, not only his followers joined the Mujahidin but the expedition turned into a holy war.

The British being masters of the policy of divide and rule, in every expedition, tried to separate a section or subsection of a tribe against whom they directed the expedition and acquired their desired results. In this expedition too, they tried their best but till the arrival of Major James did not succeed in it. Though from 20 November, the tribes made no serious attack on the troops, all was not yet over, the James powders worked and discontent soon developed among the ranks of the tribes. Being a colonial power, they finally accomplished (fully or partially) what they fought for but this was more a political triumph. In an actual sense, this expedition is a military failure.

As the tribes were not familiar with such a lengthy war this helped the colonial troops greatly. When the non-Buner tribes rejected the British demands on 14 December, probably it hurt the Buner chiefs and they informed Major James about their position. The Buner chiefs wanted culmination of the expedition either by their own will or on the urging of the troops and that is why the Buner *lakhkar* remained aloof on 15 and 16 December, which proved the last nail in the coffin.

The burning of Malka, by the troops, is still a matter of great controversy. We have two diverse views about it. The local sources claim that only a house or a portion of Malka was set on fire by the troops. While the colonial record claims the complete destruction or burning of Malka. If we carefully consider the claim of the local writers about the burning of Malka, we find a contradiction in it. The local writers on the one side claim that only one house in Malka was burnt and on the other side affirm that Zaidullah Khan, who was the main character in the negotiations with the troops was shot by that pistol which Major James gave him for his services. If we accept the burning of only one house in Malka, the credit for this is going to Zaidullah Khan. In this situation why was he rewarded by the colonial troops for burning only one house? And if we accept that the murder of Zaidullah Khan was the result of his

services for the troops then it is more probable that due to his services the Malka would be burnt completely. In this case, claim of the authorities seems correct, as after the fight on 16 December, Mujahidin were no more in a position to resist the troops and the other tribes had almost given up resistance after 20 November. Moreover, the unmolested visit of the troops to Malka also gives more credibility to their claim.

Besides, Haider Ali and Olaf Caroe have claimed that the Akhund was in favour of the burning of Malka as he wanted to decrease the prestige of Mujahidin and the Sayyids of Sithanah. According to Haidar Ali, when the people of Buner learnt that Malka was destroyed by the instigation of the Akhund and Zaidullah Khan, they killed the latter.<sup>114</sup> If we accept the claims of Sir Olaf Caroe, Haidar Ali, and others that the Akhund wanted to decrease the prestige of the Sayyids and the Mujahidin, we cannot accept that Zaidullah Khan was murdered due to the destruction of Malka. A detailed study of the events after the Ambela expedition shows that Azim Khan and Zaidullah Khan were in league with Mujahidin against the Akhund. And in the progression of these differences in 1868, Zaidullah Khan was murdered by the partisans of the Akhund on his order.<sup>115</sup>

Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, Pir Gohar, and Fauz-ur-Rahman etc., have stated that it was the Akhund who permitted or compelled the troops to burn only one house in Malka. As mentioned before, Yusufi has stated that, at the last stage of the Ambela expedition, the position of the Akhund's *lakhkar* deteriorated and most of the tribes had left for their homes. The Akhund also knew that the Buner chiefs had made a secret alliance with the troops. On the other hand, according to Major James, the Buner chiefs had already decided to conclude the war and on 10 December 1863, agreed on the destruction of Malka and other the terms. When on 14 December, the Akhund and other tribes rejected the proposals of the troops, the Buner deputation not only informed Major James about the intended attack of the tribes on 16 December, but also assured him of their non-participation.<sup>116</sup> And in the words of Roberts, the Buner people were true to their word. Major James proposed that if Buner *jargah* did not agree on the destruction of Malka by themselves then the troops by force should do this. The troops captured the villages of Lalu and Ambela and as planned and predicted by Major James, the Buner *jargah* arrived for "not even talking of terms, but simply asking for orders".<sup>117</sup> In this situation, we cannot assume that the Akhund was powerful enough to alter the agreement.

