

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUNJAB: POLICE AND THE DISTURBANCES OF 1919

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The disturbances of 1919 are considered to be a landmark in the course of political agitation in the Punjab. Though they are primarily famous because of the massacre at the JallianwalaBaghin Amritsar, many other districts of the province experienced similar fracas and like Amritsar, they were also curbed to reinstate the government control. The works written on this topic rely mostly upon the role of the military in handling the situation. The aim of the present study is to observe these disturbances in the light of the services provided by the Punjab Police and the methods that it utilized to reinstate civil administration. The police used force in the form of lathi charges and firearms to control the running and attacking mobs. It made investigations and arrested the offenders of the law during and after the disorders. It also served its purpose by saving the lives and properties of the public but had to rely upon military assistance as well to restore order where it suffered from shortage in number. There were instances as well when the police did not respond to the call for emergency and many people were killed and buildings were burnt down. The Punjab Police also became notorious for shooting and killing the unarmed demonstrators. It was further questioned and criticized for turning to illegal means in dealing with the offenders of the state.

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The Disturbances of 1919 are a major topic whenever British rule in India is discussed. The major cause of these disturbances was generally assumed to be the passing of the Rowlatt Act¹ that gave extraordinary

powers to the government and was unacceptable to the majority of politically conscious Indians. The provinces that were affected by these disturbances were Bengal, Delhi and the Punjab. In these provinces the political leaders arranged *hartals* and organized processions and meetings that exhibited anti-government sentiments. The provincial governments reacted by declaring them seditious and thus prevented the leaders from speaking to the public. After Gandhi's call for a national *hartal* in March of that year, protests in certain districts became so intense that the government decided to take extreme action, martial law was implemented at some places² and extraordinary notifications were issued to restore peace.

The province of the Punjab was the most affected of all three provinces: out of a total number of *hartals* organized in the entire India in connection with the Rowlatt Acts, one-third of them were arranged in the Punjab.³ Here a large-scale campaign against the Acts was started. The district authority reacted by bestowing the charge to the military. The military, determined to punish the members of a meeting arranged at Jallianwala Bagh in defiance of the order prohibiting the meetings, opened fire on unarmed men. This firing resulted in the great loss of Indian lives and came to be known as one of the major events in the history of India. This incident shocked Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who became fearful for more violence as a consequence of the above-mentioned incident called off the *hartal*. By the middle of April almost all the districts of the Punjab were under firm government control after which a *Disorders Inquiry Committee* or the *Hunter Committee* was formed to look into the causes and events of what the government called 'Punjab Disturbances'.

A number of works have been written on the Punjab Disturbances with some authors focusing primarily on this topic while others have mentioned them as a part of a grand plot of the British rule in India. H.N. Mitra's *Punjab Unrest Before and After* (1920), Alfred Draper's *Amritsar The Massacre that Ended the Raj* (1981) and Nick Lloyd's *The Amritsar Massacre The Untold Story of a Fateful Day* (2011) are some of the examples that have focused on the events leading to the Jallianwala Bagh and its consequences for the Punjab. The latter kind of sources include works like Ian Colvin's *The Life of General Dyer* (1929), S.C. Mittal's *Freedom Movement in Punjab (1905-29)* (1977), Syed Nur Ahmed's *From Martial Law to Martial Law Politics in the Punjab (1919-1958)* (1985), Kamlesh Mohan's *Militant Nationalism in the Punjab 1919-1935* (1985) and Ajeet Javed's *Left Politics in the Punjab* (1988) are a few among many others that relate the incidents

of 1919 Punjab in a general manner. There is a third type of study that examines the development of the institution of police and its work in handling various kinds of anti-government movements in India. It is for this reason that they have failed to focus on the contributions of the police in curbing the disorders in the 1919 Punjab. These works include Charles W. Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* (1939), Percival Griffith's *To Guard My People: The History of the Indian Police* (1972) Anandwarup Gupta's *The Police in British India 1861-1947* (1979), and J.H. Curry's *A History of the Indian Police* (n.d.).

With the beginning of the World War I, many Indian leaders and parties hoped that the World War would pave way for a real dialogue over the future of British India. That hope was spurred by the British promises that after the war a revaluation will be made of the limited role of Indians in the government of their own country. As a result, most of the Indian politicians including Gandhi and M.A. Jinnah lent their support to the war. For this purpose, thousands of Indian soldiers served in the British army and fought with distinction. However, the government introduced Defence of India Act (1915)⁴ which committed the British Government to retract them once the war was over. However, when the war was about to be over it decided to replace them with another set of rules that later came to be known as the Rowlatt Act.⁵

On December 10th, 1917 Lord Chelmsford, the Governor General of India appointed a commission under Justice Sydney Rowlatt to inspect the nature and extent of criminal and conspiracy activities connected with the seditious movements in India. It was to check the difficulties faced by the government by these activities as well as to suggest ways to deal with them.⁶ The committee recommended that security of at least two years should be taken from all those who were convicted of sedition. They should notify their presence to their local governments while the governments would be able to restrict them for two years at any place and could prohibit them from speaking at public meetings.⁷ The committee also suggested that provisions should be made for trials in the sedition cases of three judges' bench without juries and without appeals in order to avoid delays in the procedure.⁸ The recommendations further included that the government should acquire two groups of power. The first group included: to demand security with or without surety, to restrict residence of the suspect, to require abstinence from him in any activity such as involving in journalism or attending meetings and to require the person to report to the police periodically. While the second group of powers to be: to arrest, to search under warrant and to confine the person suspected of seditious act in non-penal custody.⁹ The report also said that there

must be restrictions on inter-provincial tours of trouble makers especially in a province like Punjab.¹⁰

What the general public knew about these bills was simply that they would give extraordinary powers to the local government and the police. A British intelligence report mentioned that in a rally a speaker claimed that if a policeman wanted a married woman for himself he could get rid of her husband with the help of these bills.¹¹ The police will be allowed house searches without any warrant, and detain any person for an unlimited number of days.¹² It was also known that the people will not be allowed to stand in groups and the members of such gatherings will be instantly arrested.¹³ The government will be allowed to put a ban on the publication of any paper without giving any reason.¹⁴ The government will be taking heavy taxes on marriages and funerals and will be taking away half of the produce in the name of revenue. It became known that the bills had various sections that restricted speedy trial and the arrested will not have any right of appeal and hence, *navakil, nadalil, na appeal*, became a common phrase for the Rowlatt Bills among much of the Indian public.¹⁵

Thus, the popular conception was that the bills were devised to make the British rule stronger than before by curbing all social liberties of the Indians. Soon after the spread of these features of the Rowlatt Bills many strikes were organized throughout India, but the bills became Rowlatt Acts on March 21st, 1919. In response to this action of the government Gandhi announced *satyagrah* or passive resistance on February 24th, 1919, after which a new series of protests and processions began. April 1st was announced to be the date of the first *hartal* (strike) but due to some confusion a *hartal* was organized in Delhi on March 30th.¹⁶ From the morning most of the shops were closed and those that opened were closed down by the *satyagrah* supporters. Meanwhile a group of people reached the railway station where they forced a vendor to close his shop of sweetmeats. The railway police took action and arrested two men but when the news of the arrest reached outside, more people started coming to the railway station demanding their release. Jeffrey, the Assistant District Superintendent of Police arrived with a small police force of seventeen men.¹⁷ The officer tried to persuade the people to leave the station premises but they started throwing stones and bricks which hit Jeffrey in the head. At this point, he ordered his men to open fire that killed and wounded a few men. After the firing the crowd disbanded but gathered again near Queen's Garden.¹⁸ Meanwhile the military arrived but the situation did not get better and the District

Magistrate of Delhi had to order fire again. In this firing eight more men were killed and two later died due to injuries.¹⁹ The incidents of shooting on the unarmed Indian public by the police sparked violent agitation in many districts of the province of Punjab.

