

**THE INDIAN NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
FROM THE DURAND LINE AGREEMENT
TILL THE UPRISING OF 1897: THE ROLE
OF AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN IN THE LIGHT OF
BRITISH COLONIAL REPORTS**

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The Indian North-West Frontier from 1893 to 1897 remained the centre of activities relating not only to Calcutta and London but also Kabul. After the Durand Line Agreement, the Frontier region came directly under the British sphere of influence, however, the colonial authorities were obsessed with the Russian threat. Thus, a vigilant eye was kept on every movement of the tribes a routine practice of the colonial administration. Nonetheless, during the 1897 uprising, the colonial administrators without any hesitation held the Amir of Afghanistan responsible for instigating the tribes against them only to abandon that stance a little afterwards. This alteration in the previous stance of the British not only created confusion among scholarship, rather it resulted in the emergence of two diverse views. Therefore, despite its importance, the role of Amir Abdur Rahman during these four crucial years hardly attracted necessary scholarly attention. This paper with a descriptive and analytical approach identifies the lacuna in the existing literature and emphasizes the importance of the aforementioned period. Besides, it also analyses the role of Amir Abdur Rahman in international politics.

Keywords: Indian North-West Frontier, Durand Line Agreement, Amir Abdur Rahman, Uprising 1897, Frontier tribes

Introduction

It is instinctive in our minds when the frontier of India is mentioned, to think of the 'North-west Frontier' as the only frontier worthy of the name.¹

In the struggle for supremacy between England and Russia, Afghanistan was in a grim situation as both countries were greatly absorbing countries of the time. Due to their ambitions, Afghanistan faced an unbroken peril of impingement from both sides and also the trepidation of becoming a battleground in the case of war between the two. The Russian annexation of Merv in 1884, and the Panjdeh crisis in 1885, greatly alarmed the British about their Indian empire and hence they hastily drew a boundary line between Afghanistan and Russia.²

After the demarcation of the boundary with Russia in 1887, Afghanistan's tension from the Russian side was a little reduced, but the threat from the British side persisted. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901)³ [henceforward Amir] requested a discussion about a boundary line with the viceroy, Marquis of Dufferin and Ripon but the illness of the Amir and Turkistan rebellion in Afghanistan delayed it. In 1890, he again approached the British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury. This time the Viceroy of India, Lord Lansdowne, appointed Lord Roberts the head of the commission but due to Lord Roberts being *persona non grata* because of among the Afghans and the Hazara rebellion in Afghanistan, the Amir resorted to delaying tactics.⁴ Finally, the British mission under Sir Henry Mortimer Durand arrived Kabul and signed the Durand Line Agreement on 12 November 1893.⁵

The Durand line Agreement further worsened the situation of the Frontier. Though the resistance, rising, and disturbances along the Durand Line were not new for the British, but after the Agreement suspicion of the Amir increased and every movement of the tribes was attributed to him. In the Frontier uprising of 1897⁶ too the Amir was suspected more than any other actor. The British officers of the Frontier neither simply ignored the Amir nor held him fully responsible. This stance of the British was not only ambiguous but also divided future writers. This practice continues in the modern era. States, for their interests generally ignore theirs as well as other States' activities but at the end truth dawns. This is the reason that position of the Amir is still ambiguous. In this paper too, the role of the Amir is studied in the light of international politics. Besides, throughout this paper local terms are given in such a manner to conform to the local Pukhtu/Pashto rendering and pronunciation.

Amir, British and the Frontier Tribes before the Durand Line Agreement

Though after the Durand Line Agreement the Frontier region⁷ came

under the sphere of influence of the British, but before and without this agreement, colonial Britons were in no way ready to give up these so-called independent tribal areas. In 1890, J.B. Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, wrote in his confidential note:

The events which led to our expelling Sher Ali [Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan] and assisting Abdul Rahman [Abdur Rahman] to take his place are sufficient to justify any change of policy which is necessary. I [J.B. Lyall] only mean to point out that a distinct new departure is being taken, and that we can expect any Amir of Afghanistan to regard as other than aggressive and unfair to himself a policy by which our political frontier will be extended so as to include all these so-called independent tribes between our old boundary and tracts now actually held and governed by the Amir.⁸

Lyall further asserted that the Amir had come to know about this policy and he already had informed the colonial authorities of his of the Amir and his subjects apprehension. He further asserted that some of the top British officers in Frontier worked hard for the improvement of relations between the British and the independent tribes, and steadily assured them that the British had no intent to interfere in any way with their freedom. And this assurance affirmed Lyall, was necessary for friendly relations with the tribes, as in case of war with Russia, the British must advance to Afghanistan, and in that case, if British were not in friendly footings with the tribes, they defiantly would create hurdles for the British.⁹

A similar view was also forwarded by Sir Percy Sykes who recognized that it was the view of the British government from long before that Chitral, Bajawar, Dir, and Swat shall not be under Afghan influence and rule. "This view had been firmly stated in 1861 when Dost Muhammad [Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan] advanced claims to Bajaur [Bajawar]; and in 1877 Shir [Sher] Ali [Khan, Amir of Afghanistan] was warned that any interference with Bajaur [Bajawar], Swat, Dir and Chitral would constitute a contravention of the treaty engagement."¹⁰

On the other side, the Amir also tried his best to retain the so-called independent belt with him, and for that purpose induced the tribes to accept his suzerainty. The Amir asserted that as every government tried to get as much of the land under their influence, he too, tried to get as much share as he could in those provinces which were formerly under Afghanistan.¹¹ For the purpose, he did not put any pressure on the

British authorities but put the responsibility on the Afghan loyal *malaks*¹². In this connection, Malak Rahmat Shah visited Dawar country to coax the people to come under the Amir's yoke. Upon that, the Dawar tribe held a *jargah*¹³ and decided that they were ready to succumb to the Amir and also allowed him to construct two military cantonments in the Dawar country. Besides, they also agreed to give two hundred youngmen for the Afghan military service on the condition that in future neither the Amir nor his officials would tyrannize them.¹⁴

On 20 May 1893, a deputation of the Waziris, under Akbar Khan and Toul, had an audience with the Amir. In this meeting, the Amir openly showed his resentment against the Wazir tribe. The Amir expressed that when the British troops entered Biland Khel, he expected resistance but the Waziris remained quiet. He maintained: "I am surrounded by enemies; whatever I do or say does not remain a secret, and at once it is out. I have got a man of Eastern power (referring to the British Government) in my court." The Amir further averred: "I expected all the Muhammadans to act according to the principles of Muhammadan religion, and obey the sovereign, which duties were imposed upon them, but I was sorry to observe that they did not care much for the religion." The Waziris replied that they had landed property in the British area and could not go against the British government.¹⁵

On 22 June 1893, Banochai, Gul Sher, Sath and Gulandon had a private audience with the Amir. At this occasion the Amir with great annoyance declared:

The Waziris played a double game and handed over his [the Amir] letters to British authorities. He was not going to declare war against the British Government for the Waziri country, but was going to decide the question amicably. If the supremacy of the Waziri country came to the lot of Afghanistan, he was going to take it; otherwise the British Government were to look after it. Then abusive language was used as to how the British soldiery will dishonour the Waziri women. Then the Amir abused the Commissioner of Derajat Division.¹⁶

The Amir, in a private *darbar*,¹⁷ informed a few men of the Wazir and other tribes that the British government offered him an amount of 26000000 rupees per *annum* as a subsidy for Wazir and other adjacent areas, but for the sack of Islam and his country he refused the offer. According to the Amir, the bone of contention between him and the

British were the countries of Bajawar, Tirah, and Waziristan. He also informed the audience that after the return of Mr. Pyne¹⁸ he will be able to know the views of the British.¹⁹

The Amir, on another occasion, again expressed that the Waziri played a double game with him. For six months they remained friends of the Amir and for six months of the British government. "The Afghan custom compelled him [the Amir] to give them food, otherwise he [the Amir] did not like to show them even this favour. In a short time he was going to decide the question of the supremacy of their country with the British Government."²⁰

In 1893, Malak Tarin Khan, a Waziri Malak, made two propositions to the Amir. First, the British made encroachments and inducing the various tribes to bend to their yoke, therefore he must be given one regiment of cavalry and one of infantry after which he would be able to bring down the Kabul Khel, Dawar and Mehsud to subjugation. And second, he proposed the construction of three forts at Biland Khel, Haider Khel (in Dawar country), and Wana (in Zali Khel country). To the first proposal, the Amir replied:

He [the Amir] was certain that the British Government were not going to take possession of the independent tribes. In case they were determined to take possession, such a lion will come upon the scene that the British Government will have to encounter many difficulties, and would not know how to proceed.²¹

For the second proposal, the Amir said that for a year he had no intention to do anything wrong in this regard.²²