In actual sense, the British diplomacy won the day. What the actual money or privileges promised by the administrators to different *khans* and chiefs are not known, but it is clear that the administrators had used it. In this case, the role of the Akhund in this expedition is also controversial. Some writers claim that he too made a secret alliance with the troops and got money from them. While some praise him for his standing till the last in the field. We have found no evidence of either his alliance or taking money from the troops in the Ambela expedition. But on the other side, being the last to leave the field, he neither took part in the battle on 15 and 16 December, nor tried to stop the troops advancing to Malka which made his role controversial.

Like the rest of the Frontier expeditions, in the Ambela expedition as well, the native chiefs, *malaks* and *khans* served their the masters in the best possible way. Their services were acknowledged by their the masters. Major James has applauded the services of Aziz Khan and Ajab Khan, two chiefs of Sudam. Besides, he also has accredited the services of Muhammad Shah of Zaida and Khwaja Muhammad Khan of Kohat who succeeded in controlling raids on the Kohat border. Moreover, the services of Fateh Khan “Momund [Mohmand?]”, Sarbuland Khan Mohmand, Shah Pasand Khan of Gulbalah, Afridi Khan of Malizi, and Faizullah Khan of Charparezah have been recognized.<sup>118</sup> Among these native chiefs, Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan distinguished themselves. They not only served the masters in a personal capacity but also brought a good number of levies who served in different capacities most daringly.<sup>119</sup> Besides, the local writers also mention Zaidullah Khan, Habib Khan, Asim Khan, Ahmad Khan Nasuzi and the Khan of Bagrah, Azim Khan, Mula Khan Malak, and Abdullah, and Firoz Khan of Kuga and Sarah respectively, for their services to the troops.<sup>120</sup>

Major James, who after his arrival, changed the whole scenario at Ambela was in a real sense a person who concluded the expedition. Though the troops succeeded in expelling Mujahidin from Malka, but in actual sense the real losers in the Ambela expedition were the troops. They, with the best modern weapons of the day and trained and disciplined army, did not accomplish their aims in their own style as they did from 1849 to 1862. Besides, the expedition also exposed the troops’ weakness in mountain warfare. On the other side the unity of Pukhtun tribes, though for a very brief period of two months, shows that if all the Pukhtun tribes would have made a common cause against the British, the history of the Frontier would have been different. However, without proper weapons, training, strategy and discipline, the local tribes resisted the mighty the troops for more than two months in a most daring way.

This is the reason that the Ambela expedition, after fifteen decades, is still fresh in the memories of the Pukhtuns.

### Notes and References

<sup>1</sup>W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999), p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>James Darmesteter, "Afghan Life in Afghan Songs," *The Library Magazine*, Vol. V, Third Series, October-December 1887 (New York: John B. Alden Publisher, 1887), p. 294. The same article is also published in *Little's Living Age* see James Darmesteter, "Afghan Life in Afghan Songs," *Little's Living Age*, Fifth Series, Vol. XL, October, November, December (Boston: Little and Co., 1887), pp. 418-32.

<sup>3</sup>The Hindustani known among the tribes as Mujahidin and among the British troops as the "Badmashes (scoundrels) of Malka Sitana." G.B. Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier* (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1906), p. 101. They were also called Wahabi. Altaf Qadir, *Sayyid Ahmad Barailvi: His Movement and Legacy from the Pukhtun Perspective* (Delhi: Sage Publication, 2015), p. 5. According to Marsden and Hopkins the British called them fanatics and they adopted that term after their control of the Frontier. See Magnus Marsden and Benjamin D. Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 80.

<sup>4</sup>For Black Mountain expeditions see Ishtiaq Ahmad, "British The Interference in the Affairs of the Natives: An Analysis of Black Mountain Tribes Resistance (1849—1892)," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society (Historicus)*. LXVII (4) (October-December 2019), 103-36.