After its annexation in 1849, Punjab came to be known as one of the loyalist provinces of the British Indian Empire.²⁰ This had paved the way for the recruitment of many Punjabis in the British army that had made the Punjab 'a sword arm of the Raj'. However, with the beginning of the 20th century the Punjab started to show its 'sedition' towards the British Government, one of the most significant of which was that of 1907 that began with the seditious speeches of Punjab is like Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh; against the changes in the tenure of the canal colonies and increased water rates in the Doab. The situation started to threaten the Punjab Government when large scale protests were made by both; urban and rural Punjabis. The government reacted by making large scale arrests but then thought it fit to arrest and deport the two leading figures. Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were arrested and deported to Burma on May 9th and June 3rd respectively.²¹ A more courageous effort to free India from the British control by an armed rebellion was Ghadr with the hub of its activities in the Punjab. The most significant of its features was to kill as many Englishmen as possible for the sake of Indian liberation.²² This was curbed with an organized effort of the government of the Punjab and the Punjab Police when a police informer was sent in the midst of its Indian leadership to find out the planned date of rebellion. The conspiracy was discovered and after police raids a number of Ghadr leaders were arrested.²³ On the occasion of all the debates on the Rowlatt Bills the Punjab was already getting disheartened by the government. During the war the Indian Government made many promises of rewards to the Punjab is but once the war was over, they were given 'mere' titles and medals. The monetary benefits and the promised land grants turned out to be a far cry from and they turned grieved. The situation was further deteriorated by the economic depression of the Punjab is when prices rose as a consequence of a severe plague in the Punjab as well as the war.²⁴

The Punjab was experiencing large number of gatherings against the Rowlatt Bills from February 1919 even before the announcement of Gandhi's call for the country wide *hartal*. The news of the Delhi shooting spread like a wild fire in the entire province and the men who died in the clash were termed as martyrs. A wave of avenging their murder was started in Lahore and Amritsar and posters started to appear encouraging

the people to kill and die.²⁵ In these circumstances Gandhi was invited to visit the Punjab by the Punjab Congress members. The invitation was heartily accepted and Gandhi took the train from Bombay. When the news of his expected visit to Amritsar and Jullundur reached the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, he issued orders on April 4th for banning his entry into the province.²⁶ A police force waited at the Palwal Railway Station in the Gurgaon District to fulfill the orders of the lieutenant governor. Gandhi was asked to get off the train and then he was taken into police custody. A police officer named Bowring came to see him and told him that the government did not want him to enter the Punjab because this would affect the peace of the province.²⁷ Earlier at Amritsar, due to constant *hartals* and anti-government public gatherings, the district officers had already taken precautions. The most significant among them was that it prohibited two leading Congress men of the province, Satyapal²⁸ and Saifuddin Kitchlew²⁹ from addressing public meetings.³⁰ But as the situation was very precarious, the prohibition orders were thought to be insufficient and the Punjab Government ordered the arrest and exile of the two leaders instead. On the morning of April 10th the two men were removed from Amritsar.³¹ This was the incident that ignited agitation in Amritsar as the people started to gather within an hour of the arrest and marched towards the district commissioner's residence where the first shots were fired by the police. The situation deteriorated so much so that the deputy commissioner had to call for military support as a result of which General Dyer arrived who became responsible for the Jallianwala massacre. The news of Gandhi's arrest and Amritsar disturbances reached other parts of the province like Lahore, Gujranwala and Kasur where similar kinds of demonstrations were organized and civil and military force was used.

A major feature during the suppression of disturbances was the part played by the Punjab Police. The role of the police in handling the fracas was multilayered. On few occasions it failed to perform its duty and a number of Europeans were brutally assaulted by the protestors. Yet there were many instances when it performed well and received appreciation later. An attempt has been made in this article to make a brief survey of the role of the Punjab Police in handling the 1919 Disturbances and to restore British administration.

Re-establishment of Law and Order

The foremost duty of a police force is to maintain order in its

jurisdiction. The Punjab Police managed to achieve it on various occasions during the entire episode of the disturbances. It fought back the disturbers of peace and followed the orders of the provincial government as well as their English officers. Their only aim was to stop the demonstrators from entering sensitive zones like government buildings, railways and the European civilian quarters especially after the murder of five Europeans in Amritsar. At many places the police, officers and the lower ranks, managed to resist the angry crowds and helped the government restore order in the province.

It was long before the beginning of the actual trouble that the secret police was deputed to observe and report the situation in important cities such as Amritsar and Lahore. It was known that the Rowlatt Bills were receiving criticism throughout India as well as in the Punjab. In order to keep a check Lala Jiwan Lal, an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department, Political Branch Punjab was sent to Amritsar from Lahore to report the happenings in connection with the bills tension. His first attended meeting was on February 28th. His report of that meeting expressed that the people were annoyed with the government and were thinking that the government was cruel as it intended to take away their liberties.³²

The police abstracts also show that the meetings were held way before the original disturbances started in the city and the police was keeping an eye on the events. For instance according to an abstract of March 12, 1919, a mass meeting was arranged against the Rowlatt Bills in Amritsar on February 28th.³³ Another meeting held at Jallianwala Bagh on March 29th in opposition to the bills was reported to be attended by 13,000 people.³⁴ Then the City Inspector of Amritsar, Ashraf Khan reported to the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Miles Irving, that there was a big gathering of 35-40,000 people at Jallianwala Bagh on March 30th and as he expected violence from the gathering participants he sent his men in plain clothes.³⁵

Because of these reports Irving was aware that the two Punjab Congressorators, Satyapal and Saifuddin Kitchlew were mainly responsible for the protests. It was used as an excuse for the government to ban them from speaking to the public meetings. But the banning did not stop them and they continued to address the gatherings.³⁶ When the news of their activities, attending and addressing large processions, of March 8th and 9th reached the provincial government, the Lieutenant Governor issued orders for their arrest and deportation from Amritsar.³⁷ At this the deputy commissioner consulted J.F. Rehill, the District Superintendent of Police

of Amritsar and Reginald Plomer, the Deputy Superintendent of Police along with other civil officers.³⁸ After consultation they decided to bring the two men to the deputy commissioner's bungalow and then to move them in motorcars to Dharmasala. They anticipated a reaction from the public, so Rehill provided the police escort in plain clothes to go along with the arrested men. It was also decided that Rehill will also accompany the team.³⁹ Sensing the danger from the public, police and military guards were placed at all sensitive places as well as the officer in command at the Fort was ordered to shoot anyone coming towards the railways in order to save the lives of the women and children there.⁴⁰