Similarly, Sardar Shirindil Khan repeatedly asked the Dawar tribe to accept the Amir's suzerainty. Upon this, a Dawar *jargah* held at Miran Shah in which they decided that if "the Amir fixed a good annual allowance for their tribe, entered into an agreement of light assessment and future good treatment, they had no objection whatever to bend to his rule, otherwise they would make up with the British Government and resist if an Afghan expedition were sent against them."²³ The tribe, in a letter, narrated all the above and dispatched it to the Amir. The letter was handed over to Mirza Dawud but did not receive any reply till the compilation of this report. However, the Dawar deputation met the Amir who at that time was very impolite towards them and others. The Amir addressed the Dawars, "*Janazah [Jana zah] pazur malk nisam, nache*

pa rupi, i.e., he was going to annex the country by force not by expenses.”²⁴

The Amir said on 10 August 1893, at Kala-i-Mir Ahmad Shah, to Banochi Khan Zali Khel who led a deputation of 105 men:

The British Government and myself [the Amir] are friends. The British Government claim the Mahsud, Darwesh and Dawar to be their subjects, whereas I maintain the country. The understanding and agreement between the two States is that the tribes are at liberty to choose either as their ruler and submit to him. You should not enter into any quarrel with the English, for I am greatly annoyed at such conduct.²⁵

Then the Amir showed some papers to the deputation and declared that the British had annexed the border country but they should not be displeased with it as the British had written to him for the division of the border area. The Amir assured them that he will keep their country with him and also granted large allowances to them and their children. He continued;

So long as the partition of the country has not been effected between the English and myself, you had better be polite and submissive to both the States. Do not enter into any quarrel with the English if you can possibly avoid it.²⁶

Malak Tarin Khan asked the Amir for one hundred Afghan subjects to be enlisted as the Waziris could not perform their duty. Upon this, the Amir replied that the *malak* had to enlist a hundred men from the independent area and tease and Biland Khel and others who had some connection with the British Government. In the case of Afghan subjects, the Amir would be blamed and accountable for their misconduct.²⁷ But when Muhammad Sharif Khan, ex-Chief of Dir, asked the Amir for help in the shape of troops, he replied, “that if the Khan wished to accept his (His Highness’s) jau and jawi bread, the Khan was welcome... in case the Khan wanted Dir, he was to go to the British and ask for assistance.”²⁸

Sometime before the Durand Line Agreement, the Amir asked British authorities for the map of the India-Afghan border to be demarcated. After seeing the map in which the areas of Waziristan, New Chaman, Biland Khel, Mohmand, Asmar, and Chitral were under the British sphere of influence, the Amir wrote a letter to the Viceroy of India, the abstract of which states:

As to these frontier tribes known by the name of Yaghistan, *if they were included in my dominions I should be able to make them fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslim ruler (myself)* [my Italic]. And these people being brave warriors and staunch Mahomedans, would make a very strong force to fight against any power which might invade India or Afghanistan. I will gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great Britain. But if you should cut them out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. You must remember that they are like a weak enemy who can be held under the feet of a strong enemy, as long as he is strong; and the moment he ceases to be strong enough to hold him, the weak one gets out of his hold and attacks him in return. In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subject, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your Government.²⁹

Frontier after the Durand Line Agreement

However, disregarding the situation of the so-called independent tribal belt, the ambitions of the Amir and the British, and the interests and intentions of the tribes, both countries (Afghanistan and British India) agreed to the Durand Line Agreement. As a result, this agreement not only divided the Frontier tribesmen but also brought the majority of them under the British sphere of influence.³⁰ Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, wrote that the:

Sphere of influence or the sphere of protection is objectionable for two reasons, *viz.-1st*, because it might, at some points of the line, cast on us [the British] obligations of the very onerous nature without any commensurate advantages; and *2nd*, because it might alarm the tribes and set them against us.³¹

H.L. Nevill contended that different causes were attributed to the

uprising of 1897, but the one which seems to be at the root of the whole matter was the Durand Line Agreement and the subsequent demarcation of the frontier.³² C.C. Davies in *The Cambridge History of India* also stated that the demarcation of the boundary line considerably facilitated Frontier administration, but that agreement not only increased the responsibilities of the British government but also increased the chances of collision with the tribes. It was natural that the Pukhtun tribes considered it a preliminary step to the occupation of their country.³³ H.D. Hutchinson wrote:

We may explain to them as much as we like, and protest as loudly as we can, but when they see the long line of boundary pillars going up; when they are told that henceforth all inside that line practically belongs to the British *Raj*, and that from this time their allegiance must be to us; and when, finally, they note our surveyors at work, mapping their country and measuring their fields, their reflection is, "Methinks you do protest too much!" And they are irresistibly driven to the conclusion that their country is annexed, and their independence gone.³⁴

After the agreement, both the signatories, the British and Afghanistan, formed a joint commission for the demarcation of the boundary line, the work on which commenced in October 1894, in South Waziristan. The Amir also urged the British government for delimitation of the boundary line as a telegram, published in *The Times*, stated:

The Ameer [Amir Abdur Rahman] having asked the Government of India to expedite the demarcation of the boundaries of Afghanistan under the Durand agreement, the work will be taken in hand at once on the Khyber, Kurram, and Beluchistan [Baluchistan] frontiers. It will be carried on by the local political officers. There may be some delay before the demarcation of the Waziristan and Bajaur [Bajawar] boundaries is undertaken.³⁵

As the boundary pillars were erected, the tribesmen whose apprehensions increased till they attacked the camp at Wana. According to Hutchinson, they thus rudely and emphatically made their protest against the British presence and work.³⁶ H.L. Nevill observed, the tribesmen considered the matter from their point of view and did not like the idea of being under British jurisdiction. They were afraid of losing

their independence and hence opposed the demarcation of the boundary from the very beginning.³⁷ Bijan Omrani analysed that “the officers who were demarcating the Line soon found themselves the object of unwelcome attention, mainly in bullet form. By 1897, there was a general uprising all over the area, which it took 60,000 British regular troops to pacify.”³⁸

Amir Abdur Rahman and the Uprising of 1897

In the history of the Indian North West Frontier, after the Durand Line Agreement, the next grim episode was the uprising of 1897. During the early months of the uprising of 1897, no men were so bitterly slated and remained in the official correspondence of the colonial government, as were Amir Abdur Rahman and his *sipah salar* (Commandor-in-Chief), Ghulam Haidar Khan Charkhi. The whole uprising was attributed to them and especially the Malakand and Mohmand risings were considered a deliberate interference on their part as Major Deane, Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral put all the responsibility on the Amir and his *sipah salar*. According to Major Deane, the uprising was the outcome of the steady and continual work of the Afghan Amir and his agents, which started in 1895.³⁹ In his letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Major Deane wrote that “the Sipah Salar’s intrigues on the border, the constant working by the Amir of Kabul through the Adda Mullah in Bajaur [Bajawar] and the Mianguls in Upper Swat to arouse fanaticism have the one object to embarrass Government by creating disturbances, which would entail the movements of troops against and the shedding of blood of those who are at present working for [the colonial] Government.”⁴⁰

D.S. Richards contended that the Amir became increasingly bitter over the Durand Agreement, and early in the summer of 1897, he addressed a meeting of the *mullas*⁴¹ from the Frontier and other parts of Afghanistan. He urged upon them their duty to preach holy war against the infidels and on his part, he promised military support.⁴² Woosnam Mills asserted that these *mullas*⁴³ were the persons through whom the tribes could be mobilized against the British. He blamed the Amir by raising the questions that “why did Abdur Rahman hold a conference of these men? If it was to enjoin them to preserve peace on the frontier, where was the necessity? Was not the frontier in peace?”⁴⁴ T.H. Holdich also questioned that “what was it that he wished to teach them at that special time?”⁴⁵ Lionel James also bitterly criticized the

Amir due to his books and has contended that the summoning of the *mullas* to Kabul alone was a sufficient foundation for the Amir's instigation. "Such quotations as the following⁴⁶ and the Amir's book bristles with them could not but be weapons in the hands of fanatics."⁴⁷

A more potent concern for the British about the Afghan Amir was about the two titles he assumed and two books he wrote years earlier. In 1889, he called himself King of Islam and in 1896, light of the religion and of the faith. His two books were entitled *Rectification of the Faith* and *Inducement for a Holy War*.⁴⁸ It was reported that about sixty copies of the Amir's book were sent to Adda Mulla by the Afghan *hakim* of Kunar for distribution among the Mohmands before the outbreak. Later, India Office's officials heard about a third book, *Advice to Afghans*, published sometime after 1893.⁴⁹ "The Amir is behaving worse than ever", wrote Sir Mortimer Durand in 1892, and "tells us he is King of the Afridis, and almost admits that he has stirred them up against us."⁵⁰