<sup>5</sup>H.C. Wylly, *The Borderland: The Country of the Pathans*, reprint (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1998), pp. 72-3; Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 105-6; Ghulam Rasul Mehr, *1857: Pak wa Hind ki Jang-i-Azadi ki Mufasil, Mustanad aur Mukamal Halat*, (Urdu) (Lahore: Kitab Manzal, n.d.), pp. 326-34; *Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-98*, pp. 266-7; Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism, Cultural & Geographic Research, Tribal Analysis Center, September 2009, stable URL, <http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Hindustani%20Fanatics-Deobandism.pdf> (accessed on 16/09/2014), [henceforward Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism].

<sup>6</sup>Lord Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1901), p. 281; Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai* (Urdu), 2nd edn. (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society, 1960), pp. 512-3. *Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies: Papers related to State of Affairs in Swat, &c.* (Lahore: Government Civil Secretariat Press, 1877), p. 48; Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, p. 281; H.L. Nevill, *Campaign on the North-West Frontier*, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel publications, 2003), p. 39; Abad Shahpuri, *Sayyid Badshah ka Qafilah* (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Badar Publications, 1981), p. 202; Nasarullah Khan Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat* (Pashto), 2nd edn. (Peshawar: Dar-ul-Tasnif, 1964), pp. 31-2; Khan Roshan Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht* (Urdu) (Karachi: Roshan Khan & Co., 1986), pp. 300-3; Ghulam Rasul Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin* (Urdu) (Lahore: Kitab Manzal, 1956), pp. 296-8; J.M. Ewart, *Story of the North West Frontier Province*, revised by E.B. Howell, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), pp. 11-2; *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*.

<sup>7</sup>The village then belonged to Sayyid Akbar Shah, "For tribal reasons it had some years before been made a neutral village, and conferred on his grand-father, Zamin Shah, a refugee from Takhtabund [Takhtaband] in Bonair [Buner]." Sayyid Akbar Shah, a

treasure and counselor of Sayyid Ahmad, allowed Mujahidin to settled in Sithanah. J.W. Kaye, *Papers Relating to late Disturbances in North-West Frontier of India, India Office, 17 March 1864, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online* [henceforward *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*], stable URL, [http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/imageserver/pdf\\_download.cgi?FROMHOST=parlipapers.chadwyckco.uk&MLCOUNT=%280+items%29&USERAUTH=heidelberg%3AmczJSI8KowdGo%3A99opdqXXAo2Rs%3AZyWAXia2psOjA%3AdMMzw0%2FHG2PuI%3AUHd0fgGSuWikk&SUBSCRIBED=C19C20C21&WARNING=Y&DOWNLOAD=Y&PAGES=1-202&RECORD=1864-040445&PAPERNO=%28158%29&SESSNO=1864&TITLE=Papers+relating+to+late+Disturbances+in+N.W.+Frontier+of+India&VOLPAGE=XLIII.1&NUMPAGES=202&SELECTION=ALL&RANGE=1-202](http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/imageserver/pdf_download.cgi?FROMHOST=parlipapers.chadwyckco.uk&MLCOUNT=%280+items%29&USERAUTH=heidelberg%3AmczJSI8KowdGo%3A99opdqXXAo2Rs%3AZyWAXia2psOjA%3AdMMzw0%2FHG2PuI%3AUHd0fgGSuWikk&SUBSCRIBED=C19C20C21&WARNING=Y&DOWNLOAD=Y&PAGES=1-202&RECORD=1864-040445&PAPERNO=%28158%29&SESSNO=1864&TITLE=Papers+relating+to+late+Disturbances+in+N.W.+Frontier+of+India&VOLPAGE=XLIII.1&NUMPAGES=202&SELECTION=ALL&RANGE=1-202), (accessed on 21/07/2008), pp. 125-6. Also see

*Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*; Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup>“The Umbeyla Campaign,” *The Calcutta Review*, Vol. XL, No. LXXIX, 1864 (Calcutta: R.C. Lepage & Co., 1864), p. 183; *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 126. Also see *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*; Charles Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier; The Story of an Imperial Migraine* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977), p. 137; *Selections from the Records of the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies*, p. 49; Wylly, *The Borderland: The Country of the Pathans*, pp. 75-80; Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, p. 41; Shahpuri, *Sayyid Badshah ka Qafilah*, p. 207; Khatun, *Da Sawabai Tarikh*, pp. 179-87; Mehr, *Sarguzash-t-i-Mujahidin*, pp. 305-8; Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier*, p. 85; Shahbaz Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay* (Pashto) (Lower Dir: Pashto Department, University of Malakand, 2016), p. 32; John Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life* (London: Smith Elder & Co., 1895), p. 186; “The Umbeyla Campaign”. According to Kaka Khel, in the fighting of Sitana, Sayyid Umar Shah, brother of Sayyid Mubarak Shah died and Mubarak Shah wounded. see Bahadar Shah Zafar Kaka Khel, “Da Ambele Jang,” *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, February March 1982, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup>*Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, Vol. 1, *Tribes North of the Kabul River* (Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1907), pp. 226-7; W.H. Paget and A.H. Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Since the Annexation of the Punjab* (London: Whiting & Co., Ltd., 1884), p. 96; Wylly, *The Borderland: The Country of the Pathans*, p. 80; Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat*, pp. 32-4. After the expedition of 1858, the following agreement was extracted from the tribes. “The Otmanzais [Utmanzi] of Kabbul [Kabal] and kyah [Kaya], the Jydoons [Jadun], Upper and Lower, and Akhoond Kheyl [Akhund khel] of Chunnee pledge themselves not to permit the Syuds [Sayyids] or Hindoostanees [Hindustani], or any other offenders against the Government, to return to Sittana [Sithanah], or any of the village within their bounds; any of the contracting parties failing in this to bear the blame, and to be treated as an enemy by the other parties to the agreement.” *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 21

<sup>10</sup>A.H. Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, IOR: L/MIC/17/13/18 (Simla: Printed at the Government Central Printing Office, 1895), p. 7; *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 5. Also see Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, p. 32; Haider Ali Akhund Khel, *Buner Khudu Khel: Tarikhi, Tahqiqi, aur Saqafati Jaizah* (Mingawarah: Graphics World, 2008), pp. 96-7; *Hindustani Fanatics: An 1895 British Intelligence Report*, Cultural & Geographic Research, Tribal Analysis Center, September 2008, stable URL, <http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Hindustani%20Fanatics.pdf>, (accessed on 26/12/2012); Masal Shah Ghulam, “Hazrat Abdul Ghafur Saib,” *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, February March 1982, p. 94; Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p.102.



<sup>11</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 21.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p.5. W.W. Hunter also professed that in 1862, the number of Mujahidin increased and the Punjab authorities proposed another Frontier expedition. In his dispatch of 7 April 1862, the Secretary of State for India desired that sooner or later Mujahidin should be expelled by force of arms as "they were a lasting source of danger so long as they remained on our border." Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 24.

<sup>13</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 44.

<sup>14</sup>*Hindustani Fanatics: An 1895 British Intelligence Report; House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 126. Also see Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 378.

<sup>15</sup>Sadiq Hussain, *Sayyid Ahmad aur un ki Tahrik-i-Mujahidin*, Introduction by Amjad Ali Shakir (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Mezan Nashiran wa Tajiran Kutub, 2010), pp. 540-1

<sup>16</sup>It means consultative assembly; forum; council; council of the tribal chiefs. It has other meanings, composition, functions and uses in different contexts.

<sup>17</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 21.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup>Sayyid Mahmud Shah, cousin of Sayyid Mubarak Shah, was appointed *risaldar* and later posted to the Lahore Police and then discharged under reduction of police. He requested for granting him Sithanah which was rejected. This became an excuse for recapturing of Sithanah by the Sayyids. *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 21.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 15-6.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>24</sup>The Guides were established by Henry Lawrence in 1846, when he was a resident at Lahore with the object to prepare a small fighting force that would also guide regular unites in the field and provide intelligence for their commanders. The task of raising the Guides was given to Harry Lumsden, then 25 years old Assistant Political Agent in Peshawar. Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier*, p. 113.