The next day on April 10th, at nearly 10 in the morning Satyapal and Kitchlew were called to the deputy commissioner's bungalow. When they arrived, they were handed over their arrest warrants and were told that they will be leaving Amritsar soon.⁴¹ They were then asked to sit in the motorcars to leave for Dharmasala. About 11:30 Ashraf Khan, the City Police Inspector informed Plomer that a big mob had gathered and it was moving towards the deputy commissioner's bungalow to demand the release of their leaders.⁴² Plomer informed Irving of the new situation and himself mounted a horse to take policemen and go to secure the railway bridge in order to restrict the entry of the mob in the civil lines.⁴³ At about 12 p.m. the news came that the crowd was rushing towards the railway station and the civil lines.⁴⁴ When Plomer⁴⁵ reached the spot he found that the crowd was angry and shouting abuses as well. But till then they had not taken to violent methods. It was only after the police tried to push them back that they gathered stones and started to throw them on the police guard.⁴⁶ At this point Plomer arrived and found the crowd hostile and as the police was insufficient to handle such a big angry mob he called for military. Here the mob was first stopped by Plomer and then they were fired upon by the police. But the crowd gathered again with *lathis* this time and moving the cavalry aside rushed forward towards civil station where an armed police picket under Plomer stopped them again.⁴⁷ The deputy commissioner joined him soon and was welcomed with sticks and stones by the mob. Meanwhile two members of the bar Maqbool Mahmood and Gurdial Singh Salaria tried to stop people from resorting to violence.⁴⁸ For this Salaria was given a horse by Plomer so that the crowd would be able to hear him but to no use, as the people were angry and out of control. The police had to open fire once again and this time managed to disperse them.⁴⁹

However, even with all the efforts of the police it could not totally succeed in restoring order at Amritsar and the attacks on the government

buildings and servants continued. In order to discuss their options official consultations were held in the evening of April 12 that the railway station, with the police officers of Amritsar present. They reported that the rioters had taken control of the city and that the police were besieged in their stations and were unable to patrol the streets. Feeling helpless Irving rang Lahore asking for military to take control.⁵⁰

In Lahore public meetings had started after Gandhi's appeal for the boycott of the Rowlatt Bills. These meetings were organized from the month of February and all of them were anti-government. Here also the police were keeping a watch on the nature of these assemblies. The meetings held on February 4th, March 9th and April 6th all were attended by the police reporters. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, Punjab Criminal Investigation Department Khan Sahib Sheikh Abdul Aziz in his evidence before the *Disorders Inquiry Committee* told that by the end of March, he was sure that something big was going to happen and he had informed about it to his superiors.⁵¹

In an attempt to discourage these meetings, the Senior Superintendent of Police Lahore, E.P. Broadway issued a notification on April 3rd asking the organizers to get license before a meeting. The notification also warned the public of the consequences in case of defiance of the order.⁵² Still on the same day a large gathering was organized at 10 a.m. of thousands of people moving towards the Anarkali crying *Rowlatt Bills hai hai* and then they tried to enter the Mall. At this point a police officer with several mounted policemen came near King Edward Medical College and stopped the crowd before it entered the Mall.⁵³

On April 6th, the main *hartal* day, one large group was stopped by Broadway and the Deputy Commissioner Lahore, Fyson along with some fifty policemen at Nila Gumbaz Chowk, near Anarkali.⁵⁴ The Deputy Superintendent of Police, W.G. Clarke was also there on his horse. He tried to stop the people but the crowd won't listen to him.⁵⁵ Another group was stopped by the Deputy Inspector-General, D. Donald at Market Chowk.⁵⁶ But luckily despite many encounters with the crowd the police did not get alarmed nor was the crowd infuriated to the extent that the authorities had to open fire.⁵⁷

The trouble in Lahore began in the afternoon of April 10th with the arrival of the news of Gandhi's arrest and Amritsar disorders. At this an emergency meeting was called at the governor house under Michael O'Dwyer attended by the Deputy Commissioner Fyson, Superintendent of Police, Broadway and the Deputy Inspector-General of the Punjab CID, G.A. Cocks.⁵⁸ They discussed the strategy to be taken when at

about 6 p.m. they received the news that a mob of 15,000 was moving towards the Mall. There the military on guard diverted them to the Lawrence statue where a minor police force under two Indian police officers managed to stop them for a while. But the crowd started to move forward and tried to grab muskets from the police constables.⁵⁹ It was feared that the crowd would attack the civil station where thousands of Europeans were residing. The governor perceived that the police was unable to control the crowd and therefore he called for the military. Broadway and Fyson were asked by the governor to hold the mob off the civil station as long as possible. The police was armed with buck shots and so they were asked to aim and shoot if they considered it necessary.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Fyson and Cocks went to meet the crowd while Broadway went to get police reinforcements. Fyson tried to stop them but the crowd was not in a mood to listen to him. As the police was short in number and unable to restrict the crowd's movement, the two officers decided to order fire.⁶¹ The mob as a reaction began to throw stones and bricks, aiming to hit back the policemen shooting at them. Once again order to shoot was announced by the deputy commissioner and this time the firing succeeded in dispersing the crowd with nineteen casualties including one fatal.⁶² The same evening another mob showed itself at Anarkali in the presence of Fyson and Broadway who after their attempt of asking them to quit the place were stoned by the people. The police started shooting and this time a man was shot dead and some four to five men received injuries.⁶³ When this was happening at Anarkali a similar situation occurred at the Dabbi Bazar. There a police force under Assistant Superintendent of Police de Gale was faced with a big crowd carrying sticks to attack the police. Military arrived on the spot and dispersed the crowd at the Circular Road. It later retreated once police pickets were established on sensitive locations. Later in the evening when the officials of the district administration met at the government house, the city inspector of the area submitted his report informing that despite all efforts of the police the rebels had established a *dandafauj* and the situation was extremely dangerous.⁶⁴ The same night the district authorities decided that the police should evacuate the city as it was no longer safe for them to stay.

During this time the control remained in the hands of the civil authorities represented by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Broadway and the Deputy Commissioner Fyson. Later the IG Punjab Police, Stewart also visited and spent hours with the civil administration at Lahore planning to bring everything in order again.⁶⁵

Throughout the day and night of April 11th the Lahore city remained in the control of the mob. On April 12th Lieutenant Colonel Frank Johnson arrived and marched in the city with his force. The superintendent of police was with him with his 160-armed policemen. Police pickets of twenty-five men each were then stationed on important places specially the government buildings.⁶⁶ At this time a grand meeting was going on inside the Badshahi Mosque.⁶⁷ The people came out when they came to know of the arrival of the civil and military forces. The *dandafauj* and many other men packed the roads between the mosque and the Hira Mandi. The forces tried to clear the area but when they refused to leave four police constables were ordered to fire by Fyson. The shooting of eight buck-shots by the police killed one man and wounded some twenty-eight people.⁶⁸ The next two days spent with almost a complete lock down in the city with constant attacks on the government property and on the 15th martial law was declared and the next day police started to make arrests.⁶⁹

Almost the same reaction was made by the people at Kasur when the news of the shootings at Amritsar and Lahore reached this area. The people started to gather and set to destroy public buildings and cut the telegraph wires. At one such instance one big mob moved towards the *Munsif's* Court and set it on fire. A Sub-Inspector Bawa Kharak Singh was there with a limited staff of three head constables and fourteen foot-constables. The police was short of ammunition, with only nine rifles at the station. Sensing their weakness the police decided not to take offensive action and tried to scare the crowd by shooting twice in the air instead.⁷⁰ The trick worked as the sub-inspector succeeded in saving the treasury and the *tahsil* from the looters and kept them at bay from further destruction.⁷¹ By this time the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Khan Sahib Ahmad Khan arrived with an armed backup.⁷² The force opened fire for five to ten minutes and killed four men and injured a few. After the shooting the crowd dispersed and the police started to make arrests and arrested ninety-two men.⁷³