R.A. Johnson asserted that when disputes arose over the Indo-Afghan border, the Afghan Amir was eager to acquire territory having no regard for British interests. Although he played no direct part in the uprising, he did supply arms and ammunition to the Afridis and Orakzais.⁵¹ After the Malakand rising the colonial authorities sent Abdul Hamid as a spy to collect information from the people of Swat. He reported that since the commencement of the Turko-Greek war, the Amir sent *mullas* to excite the tribes on the border and also opened shops to sell rifles and ammunition at low prices to the different tribesmen. "If there were no movement from his (the Amir's) side, Muhammadan tribes would never dare to disturb the British raj."⁵²

Besides the Amir, his *sipah salar*, Ghulam Haidar Khan, has also been deemed as hostile to the British; as he had corresponded with the leading *mullas* on the border, i.e. Sartor Faqir, Adda Mulla, and Sayyid Akbar Mulla and helped the tribesmen with arms, ammunition and even men.⁵³ J.G. Elliot was also of the same opinion "in fact the outbreak was largely the work of one man, the Afghan Commander in Jalalabad, Ghulam Haidar."⁵⁴ During the uprising, the Amir was warned by the British officials that he should remove the *sipah salar* or the Amir must be held responsible for his actions.⁵⁵ Major Deane, reported that the *sipah salar* told the Amir that the British would invade Afghanistan once they had dealt with the tribes. George White, the British Commander-in-Chief in India, told Lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, "I believe the *sipah salar* to be steeped in intrigue against us."⁵⁶

Rumours about the Amir during the Uprising of 1897

During the uprising of 1897, many rumours about the Amir's involvement were also in the air throughout the Frontier region as well as in the whole of India which coloured the public and some of the colonial administrators' perceptions against the Amir. Among these rumours, one was reported by a *sawar*⁵⁷ of the British army that the Amir supplies rifles at the rate of two rupees per rifle to those who wish to take part in the war against the British, and also sent 200 men of his army for the support of the tribes. The Deputy Inspector of Shahabad also reported a similar rumour. Another rumour received from Bannu on 14 August 1897, was that the Amir had given permission to his soldiers to join the fight but instructed them not to take their uniform with them.⁵⁸ It was also rumoured that the Amir announced the sale of 5000 muzzle-loading rifles at eight rupees a rifle. A British messenger from Jalalabad reported that according to the Amir's order some eighty rafts were lying in the river between Jalalabad and Girdi Kutch, ready to take the *ghazis*⁵⁹ to the Adda Mulla. It was also reported that several rafts, laden with grain, left Jalalabad daily for Lalpura for the Adda Mulla's *lakhkar*⁶⁰, and the *sipah salar* also sent two rafts laden with rifles for Adda Mulla.⁶¹ On 7 September 1897, the Deputy Commissioner Kohat reported that two spies saw two Afghan regiments in Mufti, bringing ammunition sent by the Amir to the Afridis.⁶² A toll collector at Dakka reported:

The Governors of Jalalabad, Kunar and Lughman had been ordered by the Amir to summon and warn the Maliks that they should not leave Afghan territory openly with banners and their tribesmen to join Mullah Najam-ud-din as it would create suspicious against the Afghan State, but that it was not his intention to stop them from joining the Ghazis and they could do so singly.⁶³

In this way, some rumours in favour of Amir also come to the front. As in the *Khyber Diary*, the colonial authorities reported that Malak Khawas Khan Zakha Khel demanded from the Amir a few thousand arms and cartridges "in connection with the reported expedition by the British against the Mohmands." The Amir replied that he would not allow a single cartridge to him and did not care that "whether he and his tribe become subject or remain independent."⁶⁴ It was reported by a Bajawar traveler that some Mohmands asked the *sipah salar* and the Governor of Jalalabad to join the Malakand rising but both replied that

they cannot give any advice to them in this matter.⁶⁵ In *Peshawar Confidential Diary*, it is written that some Afghan sepoys, encamped in Asmar, who were the disciples of Adda Mulla asked the *sipah salar* about their joining the Adda Mulla. The *sipah salar* replied that they can join him upon their own will but must leave their uniform and their names will be struck-off from the Afghan army.⁶⁶

Analysis

Colonial writers criticized the Amir for the publication of his books. Interestingly, these books were not new publications but published in 1886 and 1889 respectively.⁶⁷ It was after the uprising that the colonial administrators at once made these books and its author responsible for the uprising. The assumption of the titles and publication of these books were only for the political purpose as Amir Abdur Rahman was bitterly criticized for his friendship with the British. H.F. Walter reported that the coalition of the *mullas* was largely due to the influence of the Amir, who in June 1889, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Swat, Buner, Dir, Bajawar and Chitral urging them to look him for advice and obey him as a King of Islam. But the object behind this was strengthening his rule, as in the previous years, the *mullas* turned against him due to his friendship with the British. By his assumption of the title, he silenced many of them and the tribes looked him as their spiritual leader and henceforth he lost no opportunity of increasing his spiritual influence. His book *Taqwim-ud-din* (rectification of the faith) was published with this object.⁶⁸ On 17 August 1896, he adopted the title of *Zia-ul-Millat-wa-ud-Din* (light of the religion and faith).

In formally announcing this fact to the Government of India, he wrote that it was the unanimous request of his people that he should be thus honoured in recognition of all that he had done for the country. The 17th August is now recognized as a public holiday throughout Afghanistan and is known as the “*Jashn-i-Muttafikya*” or the “*Festival of Unanimity*”.⁶⁹

The similar view, the Amir himself too has put forward in his autobiography:

On my part, I was unable to show my friendship publicly to the extent that was necessary: because my people were ignorant and

fanatical. If I showed any inclination towards the English, my people would call me an infidel for joining hands with infidels, and they would proclaim a religious holy war against me. I knew that so long as I did not clear out of my country these fanatics and rebels, I could neither show my friendship fully, nor carry it out to its fullest extent.⁷⁰

An unknown author by the name of Ex-Political also wrote:

“Two Kabul books,” presumably on waging war against “infidels,” may also be ascribed to the Amir, but to understand his difficult position properly, both as regards his own fanatical subjects and his unflinching loyalty to the British Government, it is necessary to weigh with impartiality these conflicting attitudes with their practical result of securing the friendship of Afghanistan.⁷¹

It was reported that the Sartip of Dakka, Muhammad Husain Khan, was directed by the Amir that the future petitions of Malak Feroz Afridi of Chora to the Amir would be forwarded through him and not by Afghan Post Office at Peshawar. It is also said that the Amir granted an allowance of 5000 rupees to Malak Feroz.⁷² The Deputy Inspector of Rawalpindi reported that Malak Feroz received a *farman* of the Amir in which the *malak* was directed to raise an Afridi *lakhkar*. The men would be paid 8 rupees per *mansem* and supplied with arms. Besides, Malak Feroz would get 7000 allowance per *annum*. L.W. Dane, Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, forwarded these reports to Political Officer Khyber for verification.⁷³ He enquired and reported that the above reports were rumours and he “is unable to verify the news as it has no legs to stand upon.”⁷⁴ After the punitive expedition in Swat, on 30 October 1897, the Miangul grandson of the Akhund of Swat (Saidu Baba) with his brother Gul Badshah, the Passani Mulla and some 600 *malaks* of Upper Swat arrived at Chakdara, where Major Deane, interviewed the *jargah*. Major Deane had a private interview with the Mianguls and one of their *mullas*. At this occasion Mahmud, the leading *sheikh*⁷⁵ with the eldest Miangul, in his interview, stated to Major Deane:

For a long time past correspondence had been received from the Hadda Mulla, and, about a month before these disturbances, a letter came from him saying there was going to be a “ghaza”. The Mianguls then wrote to certain leading Khans in the Peshawar

District asking to be informed if any “muqadama,” or hostilities broke out anywhere between Government and Muhammadans. He says that the Mianguls also wrote to the Amir of Kabul through the Sipah Salar, asking if he would assist in a jehad, and the Amir replied that he was a friend of [colonial] Government, and would have nothing to do with it.⁷⁶

Mahmud was an aged man and accompanied the Akhund in the Ambela campaign too. According to him, Adda Mulla sent letters to the Mianguls before the uprising which as per the report of Major Deane was the indication of a pre-planned attack instigated by the Amir. But it is clear from Mahmud’s interview that the Mianguls wrote letters to the Amir but the latter rejected Mianguls’ petitions. Besides, the Mianguls joined Sartor Faqir on the fourth day of the fighting at Malakand and also tried to stop the Sartor Faqir before the rising. When Major Deane asked about the Sartor Faqir from the *khans*⁷⁷ of Thana, they showed him the Mianguls’ letter in which they have asked the *khans* to remove the Sartor Faqir from Landakay. The relations between the Sartor Faqir and the Mianguls were also not cordial which further increase the doubt on the theory of Amir’s involvement in the Malakand rising. It was Major Deane’s negligence rather the Amir’s involvement. If Major Deane did the same earlier which he ordered on the night of the attack, the minor gathering of the *faqir*⁷⁸ could have been easily dispersed.