<sup>25</sup>Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 25; *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 25, 40-1. Allah Bakhsh Yusufi claimed that in the attack on Guides' camp, Mawlwi Abdullah and Essa Malak forced the British to leave the field. Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 381.

<sup>26</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 19.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>28</sup>Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p. 126; *Hindustani Fanatics: An 1895 British Intelligence Report*. Hunter strongly attributed these acts to Mujahidin and Mubarak Shah. See Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup>A tenth part. According to Islamic law the Muslims are required to pay a portion of the produce of their land to the Islamic State at the rate of ten or five percent, which depends upon the nature of the water given to the fields, which is known as *ushar*. However, the heads under which it will be used and dispersed have also been specified.

<sup>30</sup>Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin*, pp. 308-9. Also see Shahpuri, *Sayyid Badshah ka Qafila*, pp. 222-3.

<sup>31</sup>Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin*, p. 310. Also see Hussain, *Sayyid Ahmad aor un ki Tahrik-i-Mujahidin*, p. 547.

<sup>32</sup>Muhammad Shafi Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad* (Urdu) (Peshawar: University book Agency, 1986), pp. 616-7.

<sup>33</sup>Abdul Halim Asar, *Ruhani Rabitah aw Ruhani Tarrun* (Pashto), Vol. 2 (Peshawar: University Book Agency, n.d.), pp. 912-3; Faqir Muhammad Abbas Qadriya, *Sufian, Darwaishan aw Ghazyen* (Pashto) (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1977), p. 36; Muhammad Amir Shah Qadri, *Tazkirah: Ulama wa Mashaikh Sarhad* (Urdu), Vol. 1 (Peshawar: Azim Publishing House, n.d.), p. 154; Mawlwi Inayatullah, "Da Swat Sahib da Jawand Azima Karnamah," *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, February March 1982, p. 45; Pir Ghohar, "Da Buner Ghaza," *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2,

February March 1982, p. 58; Farhan Shida, "Da Swat Babi Ji Saib," *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, February March 1982, p. 127.

<sup>34</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 43.

<sup>35</sup>Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State (1915—1969): From Genesis to Merger; An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Developments* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 26; *Hindustani Fanatics: An 1895 British Intelligence Report*.

<sup>36</sup>D.S. Richards, *The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars*, reprint (London: Pan Books, 2003), p. 67.

<sup>37</sup>A dye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 187.

<sup>38</sup>Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p. 105. For Ambela expedition also see, Shahpuri, *Sayyid Badshah ka Qafila*, pp. 230-46; Khatun, *Da Sawabai Tarikh*, pp. 186-91; H.C. Wylly, *From Black Mountain to Waziristan*, with an Introduction by Lieutenant-General Sir Horace L. Smith Dorrien, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003), pp. 63-75; Nevill, *Campaign on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 50-62; Khan Roshan Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht* (Urdu) (Karachi: Roshan Khan & Co., 1986), pp. 303-08; Mohiuddin Ahmad, *Saiyid Ahmad Shahid: His Life and Mission*, Introduction by S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1975), pp. 342-50; Muhammad Khawas Khan, *Royadad Mujahidin-i-Hind* (Lahore: Maktabah Rashidia Limited, 1983), pp. 276-81; Qayamuddin Ahmad, *The Wahabi Movement in India* (Calcutta: Firms K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1966), pp. 194-209; Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, pp. 552-68; Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat*, pp. 35-55; Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin*, pp. 345-65; A dye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, pp. 185-220; An Old Punjaubee, *The Panjaub and North-West Frontier of India* (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1878), pp. 45-50; T.R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849—1947* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), pp. 24-5; Michael Barthorp, *The North-West Frontier British India and Afghanistan: A Pictorial History, 1839—1947* (Poole: New Orchard Editions Ltd., 1986), pp. 56-60; Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, p. 139; Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier*, pp. 137-60; Salman Bangash, *The Frontier Tribal Belt: Genesis and Purpose under the Raj* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 264-9; A.H. McMahon and A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of the Malakand Political Agency (Exclusive of Chitral)*, revised by R.L. Kennion (Peshawar: Government Press, North-West Frontier Province, 1916), p. 35; A.H. McMahon and A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour Together with the Utman-Khel and Sam Ranizai*, edited with an introduction by R.O. Christensen, reprint (Peshawar: Saeed Book Bank, 1981), pp. 74-5; *Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-98*, pp. 267-8; J.G. Elliot, *The Frontier, 1839—1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India*, preface by Olaf Caroe (London: Cassel & Company Ltd., 1968), pp. 127-33; Marsden and Hopkins, *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier*, p. 89; Abdul Halim Asar Afghani, *Zamung Mujahidin* (Pashto), Vol. 2 (Peshawar: Muhkama Nashr-o-Ishaat Qabayal Hukumat-i-Pakistan, n.d.), p. 360.