The next city that had similar incidences was Gujranwala. Here the disturbances started on the same day as in Amritsar. By 10 a.m. the shops were closed down and the people gathered to set a railway bridge, Katchion fire. The police under their Superintendent named Heron reached the spot and warned the crowd to disperse or else get shot. Meanwhile Chaudhary Ghulam Rasul, the Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived with more force. The mob however, continued to proceed and tried to seize Heron who started to shoot them with his revolver. His policemen

also shot buck-shots and managed to hurt a few men.⁷⁴ He then sent special telegrams to Lahore and Sialkot for military assistance. Later the news arrived that mobs were gathering to attack *tahsil*, jail, *kutcheri*, treasury and the civil bungalows. The superintendent and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, J.B. Nevill went to deal with them. But the mob had already set the civil bungalow, *kutcheri* and *tahsil* on fire. At that time the police reinforcements arrived and the local police took action by opening fire at various places to disperse the crowds. At the same time air planes reached Gujranwala from Lahore and bombed the city and the disorder ceased.⁷⁵

For the government of the Punjab, all in all the performance of the police remained satisfactory and the entire force worked with extreme loyalty to the government.⁷⁶ Both in Lahore and Kasur the mob called out to the police to take their side but the police refrained from it. No plan of the Punjabi leaders came on the front for corrupting the police force as they were aware that the police in the Punjab was "too staunch".⁷⁷

Assistance to the Martial Law Administration

When the situation in various districts of the Punjab got out of control of the civil authorities, military was called and in certain districts martial law was implemented. The military came and took over the affairs but the Punjab Police was not relieved. They helped the martial law authorities in things like dispersing crowds and making arrests and investigations. In Lahore, for instance, the military forces under Colonel Frank Johnson visited the city on April 12th. The officers moved in the form of a procession consisted of military and police. When they arrived near Hira Mandi they came to clash with a crowd, which mostly consisted of the *dandafauj*. The procession was stoned and hit the police guard which was walking on the front on the suggestion of Broadway, the Superintendent of Police. The forces got scared of the stoning and the superintendent ordered his men to open fire.⁷⁸ In this firing two men were killed and some eight to nine were injured.⁷⁹

At Amritsar the military had reached before the arrival of General Dyer who joined later on April 11th. The next day he gathered his force and to show his power he decided to take a tour of the city.⁸⁰ In this march the police force of Amritsar accompanied him. During the visit he met the City Inspector Muhammad Ashraf Khan and asked him to provide a list of the ringleaders involved in the disturbances. The inspector instantly provided a list of a dozen men who were ordered to be arrested

instantly by the general.⁸¹ After the tour Dyer decided to issue a proclamation that forbade all meetings in the city of Amritsar and the police was given the task of the distribution of the proclamation.⁸²

On the morning of April 13th, the general took another procession to impress the public by showing off his authority. Once again, his strength included a large number of policemen including the district and deputy superintendents of police, Rehill and Plomer. The city inspector of Amritsar was walking in the front row along with a sub-inspector of the Punjab CID named Ubaidullah. They were instructing the drummer and the announcer to read out loud the proclamation issued a day earlier.⁸³ It was announced that all public meetings were banned and in case of any defiance the authorities would take extreme action.⁸⁴ During this trip the police detectives kept on informing about the situation in the city and by 12:40 p.m. General Dyer knew that a meeting was going to be held in the afternoon.⁸⁵

At about 4 p.m. Rehill came to see the general and told him that thousands of men have gathered in the ground of Jallianwala Bagh already and more people were expected to join.⁸⁶ Without losing any time Dyer took his military and his armoured cars and reached the spot. The police officers Rehill and Plomer were also asked to come along to the Bagh.⁸⁷ The rest of the story is well known that for ten minutes the army fired upon the unarmed Indians and hundreds of them were killed.⁸⁸ It is not known if the two police officers were with the general in his decision to open fire on the unarmed Punjabis. But they did not stop him from firing or try to convince him not to go for this action. The two leading police officers gave excuses for their non-interference in the firing before the *Disorders Inquiry Committee*. Plomer, the deputy superintendent claimed that although he was with the company but he was far behind and by the time he entered the Bagh the firing was already over.⁸⁹ The District Superintendent Rehill declared that he was even later as he did not witness the firing at all.⁹⁰

After the suppression of the disorders police were assigned the task of making inquiries about the underlying scheme of the Punjab Disturbances and to present cases in the military tribunals. For this purpose, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Eastern Range, L.L. Tomkins was called on special duty at Lahore on April 16th.⁹¹ He was to work with the DIG CID, Cocks. A CID staff was provided to Tomkins to help in his investigations. In this connection the police of the districts and the CID agents worked side by side.⁹² Meanwhile the government made two special commissions under three judges each to try the cases

sent by Tomkins and his team. The IG Punjab Police provided a special court inspector and a special court sub-inspector to each of these courts for their smooth working. As the burden on these courts increased because of a large number of cases a third and later a fourth court was created and more inspectors were provided to these courts.⁹³

As for the cases presented before the martial law tribunals were concerned, it can feasibly be said that without the assistance of the Punjab Police and the Criminal Investigation Department the investigations would not have been possible. According to the Punjab District Reports, CID arrested 858 men and presented 115 cases before the courts while the districts police made 897 arrests and presented 118 cases.⁹⁴ The police work in this regard was appreciated in the police administration report of 1919. It declared that during the months of disturbances the small staff of police remained busy keeping the authorities informed of the happenings. Later the entire staff, both of political and crime branches were busy in surveillance of the agitators and investigating cases.⁹⁵ Tomkins in his report mentioned that of all the cases that were assigned to the police for investigations only three reports were sent back to the investigation staff for defects or insufficient evidence, the rest of them were approved.⁹⁶ The police also recovered huge amounts as compensation from the public for the damages to the government property under the martial law.⁹⁷

Protection of Peoples' Lives and Properties (Success & Failure)

By definition the supreme obligation of the police in any country is the protection of the lives and properties of people from the unlawful activities. Although the Punjab Police is accused of failing to fulfill this obligation on many occasions there were still instances where it did perform well and managed not only to save the lives of the people but also served in rescuing cities from further destruction. For instance, the police at the Amritsar city kotwali saved two bankers of the Chartered Bank, A. Ross and J.W. Thomson. The bank was under attack when Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived with his twenty-five policemen and stopped the people from doing further harm to the building and rescued the two men hidden inside.⁹⁸ The two bankers were taken out and sent to the kotwali where they remained safe under police protection for hours after which reinforcements arrived under Plomer and the two bankers were sent to the Fort.⁹⁹ Similarly, P.E. Jarman, the municipal engineer was in his office when the crowd

violently attacked the post office located close to where he was and then they came to attack him but the police arrived and he was saved and was also sent to the kotwali for safety.¹⁰⁰

In a similar incident a police Inspector William Alexander Marshall was on the police lines level crossing when he heard that a mob had set fire to the Christian Church and had attacked Normal School of Girls. He had a small force of twenty-five constables of which he left half to guard the lines and took the rest towards the spot of attack. He succeeded to make the crowd run, extinguished fire and rescued four ladies trapped inside the school building.¹⁰¹