Major Deane reported that “this business [Malakand rising] has been worked up by the large sum of money paid from Kabul to some influential Mullah in India whose representative returned through Mardan on his way to Kabul a few days ago.”⁷⁹ The Commissioner Peshawar asked Major Deane regarding Kabul’s above intrigues. He replied that it was told by Khawaja Muhammad Khan of Hoti to Lieutenant Lockhart of the Guides. The Commissioner Peshawar personally inquired about the matter and found the above report as a false one.⁸⁰

Later Major Deane maintained that the outbreak was stirred up directly by *mullas* and *faqirs*, while a Muhammadan ruler like the Amir had to face disturbances raised in the same way.⁸¹ He further avowed that he did not relinquish the view that he held that the Amir and his officials had directly incited that disturbances, but without his incitement and without any local cause for discontent, the ill-will of the *mullas* and the ignorant nature of the people were sufficient to account for what had occurred.⁸²

The General Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force informed

Simla from Lakarai that there was good ground to believe that some one hundred Afghan sepoys were in the Adda Mulla *lakhkar*.⁸³ The Commissioner Peshawar also reported that he was sure that the gathering at Shabqadar was joined by the Amir's subjects.⁸⁴ Similarly, the General Officer Commanding Malakand Field Force informed Simla that Mohmand *jargah* informed Native Political Officer that the Afghan *sipah salar* encouraged them to attack British and in case of losses the *sipah salar* would compensate for it.⁸⁵ On 12 August 1897, the Viceroy of India, in a telegram, directed the Commissioner Peshawar to immediately dispatch his letter to the Amir, in which the Viceroy mentioned, that he had received information from several sources, that a large number of Afghan people and soldiers in plain clothes were involved in the attack on Shabqadar fort. Besides, "the villages of Chardeh, Ambarkhana, Basawal, Girdi, Sarkani and Lal Pura" kept rafts ready for the passage of various contingents. The Commissioner forwarded to the Amir:

His Excellency [the Viceroy] demands that you will immediately take steps to recall your subjects, prevent other to crossing Your Highness's [the Amir] border with hostile intent, and render it impossible for them to repeat an offence so exceedingly grave as this deliberate violation of the British Indian frontier. The Viceroy in his letter of May 2nd, 1896, called Your Highness's [the Amir] attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan. It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn Your Highness that if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, Your Highness must be held responsible for his action.⁸⁶

The Amir replied that neither the *sipah salar* or any other single man of the Afghan army was with Adda Mulla nor would anyone join him.⁸⁷ As regards the tribesmen, he wrote that due to his fear they cannot join such a movement openly, and if anyone had gone, he would have done secretly. About Adda Mulla, the Amir maintained that he had fled from Kabul some years before and settled at Jarobi in Peshawar district. The British officers had called him several times but he did not appear, although he maintained correspondence with them. The Amir wrote:

Every Mullah raised the people against me as long as he could, and

when he had failed he used to take shelter within the limits of the British Government, and by the magnanimity of the Government a morsel of bread used to be given to him upon which these Mullahs used to maintain themselves. These now are the very same Mullahs who had fled from me and have settled in territory which is independent of me near Peshawar. In what way then can I manage them?⁸⁸

The Amir did not stop here and further wrote:

As it has been or may have been reported to you that the regular army or the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan is taking part in this disturbances this is all a fabrication and I myself take oath that neither the troops nor the trusted officers of Afghanistan have any part in this matter. Every word that may have reached the ears of the trusted officers of the British Government is without foundation.⁸⁹

The Commissioner Peshawar forwarded his remarks to the Viceroy of India upon the Amir's letter that it is true that Adda Mulla had fled from the Amir, but afterward their relations had improved. The Commissioner Peshawar committed to mention any relations of colonial administrators with Adda Mulla and maintained that "the Mohmand village of Jarobi in which the Mullah resides belongs to the Usman Khel section of the Baizai clan. It is therefore on the Amir's side of the political boundary agreed upon last spring which gives to us only the Musa Khel section of the Baizais."⁹⁰

In another letter to the Viceroy, the Amir wrote about the Jarobi⁹¹ position that up to this time no decision has been come to concerning these places, it will undoubtedly, be as you have written.⁹² When the Viceroy wrote to the Amir that his subjects have openly gathered and formed themselves into separate bands, with flags flying and drums beating, crossed the Kabul river and joined the party of Adda Mulla, and asked him to order his local officers to prevent his subjects from crossing the frontier and to appoint guards along the Kabul river and at the other places. The Amir rejected this claim and professed that he had ordered the local officers to keep watch on Afghan subjects and prevent them from joining the Adda Mulla.

Thus the inhabitants of Lamkan (Laghman) had collected a large number of people, numbering about 30,000 men, and prepared flags,

but on the officers receiving my orders, they used their best endeavors and succeeded in dispersing them; and they all returned to their homes. *No doubt the news-writers on the frontier must have communicated this report to Your Excellency [my italic].*⁹³

The Amir maintained that it is impossible that someone openly joined the Adda Mulla from his side, however, some followers of his had great faith in the Mulla and might have gone at night like thieves by infrequent roads. "How is it possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier?" Regarding the posting of guards, the Amir opined, such arrangements can only be possible by posting 10000 guards on all the passes and roads, as far as possible, the local officials have been watching and will watch any open movement of the tribesmen.⁹⁴

On 13 August 1897, the Amir issued a lengthy proclamation to all Afghans in Pashto. In it, he also mentioned the periods of Amir Sher Ali Khan (1863-1879) and Amir Yaqub Khan (1879) and labelled them foolish who were removed due to the British enmity. He further declared:

When I [the Amir] arrived and became king of Afghanistan I had a firm belief in my mind that Amir Sher Ali Khan had acted wrongly, and that the prosperity and decline of the kingdom of Afghanistan depend entirely on the British Government. And, as help from other countries, such as Russia, Germany, Turkey, France, Italy and others, could not reach Afghanistan. I considered it advisable to assure and satisfy the British Government in every way, so that they might not take possession of the country, but might defend us in the event of some enemy rising against us. It is for these reasons that I made the boundary demarcation with them, which, by the grace of God, has come to a conclusion.⁹⁵

The Amir showed resentment towards the Frontier tribes and asserted that when Sir Mortimer Durand came to Kabul for the boundary settlement, he showed him the letters of the elders and people of Bajawar, Swat, Mohmand and the Afridis of Tirah, stating that they were willing to come under the British rule.

Now you [the Frontier tribes] should be considered and look with an impartial eye whether I am wrong in considering you as belonging to British territory, after I have seen your letters expressing

willingness to come under the British rule. Is there any remedy for what you have done yourselves?⁹⁶

He further maintained that first, you showed allegiance to the British government by giving them agreements and receiving allowances from them, and then raised disturbances and rebellion on the instigation of a *faqir*, “and as you did not consult me when you raised this revolt, you are not now justified in throwing blame on me [the Amir].”⁹⁷ He then made a complaint against the tribes and professed that the people and tribesmen of every country ought to leave all their affairs to the disposal of their king, but every Afghan considered himself as a king and tries to settle his affairs with the British directly.

Now what connection remains between you and the king of Islam that you complain against him? As you yourselves are kings, you should settle your affairs yourselves. With these facts in your minds do you not feel ashamed when you talk among yourselves that the English are killing you and the Amir does not take care of you? You want the monarch of the age to follow your foolish example. You yourselves are like asses and oxen. Why should I feel it necessary to ruin myself on your behalf? If you chose even now to leave yourselves to my disposal and authority I shall try, please God, to settle your affairs with the British Government satisfactorily.⁹⁸

He also criticized the *mullas* and stated:

Why do you call these disturbances *jehad* or *ghaza*? The (right) time will come for *jehad* and when it does come it will be announced to you..... the first condition of a *jehad* is the co-operation of the king of Islam. It is curious that the king is on friendly terms with the English and (yet) you are making a fuss about *jehad*.⁹⁹

In conclusion, he avowed:

In short, I have nothing to do with your affairs, and have no concern with you, because I have no trust on you. Do not be led to think that, like Amir Sher Ali Khan, I am [I am] such a fool as to annoy and offend others for your sake. Your real object is to make me fight with the British Government, and if I were to do such a foolish thing I am sure you would assume the position of simple spectators. For my part you should rest assured.¹⁰⁰

The British Agent at Kabul informed Secretary to the Government of India through a letter that in a large assembly, assembled at the Amir's palace on the anniversary of the assumption of the "Zia-Ul-Millat Waddin", he swore more than once that he would always maintain friendly relations with the British government, and that he never had wished to do any harm to them.¹⁰¹ In the *Khyber Political Diary*, it had been reported that the Amir had issued a general proclamation to his subjects in the Jalalabad district that anybody who left the Afghan territory and took part in the *ghaza*¹⁰², would be fined Rs. 1000 in each case of disobedience.¹⁰³