<sup>39</sup>For detail study of the uprising of 1897, see, Ishtiaq Ahmad, *Pakhtun Resistance against British Rule: An Assessment of the Frontier Uprising of 1897*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of History University of Peshawar, 2017.

<sup>40</sup>Ittodus Thomas Prichard, *The Administration of India from 1859 to 1868: The First Ten Years of Administration under the Crown*, Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), p. 46.

<sup>41</sup>"The Umbeyla Campaign", pp. 188-9.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 147.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 202.

<sup>47</sup>Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, p. 68; *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*. *The Calcutta Review* mentions in this regard that, "to attempt then to force a passage over the Mahabun [Mahaban] to Mulkah [Malka] from the direction of the Indus—had such a route been possible, would have fallen short of its object, would have given time for the escape of the colony—and could have at best resulted in the destruction of the town itself.... forced across the Indus in face of troops echeloned on the opposite bank for their reception." See "The Umbeyla Campaign", pp. 186-7.

<sup>48</sup>"The Umbeyla Campaign", p. 187.

<sup>49</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 148-9.

<sup>50</sup>"The Umbeyla Campaign", pp. 190-1. *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 149. Also see Prichard, *The Administration of India*, p. 48; Darmesteter, "Afghan Life in Afghan Songs", p. 294; Kaka Khel, "Da Ambele Jang", p. 12; Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p.107.

<sup>51</sup>*Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, pp. 237-41; *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 62. Also see Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p.107.

<sup>52</sup>*Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*.

<sup>53</sup>The Amir of Mujahidin distributed the following proclamation before the British troops had received their final orders. "In the name of the Lord.—A large force of the infidels has arrived at Salim Khana with the object of plundering this country. It is therefore incumbent on you immediately on receipt of this letter to proceed to Chamla [Chamlah] and bring with you all your allies and retainers. Lose not a moment in carrying out these orders, else the infidels will plunder and devastate the whole of Chamla [Chamlah] and Boner and Swat and annex them; thus we shall lose at once our religion and property. Be true, therefore, to Islam, and be not careless. The Kafirs are, above all, treacherous and deceitful, they will enter your hills on any pretext, they will declare their quarrel is only with the Hindustanis, that they will in no wise harm a hair of your heads, but will return to their own lands once they have destroyed the Hindustani heretics. But believe them not, for assuredly they will take away your *izat*, and your herds and flocks, and will open your *purdah* and annex your lands and take away your religion, then will it be too late to regret—so take warning in time." Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, p. 121. Also see Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 192.

<sup>54</sup>Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, p. 33.

<sup>55</sup>Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, p. 68.

<sup>56</sup>Mehr, *Sarguzash-i-Mujahidin*, pp. 324-5.

<sup>57</sup>Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad*, p. 614.

<sup>58</sup>Colonel Taylor in his report described 28 October the day of the Akhund joining Mujahidin. *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 150. John Adye mentioned that Mubarak Shah and numerous tribes joined Mujahidin on 24 October. See Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 196. Also see *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*. According to Muhammad Fahim, Akhund joined Buner tribes on 27 October. Muhammad Fahim, "British Relations with the Akhund of Swat," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 1978), Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20847060> (accessed on 14/02/2013), p. 60.