The police also saved a female doctor Mrs. Easdon who worked in the Zanana hospital at Amritsar. In the middle of the disturbances a group of Indians arrived at the hospital and demanded to see her because they wanted to kill her. A female sub-assistant surgeon at the hospital saved her life at that time by hiding her. The attackers searched the entire hospital for her but failed to find her and left dismayed. Once they were gone, she was given an Indian *burka* and Indian pajamas by a loyal *chaprasi* and made to escape from the back door of the hospital. She was then sent to the house of Mohammad Sharif, a sub-inspector of police who gave her asylum and later moved her to safety.¹⁰²

At Kasur in the Lahore District a couple with children was also protected by the police. A train from Ferozpur was about to arrive on the railway station on the morning of April 12th when it was stopped outside the station and an angry mob with *lathis* started to attack it. The mob found two English men on the train and they killed both.¹⁰³ The train carried an English couple, Sherbournes and their three children as well. With a little help they managed to escape from the train and reached a village where they were taken to a hamlet from where the Deputy Superintendent of Police Khan Sahib Ahmed Khan took them to his own residence.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile the same officer was informed that the people intended to attack the mission school with ladies and fifty female students inside. He reached there just in time to save them all. The ladies and the girls were brought to the house of the deputy superintendent where they remained hidden until they were moved to safety.¹⁰⁵

A severe unrest was also contained in Gujranwala by the police when the people there attacked the residential quarters of foreigners. The District Superintendent of Police Heron took prompt action and provided security to the American missionaries who were safely sent to Sialkot while the English people were given refuge in the treasury.¹⁰⁶ He also stationed a police guard at the treasury where nine women and

children were hiding to escape attack from the local public.¹⁰⁷ In Gujranwala there were many incidents of setting railway bridges on fire and Heron and Nevill, the Assistant Superintendent reached the spot in every case and put out the fires.¹⁰⁸

The unrest also brought with it cases of plunder and the police attempted to cease them. For instance, in Tarn Taran on April 12th a gang of rioters attacked the treasury in an attempt to loot it. Hearing this the City Inspector Chaudhary Aziz-ud-Din Ahmad went with his thirteen men out of a total force of thirty, the rest of which was left behind to guard the *tashil* and the police station. When the force reached on the spot the inspector fired in the air. The crowd thought that the military had arrived and so they scattered. A few of them tried to counter the police but they remained unsuccessful.¹⁰⁹

There is no denying the fact that there were many instances when the police did not perform its duty and failed not only to save the lives of the people but also lacked the action that it was expected to perform during the disturbances. In his evidence before the *Inquiry Committee* the Deputy Superintendent Abdul Aziz admitted that for many days seditious posters had appeared in Lahore arousing the public to get rebellious. Many of these posters were removed by the police but it failed to discover the people behind them.¹¹⁰ Had these men were arrested before hand the situation might have been different. Also the police informers had been visiting seditious meetings and making reports for days before the actual riots began, even then, the police and the government did not take any precautionary measure to avoid any unpleasant occurrence.

The District Reports of the Punjab on the disturbances highlighted many cases of police failure during the trouble. For instance, in the Gujarat District the Head Constable Sundar Singh, in-charge of the Malakwal out-post failed to report important events to the authorities on time and the damage prolonged.¹¹¹ In another case a Sub-Inspector Jalaluddin did not order his force to fire on the mob attacking the Gujranwala railway station as a consequence the rioters managed to inflict severe damage.¹¹² Randhir Singh, the Circle Inspector of Hafizabad did not check the attacks on the railways. He also did not take any action against the attackers and they continued to attempt and destroy the railway tracks.¹¹³ Also Kartar Singh, the Circle Inspector of Khangah Dogran did not take any initiative to stop the Sikh villagers from burning the Maman Station on the night of April 15th. In another case the Sub-Inspector Abdul Ghani left his Sangla Police Station for the investigation

of a petty case elsewhere in his jurisdiction at the time of severe disturbance. In his absence, there were insufficient personnel available to take action and stop the attackers.¹¹⁴

However, the most notorious of the police failures is considered to be of the police at Amritsar and more particularly the one stationed at the city kotwali. In the evidence before the *Disorders Inquiry Committee* Farquhar, the Deputy IG of Punjab Police, Central Range, confessed that the police arrangements at the city kotwali were sufficient enough to contain the disturbance. As on April 10th there were nearly a hundred-armed policemen at the kotwali and a hundred more unarmed spread in the city. He admitted that the police was afraid and that became the cause of its failure in taking initiative.¹¹⁵ Also when Muhammad Ashraf Khan, the City Inspector at the kotwali was asked by the *Disorders Inquiry Committee* the reason of his inactivity at the time when the Europeans were being murdered. He replied that in his twenty-seven years of service he had to shoot only once on the dacoits and had no experience of handling riots.¹¹⁶ This shows the extent of inexperience with which the Punjab Police suffered in 1919. Even then there was no excuse for police for the tragic incidents that occurred on April 10th in Amritsar.

The main street of Amritsar which was the center of all business ran from Hall Gate and moved in straight line to two major blocks. One of these blocks contained Town Hall, Municipal Offices and Post Office while the opposite block had the kotwali. The banks that got hit by the mobs were also in the same area. When the riots started there were two officers at the kotwali, the Deputy Superintendent Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan and the City Inspector Ashraf Khan.¹¹⁷ During the course of disorders on April 10th all the major buildings that got burnt or attacked by the insurgents including, Chartered Bank, National Bank and Town Hall, were located only few yards away from the kotwali yet the police either didn't come or came too late and five Europeans were killed. The emotional crowd destroyed the National Bank and murdered its manager Stuart and the accountant named Scott. They also attacked the Alliance Bank and killed its manager.¹¹⁸ They also succeeded in killing Sergeant Roland, the expert electrician of the garrison and Robbins, the railway guard.¹¹⁹

Intelligence regarding the plans of the agitators did not reach the police and the members of the CID. The fifteen or sixteen detectives assigned the task to report to the kotwali about the happenings in the city did not report at all. Khan Sahib admitted in front of the inquiry committee that he did not get a single report from any of the police detectives.¹²⁰

The disturbances spread rapidly and many quarters accused the police for failing to contain the situation in time. There indeed were occasions when the Punjab Police did not perform well but one reason should not be denied that the police in most of the cases was insufficient in number to cope with the situation. The *Police Administration Report of the Punjab* for the year 1919 shows that there was an extreme lack of police force in the province and it became very difficult for it to handle the growing number of cases. The Commissioner of Jullundur Division, Colonel Burlton had also written to the IG Police regarding the same issue. He had mentioned that the police work had increased a lot everywhere. And it was time that the Punjab Government realized that the same staff was unable to handle the situations it used to do earlier.¹²¹ The *Hunter Commission* also supported this position when it stated that the shortage of police made it very hard for men to contain the unrest.¹²²

The same viewpoint was found in the district reports of the deputy commissioners of the Punjab. All reports mentioned that at various places the police were short numbered and therefore military help was sought. For instance, the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore declared that it was obvious that the police was inadequate and there were practically no police reserves to handle the situation on April 6th and so the military aid was asked for.¹²³ Similarly the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala in his message to Lahore during the disturbances asked for military assistance on the plea that the police were limited and were unable handle the protests and angry mobs.¹²⁴