In a telegram, dated 7 October 1897, the Foreign Secretary wrote to Major Deane, to "please bear in mind that Government will report any correspondence of this kind to the Amir, and it is essential to be accurate as to facts on which your communication is based. If you do write, you may add that facts will be reported to Government of India, who will, doubtless, communicate with Amir."¹⁰⁴ In another letter to the Amir, the Viceroy informed him that the colonial authorities found a letter of the Adda Mulla to the Mianguls of Swat in which the former informed the latter that the Amir informed the Adda Mulla that after consulting his military officers he would again write to him about jihad¹⁰⁵. The Viceroy affirmed:

In this way, Najm-ud-din has tried to make mischief between Your Highness and the Government of India; and it is not to be wondered at if, under such circumstances, people believe that they will not incur Your Highness's displeasure by acting in a hostile manner towards the British Government.¹⁰⁶

Similarly, the Amir turned back the Afridi *jargah*, in September 1897, upon which the Viceroy wrote, "I thank Your Highness for this friendly act, which is exactly in accordance with what I had proposed to ask Your Highness to do."¹⁰⁷

The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram reported that a deputation of twenty-four men from Tirah presented a petition to the Amir for help. The Amir answered the deputation that, "he intended to keep to his agreement with the British, as he was in receipt of lakh of rupees from Sarkar and that Sarkar held three roads, *viz.*, the Khaibar, Kurram and Quetta, which led direct to the heart of his kingdom."¹⁰⁸ The British Agent at Kabul reported that the Amir assured him that during "in his life he will never deviate from his friendship with British Government,

and, in case of war with Russia, he will fight his utmost though his kingdom be utterly ruined by Russia.”¹⁰⁹

On 11 September 1897, in the Afridis and Orakzis’ *jargah*, “a letter promising arms and ammunition, and purporting to be from the Amir, was read” and according to British colonial record, the people believed in its genuineness.¹¹⁰ Six days after, in another *jargah*, at Bagh, it was decided to seek assistance from the Amir and to offer him *ushar*¹¹¹. A *jargah* of Samil clans and Ger Ali Khels was held, on 20 September, at Saderrai. In this *jargah*, it was decided that the Orakzis and Afridis should send a joint deputation to the Amir to seek his assistance. And the *lakhkars* should not be reassembled until the return of the deputation from Kabul. On 21 September, Alam Din, a messenger of the Mulla Sayyid Akbar to the Amir, returned and reported the tribes that the Amir refused to have anything to do with the Afridis.¹¹² The British Agent at Kabul wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, that the Amir sent him a petition¹¹³ of some eighteen leading *malaks*, elders, and *mullas* demanding help from him. “The Amir totally declined to help them in any way, and ordered them to be sent back to their country at once.”¹¹⁴

A messenger reported that two men had arrived at Tirah from Kabul with a gift of Chogha and Postin and also congratulate Mulla Sayyid Akbar on his success. The men asked Mulla Sayyid Akbar that on behalf of each section to accept the Amir’s suzerainty over Tirah. After which the Amir would write to the British government for cessation of hostilities. Besides, the Amir would be responsible for any loss sustained by British troops. If the British did not stop hostilities despite the Amir’s proposal, the Amir would then help the tribes with rifles and ammunition. L. W. King, Deputy Commissioner Kohat wrote:

The charge of the Amir’s connivance seemed at the time to be a concoction of Mullah Seyad [Sayyid] Akbar to encourage the tribes, but there was no doubt that the people fully believed in its truth.¹¹⁵

A deputation of the Afridis of Tirah, including their *malaks*, *ulama*,¹¹⁶ and elders coming to Kabul were stopped at Jalalabad and their solicitations were forwarded to the Amir (copy of which then the Amir sent to British Agent at Kabul). They prayed for assistance in money, guns and men but the Amir declined to help them.¹¹⁷ Similarly, on 28 October, a deputation of Tirah *mullas*, returned from Kabul with a reply that, “the Amir was unable to assist them, as he was now a friend of British Government.”¹¹⁸

The officer on Special Duty Kurram reported that Haji Khan Alisherzai of Tang Tang, Gulandaz Afridi, and Qazi Mulla of Maidan has returned to Tirah from Kabul. They told the tribes that every tribe should send one elder to assure the Amir to the effect that in the future they should never do anything to displease the Amir. As a result of the agreement, the Amir should send 15000 men from the Peshawar side and 15000 from the Kurram side. He asserted, "on receipt of this news, which is probably absolutely false, but which [the] Afridis appear to have believed, lashkars were at once assembled and started south."¹¹⁹

Unlike the other colonial administrators, who attributed the uprising to the Amir and his *sipah salar*, King asserted in his report, regarding the alleged complicity of Kabul:

I am forced to the conclusion that, however he [the Amir of Afghanistan] and his lieutenant Gholam Hyder [Ghulam Haidar] Charkhi, may have sympathised with the Afridis and Orakzais in their attempt to shake off our [British] yoke, they never gave them any material assistance.¹²⁰

He further argued that the examination of the surrendered rifles of the tribes showed that these rifles were largely of the local or foreign manufacturer and not imported from Kabul, while the ammunition which fell into the British hands was almost entirely of British made though in many cases the cartridge had been reloaded.¹²¹ L.W. Dane, opined that after receiving information regarding the frequent communication between the *sipah salar* and the Adda Mulla and the tight hold of the Amir upon his subjects indicate that the rising had, at least, his sympathy even if it is not mainly due to his secret instigation.¹²² Sir William Lockhart, Commander Tirah Expeditionary Force, also explained:

I am bound, however, to say that no evidence has been found in Tirah that either arms or ammunition were ever supplied by the Amir, and, though it is possible that his pamphlets on the duty of a Jihad may have had some effect in persuading the people that they might look for help from Kabul, no reports have reached me of these pamphlets being disseminated among Afridis or Orakzais as they were said to have been in the Swat valley and the Mohmand country.¹²³

In the opinion of an unknown writer, by the name of "Frontier

Political” the Afridis were against the supremacy of the Kabul and the Amir was not likely to strengthen their hands by giving them rifles. He professed that though the Amir might have no love for the British his public declaration and actions have positive effects for the British and there is no reason to suspect him of secretly supplying arms to the British enemies.¹²⁴ In a recent study Dr. Salman Bangash also has written:

The viceroy was not convinced and believed that the British had no concrete proof of Afghanistan’s involvement in the uprising. The viceroy explained to George Hamilton that ‘We have received no direct evidence of the Amir’s complicity in the disturbances.’ He also stated that ‘If we are not very cool at headquarters, some of our soldiers or political will plunge us into an Afghanistan.’¹²⁵

British Perceptions about the Amir’s Involvement

By studying the whole episode of the Uprising of 1897 we can found three different phases of the Amir’s involvement in the British colonial reports.. First at the time of the Malakand attack, which was wholly assumptions. The second was from the Mohmand attack on Shabqadar till the Afridis and Orakzis’ uprising, which was based on rumours and reports of intelligence and different diaries. In this phase we can find mixed reports, i.e. in some, the colonial administrators confirmed the Amir’s involvement while in some denied it. And the third stage was from the conclusion of the Tirah expedition till the final settlement, in which the colonial administrators completed and finalized their investigation and came to the conclusion that the Amir was not directly and actively involved in the uprising. However, by studying the whole event the involvement of some of the Amir’s subjects in Shabqadar or with Adda Mulla appear logically true due to two reasons. First, till that time, Mohmand boundary was not demarcated fully, and even if demarcated, there were some villages and families situated at such a point that fell on both sides of the boundary. And second, the Adda Mulla, was originally from Afghanistan and had a lot of disciples there. In tribal society and in that sort of situation, it was probable that some men from Afghan territory would have joined the Adda Mulla but this does not indicate that they were instigated, encouraged and even supported by the Amir or his subordinate officers like governors of the adjacent provinces or his *sipah salar*.