<sup>59</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 132.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 75. Shahbaz Muhammad asserted that the plan of Mujahidin worked and the Bunerwals, Madda Khel, Chagharzi and Hasanzi tribes called the Akhund for help. He on 27 October reached to Buner with hundred standards. He was accompanied by Sherdil Khan of Aladand and his nephew Suhbat Khan. With the joining of Akhund, people from the other part of the province also joined Mujahidin. Mawlwi Abdullah himself take command of 900 Mujahidin. Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, p. 36. Also see

Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 384. For the strength of Akhund lakhkar also see Akhund Khel, *Buner Khudu Khel*, p. 98.

<sup>61</sup>Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, p. 10; *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*. Also see Rathbone Low, *Major-General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, Bart., V.C., G.C.B., C.I.E., R.A.: A Memoir* (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1883), p. 93; Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, pp. 282-90; Kaka Khel, "Da Ambele Jang", p. 12; Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p.119.

<sup>62</sup>Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 28.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>64</sup>*Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*.

<sup>65</sup>Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, p. 10. *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 133. Also see Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 193; Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 31.

<sup>66</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 173-4. Also see Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, p. 71; Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, pp. 31-2.

<sup>67</sup>Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, p. 10; *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*; Charles E. Stewart, *Through Persia in Disguise: With Reminiscences of the Indian Mutiny*, edited from his Diaries by Basil Stewart (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1911), p. 57, 69; Prichard, *The Administration of India from*, pp. 59-60. In the fighting on 18, 19, and 20 November, British casualties were; 75 wounded, 44 killed; 5 wounded, 3 killed and 110 wounded and 27 killed respectively. The bodies of those killed on 18 November recovered on 21 November. *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 88-91. For casualties on 20 November also see Stewart, *Through Persia in Disguise*, p. 67; Ghohar, "Da Buner Ghaza", pp. 55-6; Ghulam, "Hazrat Abdul Ghafur Saib", pp. 96-7.

<sup>68</sup>An old and most popular genre of the Pashto poetry and reflects all human feelings and aspirations elegantly.

<sup>69</sup>Sultan-i-Rome, *Tapay* (Pashto) (Mingawara: Shoaib Sons Publishers & Booksellers, 2018), p. 132; Muhammad Nawaz Khan, *Tarikhi Tapay* (Pashto) (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2004), p. 26.

<sup>70</sup>Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, p. 131.

<sup>71</sup>Akhund Khel, *Buner Khudu Khel*, p. 99.

<sup>72</sup>Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 206.

<sup>73</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 174-5.

<sup>74</sup>Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 32.

<sup>75</sup>Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad*, p. 625. John Adye also asserted that at the beginning of December there were five-and-twenty thousand men north of the Jhelum. See Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 205; **Fosbery**, "The Umbeyla Campaign" Lecture on Friday, April 12th, 1867, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. XI (London: W. Mitchell and Co., 1868), p. 549.

<sup>76</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 177. Also see Prichard, *The Administration of India*, p. 61.

<sup>77</sup>Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, p. 11; *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 97-8, 115-6. Also see Stewart, *Through Persia in Disguise*, pp. 72-5; Prichard, *The Administration of India*, pp. 61-4; Sabir, *Tarikh Suba Sarhad*, p. 627; Muhammad Pervish Shaheen, *Gulwariny Sukey* (Pashto) (Mingawarah: Shoaib Sons Publishers, 1989), pp. 116-7; Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>78</sup>Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 135-6.

<sup>80</sup>Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, pp. 287-8.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 178, 110. Also see Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, pp. 216-7.

<sup>83</sup>Muhammad Perwaish Shaheen, "Da Ambelay Ghaza," *Miyashtinay Pukhtu*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, February March 1982, p. 41. A similar story also narrated by Nasar. See Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat*, pp. 50-2.

<sup>84</sup>The tribal force taking the field under the tribal banner at the time of need without any payment, at own cost, arms and ammunition.

<sup>85</sup>Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat*, pp. 50-2.