In Kasur the condition of the regular police was the same and found it extremely difficult to stop the running crowds. Because of this very reason when the angry men attacked the train coming from Ferozepore the railway police fled from the scene. It was later known that the policemen on the station were very few and all of them were unarmed.¹²⁵ Because of the police backup that was sent to Lahore from Kasur there appeared shortage of force in Lahore itself. In order to cope up with the situation and to secure Lahore Civil Lines from the attackers, additional police was stationed there. For further assistance demobilized sepoy were requested to join the police for the restoration of peace.¹²⁶ Gujranwala was also facing extreme shortage of police when the *hartal* began there on April 14th. It can be understood by the statement of the Assistant Superintendent Nevill who declared that after placing guards on important places the police force was left with only fifty men to face the running and shouting mobs.¹²⁷ The scarcity of police was so severe at Lyallpur that in order to cope with the situation, respectable pensioners

and arms license holders were asked to join the police on emergency basis.¹²⁸ Therefore, it was not easy for the Punjab Police to cope with the extensive burden of the disorders and among many other reasons their deficiency in strength affected their performance and in turn led to be filled by the military.

Extortionist Attitude of the Police During Investigations

One major reason for which the Punjab Police became most notorious was making illegal and hasty arrests without proper evidence during the entire episode of troubles. It was also accused of making the arrested men torture in order to extract false confessions. For these actions the institution was severely criticized by all corners of India.

Right after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre a chain of arrests started. The people were captured and put behind bars where they stayed for days and in some cases for months.¹²⁹ They were handcuffed and put into lock-ups without being informed what they were accused of and no opportunity was allowed to them to see or consult their friends or families.¹³⁰ The Punjab Sub-Committee formed by the Indian National Congress in order to show its disregard for the findings of the *Disorders Inquiry Committee* and to find out the truth about the disturbances was full of incidents of police blackmailing and torture. The police made use of their torturous methods to find out the names and whereabouts of those who were involved in the disturbances. In these investigations members of all fields of life were questioned, threatened, arrested and tortured by the police irrespective of their position, gender and age.

In Amritsar, the hub of disturbances in the province, the police inquiries began after April 10th. In this connection the medical doctors of the vicinity were investigated. They were asked to provide the lists of wounded men they treated during the riots. When the doctors replied that they were unable to give such lists they were arrested for helping the rebels. Mrs. Neeli Benjamin, the Sub-Assistant Surgeon, for example, who saved Mrs. Easdon, was called to the kotwali twice where Plomer threatened her to be arrested unless of course she gave the names of the attackers.¹³¹ Dr. Kidar Nath Bhandari, the Senior Assistant Surgeon of the same hospital was also treated in the same manner. Plomer was there in his case again and witnessed the threats given to the doctor by his subordinates.¹³² Dr. Bhandari was kept in the kotwali where he remained for fifteen days despite the fact that he was sixty years old. At the kotwali he was harassed and humiliated by all means possible.¹³³

The inquiries enrolled the business class as well when a man named Seth Gul Mohammad who was a glassware merchant and a respectable man in Amritsar, was arrested by the police on April 20th and was taken to the kotwali. There the CID Inspector Jawahar Lal held him by his beard and asked him to give statement that Kitchlew and Satyapal instigated him to be a part of the *hartal* on April 6th because they were planning a conspiracy against the government.¹³⁴ When he refused to give this statement his hand was put under a leg of the cot and eight policemen sat on it. He was promised to be relieved only when he will show his willingness to give the required statement.¹³⁵

The same happened even to the most influential people of Amritsar like Satyapal. After his arrest and exile to Dharmasala he was kept like a captive. While he was restricted there a close watch was kept at his residence in Amritsar and all of his post was censored by the police. He was sent to Lahore Central Jail in cuffs and when he was presented in front of the martial law commission, he was shocked to hear the long list of accusations put upon him by the police that included murder, *dakaiti*, sedition, rebellion and war against the king.¹³⁶ His old and sick father was also arrested during police inquiries and was kept in the lock-up for five weeks.¹³⁷

A similar situation was faced by Maqbool Mahmood, a lawyer of the high court who endangered his own life by trying to help the government authorities in pacifying the angry crowds on April 10th. He was arrested by a sub-inspector and was taken to the police station. The sub-inspector told him that he would stay confined to the *thana* until he wrote a statement giving the names of those who killed the Europeans during the riots. Even though the police did not have any proof to declare him guilty he was kept in the lock up for days.¹³⁸

In another case on April 12th a group of people were coming back to the city after the funeral ceremony of those who died a day earlier. On their way back they were met by a company of army and police under the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Irving who stopped the group and asked one man named Somdatt if he was Ratto or Bugga?¹³⁹ When Somdatt denied that he was neither of the two, he and his companions were arrested and taken to the kotwali. There Plomer insolently treated all of them. They were shouted at every time they denied knowing the two men. At one point, Plomer personally told Somdatt that the time of funerals was not over yet as soon they were all going to face the same fate.¹⁴⁰

The two men, about whom the police were investigating, were

arrested later on the same day. One was Baishnavadas, widely known as Bugga, whose house was attacked by a company made up of soldiers and police constables. His wife was shocked to see so many men enter her house without warning. She told them that she had no clue about the whereabouts of her husband upon which she was shouted upon by the policemen. All the other people in the house were put in chains and the wife was dragged outside by one of the soldiers. Meanwhile Bugga arrived and found his family in distress, offered himself for arrest. His wife was let go but all the men of the house along with Bugga were taken to the kotwali. The same fortune befell the wife of Ratan Chand nick named Ratto.¹⁴¹

The torturous attitude of the police can further be comprehended with the incidents related to the *salaaming* order issued by the Martial Law authority in Amritsar. According to this order all Indians who saw General Dyer or any other European officer, had to pay respect and if they failed to satisfy the officer they were arrested and were physically abused. A man named Lala Har Gopal Khanna related that once on April 18th he came across Dyer and Plomer walking with a group of policemen. As he was aware of the consequences, he paid his respect to the officer twice but still failed to impress the general who asked him to visit his headquarters the next day. The next day when Khanna went there, he was made to sit in the sun for a long time after which he was given an excruciating training by the policemen to salute.¹⁴² Mian Firoz-ud-Din, an honorary magistrate declared in front of the Congress committee that the people were whipped by the police if they did not stand and greet Dyer and Plomer on their visits to the city.¹⁴³

The same treatment was meted out to the respectable men of Lahore. Manohar Lal, a trustee of *The Tribune* was arrested on April 18th 1919. There was no warrant nor was he apprised of any kind of charge under which he had been arrested.¹⁴⁴ During his stay in jail, his house was searched and then locked by the police, forcing his sick wife and children to take refuge in the servants quarters.¹⁴⁵ Other leaders in Lahore, including Rambhuj Dutt, Lala Harkishan Lal and Duni Chand had been arrested on April 14th under the Defence of India Rules on the charge that they had waged war against the King by organizing *hartals*.¹⁴⁶ All these men had tried to help the authorities at various points by making conciliations between the demonstrators and the armed forces.