In May 1896, the Amir told Lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, about

the Mohmand country, which the Durand convention had left in his hand, that the line drawn on the map “did not conclusively define the boundary.” The British rejected this plea of the Amir and as Keith Surridge observe that “so throughout 1896 the dispute rumbled on, especially as the amir was apparently urging his local commander-in-chief, or sipah salar, Ghulam Haidar Khan, to encourage the Mohmands to protest.”¹²⁶ Regarding the Amir’s involvement in the uprising of 1897, Keith Surridge has written:

During those first shocking weeks the British sought to understand why such an event had occurred and one answer that emerged was the alleged complicity of the Afghan ruler, the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. While this charge was never proven, the suspicion revealed the ambiguous position the amir held in British perceptions. On the one hand, he was a duplicitous enemy of Britain, who, in the opinion of one viceroy, was ‘a cantankerous and suspicious old savage’. On the other hand, however, in the words of another viceroy, the amir, ‘in spite of his uncertain temper and insolent language, [was] a consistent friend of the British alliance’.¹²⁷

Lord Elgin wrote to Lord Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, about Amir’s complicity after his letter and denial of any role in uprising. He observed:

He felt himself ‘to be standing in a very isolated position as regards our attitude towards the Amir’. The military, the civilians, that is Udny and Deane, and even the India Office, especially Lee Warner, the secretary of the Political and Secret Correspondence Department, were all ready to see the amir in a bad light.”¹²⁸

So “Elgin was prepared to investigate the allegations made against the amir ‘with all honesty’.”¹²⁹

The Viceroy wrote to Hamilton, “we have received no direct evidence of the Amir’s complicity in the disturbances. On the contrary, all the evidence which is forthcoming is in his favour, and I propose to reply that we shall forthwith reopen the Khyber line, and permit the passage of His Highness’s [the Amir] stores as formerly.”¹³⁰

Again Surridge had written:

While there were many on the frontier who felt this, those in higher positions, notably the viceroy himself, refused to consider the notion

and argued that the amir had done nothing to warrant British hostility. In this regard he was supported by Winston Churchill, who suggested afterwards that ‘the advantages which the Amir would derive from a quarrel with the British are not apparent’.¹³¹

Conclusion

We can find a mixed reaction about Amir Abdur Rahman in the primary colonial archival record. In some files, it seems that he actively or passively turned the Frontier situation in his favour by creating troubles or inducing the tribes by some incentives like allowances, etc. While in some files the Amir left the tribals to their fate and declared to the tribes that he had no intention to create problems for himself and would agree to the decision of the British. Besides, the tribes adjacent to the Durand Line also knew the situation and position of the Amir and the British. The Waziristan tribes showed their inclination to include into the British sphere and the rest of areas except the Mohmands were virtually under the control of the British. Besides, the Amir also knew very well that the British, by no means, would agree to leave the Frontier region.

The Durand Line Agreement and the subsequent demarcation of the boundary played up the resentment of the local tribes. However, the situation in 1897, was somewhat satisfactory and almost all the *malaks*, residing in the vicinity of the Durand Line, were in agreement with the British. The Durand Line Agreement did not bring much difference in the position of the tribal *malaks* and chiefs but only changed their masters. Those who received allowances from the Amir of Afghanistan started taking it from the British. Thus the *malaks* and chiefs, by whom the British controlled the local population, were in their pockets.

The other point which is quoted by a lot of writers and generally known by common people is that the Amir wrote to the Viceroy of India that “if you should cut them [Frontier tribes] out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them.” It is to be mentioned that this quote of the Amir was misunderstood by many. If a complete abstract of the said letter is read, one would see that the sentence which I have italicized on page 7, clearly shows that the Amir intended to use the Pukhtun tribes of the Frontier as mercenaries for himself as well as for the British. The second point in this abstract and italicized lines was the use of religion by a stake holder for their vested interests, which was a dangerous move. It is this Frontier region which Amir Abdur Rahman wanted to

use in the name of religion and the later authorities, who followed colonial legacy, used this region at different times and on different fronts like, in Kashmir Jihad, Afghan Jihad, Taliban Jihad and the so-called war against terror. It clarifies that Amir Abdur Rahman, like the colonial rulers, just wanted to use this region and its tribes for his benefit irrespective of their ethnicity and religion. And if we glance at the Frontier History we could find at least forty-six major expeditions of the British against the different Pukhtun tribes before the Durand Line Agreement. It shows that risings, resistance, and expeditions are not new phenomena in the Frontier region.

Colonial writers have blamed the Amir for his meeting with *mullas* in the summer of 1897, and have considered it a war meeting after which the uprising started immediately. Interestingly, the colonial record did mention the meeting but did not record its proceedings, though it was not a secret meeting and besides the colonial intelligence a British Agent was also present at the Amir's court. The time-space between the meeting of the *mullas* and the commencement of the uprising was not so long in which the concerned parties could make preparations. And if they made preparations prior or after the meeting, then without any doubt the colonial authorities must have known about it.

Besides all these, Amir Abdur Rahman was a shrewd ruler and could better understand his position and strength. He knew very well the strength of the British Empire and their concern in the area. It is a fact that Amir Abdur Rahman did not like the British because till that time, they did not consider him a sovereign ruler. But despite this, he could not dare to actively support the tribes during the uprising or openly instigate them against the British. Under these circumstances, during the uprising, he periodically rejected the tribal petitions for help and declared very clearly that he would maintain friendly relations with the British as the safety and future of Afghanistan is related to them. As stated earlier, even in 1893, he told to the deputation of Zalli Khel Wazir:

The Waziris played a double game and handed over his letters to British authorities. He was not going to declare war against the British Government for the Waziri country, but was going to decide the question amicably. If the supremacy of the Waziri country came to the lot of Afghanistan, he was going to take it; otherwise the British Government were to look after it.¹³²

On the other side he, time and again, for political purposes, took measures for gaining support and sympathies of the local Pukhtun tribes

or religious class. Obviously proclaiming himself the king of Islam and waging *jihad* against the infidels (in Kafiristan) were for this purpose. But as stated earlier he knew his strength, and if he wished, then he cannot wage a direct or proxy war against the British. But the religious class and the local Pukhtun tribes cannot understand these complications, and in per their perception, if they wage *jihad* against the British, the king of Islam would support them. Anyway, some of the aforementioned measures of the Amir were considered positive gestures from his side and thus if not direct he played his passive role in the uprising.

International affairs and events are not simple.¹³³ We have dozens of examples in which we found great differences between the deed and the word of a state or a ruler. In international politics, every country irrespective of their strength preferred their national interests and did not hesitate from achieving it. During the First World War, what promises Great Britain had made to the Indians and what they did after the war? Similarly, the US President Ronald Wilson Reagan assured the Congress that Pakistan was not making atomic bomb though he knew about it.¹³⁴ Later his successor, George Herbert Walker Bush, also continued this policy. Besides, the state of Pakistan too, at first, time and again denied that she is working on an atomic bomb. In this continuation both America and Pakistan along with China and Saudi Arab openly refused any help or support to Afghan Mujahidin during the Soviet-Afghan War.¹³⁵

What happened and is happening in the Middle East is also the best example of international politics. United States and her allies like the United Kingdom were the major countries that held that Iraq had chemical weapons¹³⁶ but after destroying Iraq and capturing their resources they simply called it an intelligence mistake.¹³⁷ The visible and hidden relationship between Iran, America, and Israel is another example of Middle East politics.¹³⁸ It is rumoured that Islamic revolution of Iran was sponsored by America and the West.¹³⁹ What happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and what are happening in Syria, Yemen, and Sudan are also the events in which the real actors refused their role.

What Pakistan had done in Kashmir and Afghanistan and vice versa, what India and Pakistan had done in Bangladesh, what happened in Kargil, and what Pakistan Army has done in Pukhtun belt in the progression of war on terror are still waiting to be accepted by the parties concerned. Credit must be given to Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Imran Khan who accepted some of Pakistan's roles during his visit to the USA on 25 September 2019.¹⁴⁰ Simply no one accepts what he did or had done for the time being but later truth is revealed in one way

or the other. As such, we cannot simply accept the plea and claim of Amir Abdur Rahman about his non-involvement in the uprising of 1897. But on the other hand, we have to accept his as well as British official claims of his non-involvement because after twelve decades neither we found solid proof of his taking part nor the British colonial record claimed his active and direct involvement in the uprising of 1897.