<sup>86</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 174.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 178-86. Also see Prichard, *The Administration of India*, p. 65-6; Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, p. 72; Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 140-1; *Hindustani Fanatics: An 1895 British Intelligence Report*; Hussain, *Sayyid Ahmad aor un ki Tahrik-i-Mujahidin*, p. 558. According to Nasar, British troops burnt Malka and, on their return, destroyed Sithanah on 4 January 1864. Nasar, *Akhun Sahib Swat*, p. 54. James Darmesteter has wrongly argued that "Chamberlain, with his new unexpected allies [Buner *malaks*], went to Sithanah, burnt the camp, and came back through the fatal pass without firing a gun." Darmesteter, "Afghan Life in Afghan Songs", p. 94. According to Perwaish Shaheen, on 22 December last fight was fought in which both sides faced many casualties. See Shaheen, "Da Ambele Ghaza", p. 41. Farhan Shida asserted that British burnt Malka on 27 December. See Shida, "Da Swat Babi Ji Saib", p. 128.

<sup>89</sup>Masson, *Report on the Hindustani Fanatics*, p. 11; Richards, *The Savage Frontier*, p. 73; Low, *Major-General Sir Frederick S. Roberts*, p. 92; Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, pp. 290-2; Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier*, p. 141; Sydney Cotton, *Nine years on the North-West Frontier of India: From 1854 to 1863* (London: Richard Bentley, 1868), p. 245. Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, p. 43; *Fosbery*, "The Umbeyla Campaign", p. 549.

<sup>90</sup>Mundi was fort built by Mujahidin near Sitana. *Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*.

<sup>91</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 182.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>93</sup>Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 567. Also see Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht*, p.308.

<sup>94</sup>Akhund Khel, *Buner Khudu Khel*, p. 90; Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad*, p. 627; Kaka Khel, "Da Ambilay Jang", p. 14; Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 389.

<sup>95</sup>Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin*, p. 365.

<sup>96</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 154.

<sup>97</sup>Darmesteter, "Afghan Life in Afghan Songs", p. 94.

<sup>98</sup>Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 33.

<sup>99</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 153.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid.* Shahbaz Muhammad also narrated the same event and affirmed that when the British faced severe resistance, they turn towards their old policy of divide and rule and started conspiracies among the Pukhtuns. For this purpose, they got the services of Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan of Sudam and quoted the above letter that two bigger *malaks*, Ahmad Khan of Bagrah and Zaidullah Khan of Dagar wrote to him that he sent some trustworthy men for deal, and the Commissioner informed them that came with said person of Sudham. Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, pp. 38-9.

<sup>103</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 157.

<sup>104</sup>Stewart, *Through Persia in Disguise*, p. 72.

<sup>105</sup>Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 133-4.

<sup>106</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 173-4.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 173. Also see Muhammad, *Da Malakand Ghazaganay*, p. 39.

<sup>108</sup>Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, p. 134.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 134-5.

<sup>110</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 176-7.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid. p. 179. Also see Paget and Mason, *Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes*, p. 147. According to Roberts, the Buner *jargah* arrived on 15 and 16 December. Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, p. 290. Also see Salman Bangash, "British Frontier Wars: Nasty Not Nice: The Umbeyla Campaign (1863): A Critical Appraisal." *Central Asia* (Peshawar), No. 68 (Summer 2011), pp. 71-84.

<sup>112</sup>According to John Adye it consists of 400 men. See Adye, *Recollections of a Military Life*, p. 217.

<sup>113</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 179-80. Also see Fahim, "British Relations with the Akhund of Swat", p. 62.

<sup>114</sup>Akhund Khel, *Buner Khudu Khel*, p. 100.

<sup>115</sup>*Hindustani Fanatics: India's Pashtuns, and Deobandism*.

<sup>116</sup>Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, pp. 287-8; Scott, *Twenty Years on the North-West Frontier*, pp. 135-6.

<sup>117</sup>*House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, p. 179.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>120</sup>Qadri, *Tazkirah: Ulama wa Mashaikh Sarhad*, p. 155; Mehr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin*, p. 323; Sabir, *Tarikh Subah Sarhad*, pp. 615-6; Hussain, *Sayyid Ahmad aur un ki Tahrik-i-Mujahidin*, pp. 560-1.