In Gujranwala after the bombing by the planes on April 15th, the deputy commissioner took a tour of the city with a police and military escort. This team went to the houses of more than twenty respectable

men and arrested them. These men were made to march through the streets under police supervision and then taken to the railway station and put into an open coal truck under a military guard.¹⁴⁷ Similar arrests were made in other cities of the Punjab like Kasur and Hafizabad. Large numbers of people were arrested on the charge of rioting. Many were made to stand and walk in the sun, kept in the lock-ups for days and then released because of the lack of evidence. In his evidence before the *Inquiry Committee*, I.W. Bowring, the Superintendent of Police, Punjab CID proclaimed that the arrested men were kept in jails for weeks without giving any reason. And most of them were set free after two or three weeks without sending them for trial.¹⁴⁸ There were also rumors that police were taking bribes from the public to spare them from arrests. Accusations of extortions by police seeking to extract money from the villagers during investigations were also commonly heard. The public claimed that the police wrested money from them, threatening to put them behind the bars on account of false charges if they refuse to pay up.¹⁴⁹

However, the police department denied these allegations and declared that only two cases of bribery came into the notice of the police authorities. In one case, a constable was released due to lack of evidence. In the other, a head constable was arrested, found guilty and therefore penalized. The department further claimed that the cases of bribery were rare since the investigations were made under the direct supervision of the gazetted police officers. Therefore, it was hardly likely that all the allegations put by the public were true.¹⁵⁰

Conclusion

The Police of British Punjab was considered by the nationalist leaders as the leading element of administration to sustain the British control in the province. For the public it was simply an instrument of oppression. The handling of the 1919 Disturbances by the police in the Punjab turned out to be one of the leading examples in this regard. The force was criticized for serving as a tool in the hands of the Punjab Government for curbing the opponents of the régime vengefully in the name of containing the disturbers of peace. It was also blamed for being torturous during the investigations once the disorder was curtailed. These charges seem justified when one observes the ways in which the police behaved with the people during and after the disturbances. The fact is that the police did manage to assist in curbing disorder in the disturbed

districts that was supposed to be its primary duty alongside detection and prevention of crime. It stopped the rushing crowds and forced and hurt the unarmed Indians with batons and firearms. However, these incidents are limited in scope as the Punjab Police performed its duties of protection well. In many cases it succeeded in fulfilling its duty of saving the lives and properties of the public. Therefore, the role of the Punjab Police was not entirely of a tool of the colonial control, nor was it entirely a brutal instrument to hunt mostly unarmed protesters. While helping the military authorities during troubled times, the Punjab Police also served as a protectionist force for the citizens.

Notes and References

1. These acts were introduced to replace Defence of India Act (1915) after the end of World War I. They made it legal for certain cases of political nature to be tried without jury and the confinement of people without trial.
2. The places where martial law was implemented were Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.
3. *The Disorders Inquiry Committee Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Vol, VI, Punjab Government and Sir Umar Hayat Khan V/25/262/8*, NDW, Accession No. 2856, p. 72.
4. This Act was an emergency criminal law made to be implemented in India during World War I in 1915. It was aimed to curtail the activities of nationalist movements in the sub-continent.
5. Satya M. Rai, *Punjabi Heroic Tradition 1900-1947* (Patiala: Punjabi University, n.d.), p. 109.
6. S.C. Mittal, *Freedom Movement in Punjab (1905-1929)* (Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1977), p. 114.
7. *Sedition Committee 1918 Report*, <http://archives.org> (accessed March 15, 2019), p. 199.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207
10. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
11. Nick Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre The Untold Story of One Fateful Day* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2011), p. 41.
12. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 1, 1919.
13. *The Disorders Inquiry Committee Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Vol, V, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Lyallpur and Punjab Provincial V/25/262/7*, NDW, Accession No. 2855, p. 197.
14. Syed Nur Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 9.
15. Anandswarup Gupta, *The Police In British India 1861-1947* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1979), p. 361, and *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, VI,

- p. 101. The government made attempts to spread awareness about the Rowlatt Bills among the public. For this purpose, the Punjab government published thousands of copies to be distributed free. Michael O'Dwyer, *India As I Knew It* (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1925), p. 269.
16. Percival Griffiths, *To Guard my People: The History of the Indian Police* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 243, Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, 32, and Alfred Nundy, *Indian Unrest, 1919-1920* (Dehra Dun: The Garhwali Press, 1921), p. 178.
 17. Ian Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer* (Edinburg and London: William Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1929), p. 133.
 18. Curry, *The Indian Police* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., n.d.), p. 242, and S. R. Bakshi, *Indian National Movement and the Raj* Vol, I (New Delhi: Criterion Publications, 1989), p. 291.
 19. Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 32.
 20. During the war the majority of the Punjabi landlords and their subjects decided to side with the new masters. As a reward they were granted lofty titles and large tracts of land as *jagirs*. The province was further gifted with an extensive network of irrigation in the form of canals and water ways that made its irrigation system one of the best in the world. Ishtiaq Ahmad, *The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy Through Secret British Reports and First Persons Accounts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 28.
 21. Ganda Singh, *The Panjab Past and Present*, Vol. VIII Part I (Patiala: Patiala Publication Bureau, n.d.), p. 215.
 22. Other objectives included arming Indian army, destruction of railways and telegraphs and the looting of government treasuries for financing the campaign. Sarfaraz Khawaja, *Sikhs of the Punjab A Study of Confrontation and Political Mobilization* (Islamabad: Modern Book Depot, 1985), p. 130.
 23. Kuldeep Singh, "Ghadar Rebellion in the Punjab and Lahore Conspiracy Case 1914-1915" *The Punjab Past and Present The Ghadr Movement (Special Issue)*, ed. Ganda Singh (Patiala: Patiala Publication Bureau, 2013), p. 161.
 24. Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 63.
 25. A Hameed, *Amritsar ki Yaden* (Lahore: Muhammad Jami-un-Nabi, 1991), p. 70, and Ikram Ali Malik. *The History of the Punjab 1799-1947* (Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House, 1983), p. 401.
 26. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, VI, p. 375.
 27. M.K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Eng trans. Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, n.d.), p. 513.
 28. Satyapal was a Hindu medical doctor, an assistant surgeon and a resident of Amritsar city. During the World War I he had served in the Indian medical service. He was affiliated to the Punjab Provincial Congress and like Gandhi he was known to be a great supporter of non-violence. He came into prominence during the opposition to the Rowlatt Bills.
 29. Saifuddin Kichlew was a Kashmiri Muhammadan living in Amritsar and a PhD degree holder. He was also a famous legal practitioner and a great supporter of the Congress and Home Rule. Like Dr. Satyapal he also became popular during the defiance against the Rowlatt Bills.