Notes and References

1. George Macmunn, *The Romance of the Indian Frontiers*, first published in 1931, reprint Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978, p. 17.
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3. For the expansion of Amir Abdur Rahman see, Sultan Mahomed Khan, ed., *The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.*, with a new introduction by M.E. Yapp, 2 Vols., first published in 1900, reprint in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980).
4. At this Lord Lansdowne wrote to the Amir that “whether you accept this offer or not, it will be necessary to decide what territory does, and what does not form part of the kingdom of Afghanistan.” Salman Bangash, *The Frontier Tribal Belt: Genesis and Purpose under the Raj* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 177.
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6. For a detailed study of the uprising of 1897, see, Ishtiaq Ahmad, *Pakhtun Resistance against British Rule: An Assessment of the Frontier Uprising of 1897*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of History University of Peshawar, 2017.
7. Throughout this paper the word “Frontier” or Frontier region” means only unadministered territories of the Indian North-Western Frontier.
8. Confidential Note of J. B. Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, on 23 August 1890, (I) *Trans Frontier Policy of the Punjab Government*, (II) *Punjab Frontier Policy*, File No. 1023, at Tribal Research Cell, Cabinet Division, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar.
9. *Ibid.*

10. Percy Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol. II, first published in 1940, reprint (Lahore: Al-Biruni, 1979), p. 170.
11. Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, p. 149.
12. A tribal chief recognised as head of the whole tribe, or of its major or minor sub-division, or a section or sub-section; in the tribal areas the colonial authorities granted the status or title of *malak*-ship.
13. It means consultative assembly; forum; council; council of the tribal chiefs. It has other meanings, composition, functions and uses in different contexts.
14. Extract paragraph 10 from the Kabul Diary for the Period from 8 to 11 April 1893, *Extracts from Kabul Diaries*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 878, Bundle No. 9, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
15. Extract from the Kabul Agent's Diary No 41, dated the 24th May 1893, *Extracts from Kabul Diaries*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 878, Bundle No. 9. For British policy in Waziristan see, Hugh Beattie, *Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan* (London: Curzon Press, 2002); Hugh Beattie, *Empire and Tribe in the Afghan Frontier Region: Custom, Conflict and British Strategy in Waziristan until 1947* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).
16. Extract from Kabul Diary No. 50, for the Period from the 20th to 23rd June 1893, *Extracts from Kabul Diaries*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 878, Bundle No. 9.
17. A court; reception.
18. "Pyne, a clerk in a Bombay firm, was sent to Kabul with a consignment of goods. There he attracted the attention of the Amir, who gave him the contract for the erection of an arsenal and, when it was completed, placed him in charge of it." Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, p. 174.
19. Extract from Kabul Diary No. 52, for the Period from the 28th to the 30th June 1893, *Extracts from Kabul Diaries*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 878, Bundle No. 9.
20. Extract from Kabul Diary No. 57, dated 19th July 1893, *Report on the Initial and Experimental Stage of Maintaining Communication with Chitral by the Malakand and Dir*, Files of the Commissioner Office Peshawar, Serial No. 911 A, Bundle No. 33, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar. For similar view also see Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, pp. 148-149.
21. Extract from Kabul Diary No. 58, dated 22nd July 1893, *Report on the Initial and Experimental Stage of Maintaining Communication with Chitral by Malakand and Dir*.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Extract paragraph 15 of Kabul Diary No. 63, of the 9th August 1893, *Report on the Initial and Experimental Stage of Maintaining Communication with Chitral by the Malakand and Dir*.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Extract from Kabul Diary No. 68, dated the 26th August 1893, *Report on the Initial and Experimental Stage of Maintaining Communication with Chitral by the Malakand and Dir*.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, pp. 157-158.
30. Sultan-i-Rome, *The North-West Frontier*, p. 153.

31. Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated Simla 26 October 1896, (I) *Trans Frontier Policy of the Punjab Government* (II) *Punjab Frontier Policy*, File No. 1023.
32. H.L. Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, first published in 1912, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003), p. 209.
33. H.H. Dodwell, ed., *The Cambridge History of India: The Indian Empire, 1858-1918*, Vol. VI, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 462; Arnold Keppel, *Gun-Running and the Indian North-West Frontier* (London: John Murray, 1911), p. 112.
34. H.D. Hutchinson, *The Campaign in Tirah, 1897-1898: An Account of the Expedition against the Orakzais and Afridis under General Sir William Lockhart* (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1898), p. 9. Also see Sultan-i-Rome, *The North-West Frontier*, p. 153.
35. G.W. Leitner, "The Amir of Afghanistan and Great Britain", *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record*, New Series—Vol. VII, Nos. 13 & 14, January and April Numbers, 1894, (for the half year: October 1893 to end of March 1894), p. 287.
36. Hutchinson, *The Campaign in Tirah, 1897-1898*, p. 9.
37. Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, p. 209.
38. Bijan Omrani, "The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border", *Asian Affairs*, Vol. XL, No. II (Published online: 17 Jun 2009), Stable URL, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068370902871508>, (accessed: 22/12/2013), p. 187.
39. From R. Udny, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent Peshawar Division, to the Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 247 C., dated 10 August 1897, *Punitive Expedition into the Swat Valley in Connection with the Disturbances in the Malakand*, EX-DD Files, Serial No. 1980, Bundle No. 18, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
40. From, Major H.A. Deane, Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department, No. 217, dated 9 June 1897, *Report on the Initial and Experimental Stage of Maintaining Communication with Chitral by the Malakand and Dir*.
41. On 2 July 1897, the *Pioneer* mentioned that the Amir just issued a circular letter to all governors of provinces ordering them to send influential *mullas* to Kabul for a religious discussion. "Nothing is known as to the particular point on which Abdur Rahman desires enlightenment, but the gathering at Kabul may have some political meaning." Extract from the *Pioneer*, dated 2nd July 1897, *Repayment by the Amir of the later Advance made to Mian Hussain Shah*, F.F. Political Department, Serial No. 804, Bundle No. 45, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar; Extract from the *Pioneer*, dated 2nd July 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*, FF Supplementary List, Serial No. 190, Bundle No. 15, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
42. D.S. Richards, *The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars* (London: Macmillan Limited, 1990), p. 130.
43. Mulla/Mullah means the priest. *Mulla* usually perform the duty of *imat*

(leading the prayers) in the mosques and teaches the Holy Qur'ān, and the Islamic injunctions to the people. The title usually become hereditary and applies also to those descendants of the priests who are not versed in the Islamic education and does not perform these functions.

44. H. Woosnam Mills, *The Pathan Revolt in North West India*, first published in 1897, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996), p. 2; Richards, *The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars*, p. 130.
45. T. Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900* (London, Methuen & Co., 1901), p. 339.
46. "The need of those persons who defend the frontier of Mohamedan territories for one prayer is equivalent to five hundred prayers of those who stay at home and do not proceed to the frontier for keeping watch." Again: "O true believers, when ye meet a party of infidels, stand firm and remember God frequently that ye may prosper. . . . When ye meet the unbelievers marching in great numbers against you, turn not your backs from them, for whoso shall turn his back unto them on that day, unless he turneth aside to fight or retreateth to another party of the Faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation of God, and his abode shall be Hell: an ill journey shall it be thither!"
47. Lionel James, *The Indian Frontier War: Being an Account of the Mohmund and Tirah Expeditions, 1897* (London: William Heinemann, 1898), p. 7
48. See Keith Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 North-West Frontier Uprising", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 2008), Stable URL, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086530802318516>, (accessed: 19/07/2013), p. 424; Charles Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977), pp. 259-60; A.H. McMahon and A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of the Malakand Political Agency (Exclusive of Chitral)*, revised by R.L. Kennion (Peshawar: Government Press, North-West Frontier Province, 1916), p. 49.
49. Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir", p. 424.
50. Miller, *Khyber: British India's North West Frontier*, p. 240; J.G. Elliot, *The Frontier, 1839—1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India*, with preface by Olaf Caroe (London: Cassel & Company Ltd., 1968), p. 153.
51. R.A. Johnson, "Russians at the Gates of India? Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900", *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (July 2003), Stable URL, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397324>, (accessed: 14/02/2013), p. 700.
52. *Malakand Affairs*, Translation of the report of Abdul Hamid, dated 26th August 1897, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 2092, Bundle No. 19, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
53. Hutchinson, *Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898*, p. 11.
54. Elliot, *The Frontier, 1839-1947*, p. 239.
55. Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir", p. 426.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 428.
57. Mounted soldier.
58. Extracts from Police Abstract of Intelligence, dated 28 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
59. Religious fighters.

60. The tribal force taking the field under the tribal banner at the time of need without any payment, at own cost, arms and ammunition.
61. Extracts Paragraphs 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 20 from the Khyber Political Diary from 8–14 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
62. Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir", p. 427. During those days a lot of similar rumours were in the air. For example the deputy inspector of Chuchak reported that a rumour is that the Amir of Kabul secretly aids the Waziris against the British Forces at Tochi. Another rumour was that the Swatis attacked Malakand on the instigation of Baba Tor of Baghdad. The deputy inspector of Hansi reported that there is a Bazar rumour in the city that the Amir of Afghanistan is aiding the *mullas* in the Tochi valley on the instigation of the Sultan of Turkey. The deputy inspector of Shahabad reported another rumour that the Amir is supplying fire arms at nominal prices to those who wish to fight against the British on the frontier. The Amir was said to have given his soldiers permission to fight against the British, but that any one doing so was forbidden to take his uniform with him. The deputy inspector of Pathankot reported another rumour that the Amir of Kabul has demanded extension of his frontier to the Jhelum, but British government has refused his request. Another rumour was that the disturbances were caused by the Russians. *Abstracts of Intelligence Punjab Police 1897*, Vol. XIX, Oriental Section, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar, p. 178.
63. Extracts from Police Abstract of Intelligence, dated 6 September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
64. Extract from the Peshawar Confidential Diary No. 11, dated 12th June 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
65. Extract Paragraphs 5, 12, 16, and 25 from the Khaibar Political Diary from 1st to 7th August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
66. Extract from Peshawar Confidential Diary No. 18, dated 22nd September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
67. Warren Dockter, *Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2015), p. 21.
68. H.F. Walters, *The Operations of the Malakand Field Force and the Buner Field Force, 1897-98*, (Simla: Printed at the Government Central Printing Office, 1900), p. 6.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, pp. 117-118.
71. Ex-Political, "The Amir and the Tribes", *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record*, Third Series Vol. V, Nos. 9 & 10, (January–April, 1898), pp. 271-274.
72. From L.W. DANE, Esquire, offg., Chief Secretary to Government Punjab, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, No. 509, dated Lahore 4th May 1897, *Interference of the Amir with Afridis in Tirah*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 2085, Bundle. No. 19, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
73. *Ibid.*
74. From Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, C.I.E., Political Officer,