30. H.A. Williamson, *A Note on the Subversive Movement (Other than Terrorist) in India*, Special Branch, Lahore, p. 9.
31. *Ibid.* p. 13.
32. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 19, 1919.
33. Punjab Police Abstracts of Intelligence for the week ending March 15, 1919, Special Branch, Lahore, p. 82.
34. Punjab Police Abstracts of Intelligence for the week ending April 12, 1919, Special Branch, Lahore, pp. 138-139
35. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, pp. 139.
36. *Memorandum on the Disturbances in the Punjab April 1919* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997), p. 4. Charles S. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1939), p. 39.
37. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, VI, p. 375.
38. Alfred Draper, *Amritsar The Massacre that Ended the Raj* (London: Cassell, 1981), p. 54.
39. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 15, 1919. In order to deal with the expected riots in the city seventy-five armed policemen under an Indian Deputy Superintendent was posted at the Kotwali already. Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, *Panjab Under the British Rule (1849-1947)*. Vol. II (Lahore. Mustafa Waheed, n.d.), p. 69.
40. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, 41
41. Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 70, and Hameed, *Amritsar kiYaden*, 71.
42. Mittal, *Freedom Movement in Punjab*, p, 120.
43. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, pp. 144-145.
44. Punjab CID Inspector, LalaJiwanLal was also in that crowd as he described the furious crowd in front of Hunter Committee.
45. For his services in terms of saving Civil Lines on April 10th Mr. Plomer was awarded King's Police Medal. *Civil and Military Gazette*, January 7, 1920.
46. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, p. 43.
47. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 13, 1919. But the force with Mr. Plomer was very small, only twenty-four foot and seven mounted policemen. *Ibid.* November 16, 1919.
48. *Punjab Disturbances 1919-1920 Volume One. Indian Perspective Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress to look into Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, (New Delhi: Deep Publications, 1976),p. 48.
49. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 63.
50. Ahmad, *From Martial Law*, p. 13.
51. *The Disorders Inquiry Committee Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, Lahore and Kasur V/25/262/7, NDW, Accession No. 2855, p. 102.
52. Earlier the editor of *Partap* was arrested under the Defecne of India Rules for its issues of April 2nd and 3rd on the charge of instigating and exaggerating the happenings in India with regard to Rowlatt Bills agitation. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 40.
53. H.N. Mitra, ed. *Punjab Unrest Before and After* (Calcutta: N.N. Mitter, 1920), p. 77.

54. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, vol, IV, p. 32.
55. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 28, 1919.
56. *District and Miscellaneous Reports on the Punjab Disturbances April 1919*, p.102.
57. The newspapers like *Desh*, *Paisa Akhbar* and *Aftab* admitted that the police and the civil authorities worked wisely and did not get engaged in any conflict with the public even though the members of the secret police were hissed and taunted by the people in a meeting at Bradlaugh Hall. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 41.
58. Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 91.
59. Griffiths, *To Guard my People*, p. 244.
60. O'Dwyer, *India As I Knew It*, p. 275.
61. Mitra, *Punjab Unrest Before and After*, p. 124.
62. Griffiths, *To Guard my People*, p. 244.
63. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 102.
64. Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law*, p. 12.
65. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 12, 1919.
66. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, p. 36.
67. During his speech, Maulvi Abdul Hai spotted Chaudhri Ali Gauhar, an Inspector of the CID. Maulvi. Hai started to abuse the police and the CID and declared that the progress of India was restricted by the activities of the men of these institutions. He further asserted that it was the constant surveillance of the CID agents that the Indians were unable to achieve their aims. After this he pointed out the CID inspector to the public who in turn fell upon him with sticks and he had to flee from there to take refuge in his house in order to save his life. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 47.
68. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 103, and Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 97.
69. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 104.
70. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 58.
71. He was rewarded with a King's Police Medal for his good work. *Civil and Military Gazette*, January 7, 1920.
72. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 123.
73. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, p. 137.
74. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 19, and Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 112.
75. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 20.
76. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 98.
77. *Ibid.*,p. 111.
78. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, p. 36.
79. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 26, 1919.
80. *Ibid.*, November 21, 1919.
81. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 77, and Mitra, *Punjab Unrest Before and After*, p. 122.
82. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 21, 1919.
83. Kamlesh Mohan, *Militant Nationalism in the Punjab 1919-1935* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1985), p. 27, and *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 23, 1919.

84. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, p. 169.
85. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 82, and Mittal, *Freedom Movement in Punjab*, p. 127.
86. Mohan, *Militant Nationalism in the Punjab*, p. 28.
87. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, p. 174, and *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 21, 1919.
88. For killing hundreds and wounding thousands General Dyer was termed as a madman even by English papers. The Indian Government and the British Parliament also disapproved the action of the General. Nundy, *Indian Unrest*, p. 15.
89. *Punjab Disturbances 1919-1920 Volume Two. British Perspective: Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee 1919-1920 Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi and Bombay* (New Delhi: Deep Publications, 1976), p. 46.
90. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, p. 178.
91. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 369.
92. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol. V, p. 245.
93. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 370.
94. *Ibid.* p. 336.
95. *Report on Police Administration in the Punjab for the year 1919*, p. 15.
96. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, V, p. 245.
97. Gupta, *The Police In British India*, p. 364.
98. Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, p. 73.
99. *Punjab Disturbances 1919-1920 Volume Two*, pp. 35-36.
100. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 13, 1919.
101. For this commendable job Mr. Marshall was awarded King's Police Medal. *Civil and Military Gazette*, January 7, 1920.
102. *Report on the Punjab Disturbances April 1919* L/P.S/20/F205, NDW, Accession No. 6780, p. 37, and *Civil and Military Gazette*, June 6, 1919.
103. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 17, 1919.
104. *Punjab Disturbances 1919-1920 Volume Two*, pp. 64-65.
105. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, p. 135.
106. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 17, 1919.
107. *Ibid.* May 1, 1919.
108. *Punjab Disturbances 1919-1920 Volume Two*, p. 70.
109. *Civil and Military Gazette*, May 28, 1919. The Inspector was awarded King's Police Medal for it was primarily because of his personal valour that the crowd failed to overpower him and his force. But he kept his ground and not only succeeded in securing the three-lac amount of money in the Treasury but also saved the place from further destruction. *Ibid.* January 7, 1920.
110. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol. IV, p. 105.
111. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 337.
112. *Ibid.* p. 338.
113. *Ibid.* p. 337.
114. *Ibid.* p. 338.
115. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 19, 1919.
116. *Ibid.*
117. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, p. 151.

118. *Report on the Punjab Disturbances*, p. 36. and Griffiths, *To Guard my People*, p. 243
119. PindiDaas. *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law Congress Committee Report* (Lahore: Fiction House, 1996), p. 77.
120. *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 22, 1919.
121. *Report on Police Administration in the Punjab for the year 1919*, p. 8.
122. O'Dwyer, *India As I Knew It*, p. 287.
123. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 111.
124. Imran Ali Malik, *A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799-1947* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1970), p. 411.
125. *District and Miscellaneous Reports*, p. 119.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
127. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, V, p. 202.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
129. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, p. 99.
130. Bakshi, *Indian National Movement*, p. 313.
131. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, p. 262.
132. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 109.
133. Kapil Deva Malaviya. *Open Rebellion in the Punjab (with Special Reference to Amritsar)* (Amritsar, 1919), p. 63.
134. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, p. 267.
135. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 110.
136. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, 232-34.
137. *Ibid.* 239.
138. *Ibid.* p. 101.
139. They were the close associates of Kitchlew and Satyapal and accompanied the two men in all the meetings and processions.
140. Malaviya. *Open Rebellion in the Punjab*, pp. 31-33.
141. *Ibid.* pp. 34-35.
142. Draper, *Amritsar*, p. 103.
143. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, p. 97.
144. Malaviya. *Open Rebellion in the Punjab*, p. 319.
145. Daas, *Punjab May Pehla Martial Law*, p. 125.
146. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol. IV, p. 36.
147. Malaviya. *Open Rebellion in the Punjab*, p. 83.
148. *Disorders Inquiry Committee*, Vol, IV, p. 99.
149. *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 241.
150. *Memorandum on the Disturbances*, p. 15.