- Khaibar, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, No. 375, dated Peshawar 26th May 1897, *Interference of the Amir with Afridis in Tirah*.
75. Disciple; follower of a *pir*; also a *pir*; a teacher.
 76. From Major H.A. Deane, Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 629, dated 18 November 1897 [henceforward From Major H.A. Deane to the Secretary to the Government of India], *Attack on the Troops at Malakand and Chakdarra*, FF Supplementary List, Serial No. 182, Bundle No. 14, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
 77. The meaning of the word Khan depends on the sense in which it is used on the particular occasion. It is used as a title for a chief; for addressing and respect of a landowner; sarcastically for an unworthy person; and is given as personal name. In this dissertation it refers to the tribal chief who have a sort of ruling status over the area or tribes(s) concerned.
 78. Religious mendicant without status; resident in some ones quarter free of rent but liable to some manual work for the proprietor. Here it refers to the Sartor Faqir.
 79. From, R. Udny, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 247 C., dated 10 August 1897, *Punitive Expedition into the Swat Valley in Connection with the Disturbances in the Malakand*.
 80. From, C.E. Bunbury, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, No. 54 C., date 8 August 1897, *Punitive Expedition into the Swat Valley in Connection with the Disturbances in the Malakand*.
 81. From Major H.A. Deane to the Secretary to the Government of India.
 82. *Ibid*.
 83. Telegram from General Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force, Lakarai via Nahaki, to Simla, Punjab, dated 22nd September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
 84. Telegram from the Commissioner Peshawar, to Simla, Punjab, dated 13th August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
 85. Telegram from General Officer Commanding Malakand Field Force, Panjkora, to Simla, Punjab, dated 28th September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
 86. Telegram from Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Commissioner Peshawar, dated 12 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
 87. Translation of a Letter, dated Wednesday, 18 Rabi-ul-awal 1315 H., 18th August 1897, from the Amir of Afghanistan, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
 88. *Ibid*.
 89. *Ibid*. The Amir added that in the last few years these *mullas* stirred up my own people against me. So in every rising whether at Qandahar or that of Mulla Mushk-i-Alam, or in the case of Uzbek Mulla, who joined Ishaq Khan at Balakh were originated by *mullas*. *Ibid*.
 90. Telegram from Commissioner Peshawar, to Simla, Punjab, dated 22 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.

91. Jarobi was in actual sense an area which the Afghan Amir and even Adda Mulla considered under the British, as in *Peshawar Confidential Diary* of 28 May 1897, it has reported: "Since the withdrawal of the Afghan khasadars from Mitai the Mullah of Adda has been in great perplexity of mind, as he thinks that Jarobi, the village where he resides, has come on the British side of the Boundary line, and he is therefore afraid that the British Government may take notice of his hostile conduct during the late Chitral Relief Expedition. He seems inclined to open communication with the British authorities." *Extract from the Peshawar Confidential Diary No. 10, dated 28th May 1897, FF Supplementary List, Serial No. 190, Bundle No. 15, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.*
92. Translation of a Letter from the Amir of Afghanistan, to the Address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 12 September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
93. Translation of a Letter from His highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependences, to the Address of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 12 Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H., Corresponding to the 10 September 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
94. *Ibid.*
95. Translation of a Proclamation issued by the Amir in Pashtu under the name of Izahul-Bayan-fi-Nasihati ala'l Afghan (A clear Declaration by way of Warning to Afghans) dated 13 Rabi-ul-awal 1315 H., 13 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Ibid.*
101. From the British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Kabul, 18 August 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
102. Holy war. Technically a holy war in which the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) led the Muslims.
103. Extract from the Khyber Political Diary from 26 September to 2 October 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
104. Telegram from Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral, Inayatkilla (through Panjkora), dated 7th October 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
105. Religious war waged by the Muslims against the non-Muslims.
106. From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, G.C.B, G.C.S.I., Kharita No. 83 P.O., dated Simla, 7th October 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
107. *Ibid.*
108. Telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, to Simla, Punjab, dated 20 October 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances.*
109. Telegram from British Agent at Kabul, Peshawar, to Simla, Foreign Secretary,

dated 22 October 1897, *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.

110. From L. White King, Esq, Deputy Commissioner Kohat, to Sir Richard Udny, Chief Political Officer Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 3-C, dated Kohat, 4 January 1898 [henceforward From L. White King to Sir Richard Udny], *Tirah Expedition*, FF Supplementary List, Serial No. 184, Bundle No. 14, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
111. A tenth part. According to Islamic law the Muslims are required to pay a portion of the produce of their land to the Islamic State at the rate of ten or five percent, which depends upon the nature of the water given to the fields, which is known as *ushar*. However, the heads under which it will be used and dispersed have also been specified.
112. From L. White King to Sir Richard Udny.
113. For a complete petition see, Translation of a Letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to the Address of the British Agent at Kabul, dated the 25th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. corresponding to the 23rd September 1897 *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
114. From Ghafur Khan, British Agent at Kabul, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 217, dated Kabul 25 September 1897 [hence forward From Ghafur Khan, to the Secretary to the Government of India], *Extent of the Amir's Complicity in the Frontier Disturbances*.
115. From L. White King to Sir Richard Udny.
116. Plural of *alim*. Muslim religious scholar.
117. From Ghafur Khan, to the Secretary to the Government of India.
118. From L. White King to Sir Richard Udny.
119. Telegram from Officer on Special Duty Kurram, Para Chinar, to Simla, Punjab, dated 13 October 1897, *Tirah Expedition*, EX-DD Files, Serial No. 2011, Bundle No. 18, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
120. From L. White King to Sir Richard Udny.
121. *Ibid.*
122. Note or Précis by L.W. Dane, Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, dated 10 August 1897, *Expedition into Swat and Boner*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 1983, Bundle No. 18, at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Archives, Peshawar.
123. From Sir William Lockhart, Commanding the Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 8, dated Calcutta, 3 February 1898, *Tirah Expedition*, FF Supplementary List, Serial No. 184, Bundle No. 14.
124. Frontier Political Officer, "The North-West Frontier", *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record*, Third Series-Vol. V, Nos. 9 & 10 (January–April, 1898), pp. 1-11.
125. Bangash, *The Frontier Tribal Belt: Genesis and Purpose under the Raj*, p. 285; Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir", p. 428.
126. Surridge, "The Ambiguous Amir", p. 421.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 417-8.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 427.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 428.

131. *Ibid.*, pp. 429-30. "Forty years later Churchill remarked that the tribes' hostility was 'easily explainable on quite ordinary grounds'. These grounds, once the dust had cleared, seemed to be Britain's frontier policy as a whole." *Ibid.*, p. 430.
132. Extract from Kabul diary No. 50 for the Period from 20 to 23 June 1893, *Extracts from Kabul Diaries*, Ex-DD Files, Serial No. 878, Bundle No. 9.
133. Dr. Sultan-i-Rome's note to the point on an earlier draft of this paper.
134. *The American Enterprise*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990), p. 9.
135. For Pakistan, America, Saudi Arab and China's role in this war see, Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap; The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown: Casemate, 1992).
136. Eliot Weinberger, *What I Heard about Iraq* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 10-11; Patrick Porter, *Blunder: Britain's War in Iraq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 63.
137. BBC News, "Tony Blair expressed sorrow, regret and apology", published July 6, 2016, video 5:01, stable URL, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-36727331/tony-blair-expressed-sorrow-regret-and-apology>, accessed (26/11/2019); BBC News, "Tony Blair tells of 'sorrow and regret' over Iraq", published July 6, 2016, video 3:57, stable URL <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfR7TKtfKtg>, accessed (26/11/2019).
138. For detail see, Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
139. William Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, revised edn. (London: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 169-172.
140. Geo News, "Geo Headlines - 04 PM | 25th September 2019", published September 25, 2019, video 11:04, stable URL, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpHSMdEJXnA>, accessed (26/11/2019).